URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, 
PAST AND PRESENT

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Urban “redevelopment” has emerged, in recent years, as one of the key concerns of urban social science in both theoretical and empirical-based settings. This reflects a concomitant trend associated with urban studies more generally, toward specifying the economic, political, and cultural factors responsible for uneven metropolitan development. Indeed, even a causal look at our metropolitan areas reveals that they are composed of many different cities and spatial forms that divided according to different land uses as well as related to patterns of race and class. One city is reserved for the rich and affluent; another is composed of working-class and middle-class neighborhoods; other areas cater to commercial interests, entertainment, tourists, and consumers; and still others languish in chronic disinvestment and decay, reserved for the homeless, the poor, minorities, and the urban underclass. These contrasts are quite graphic, as anyone touring our metropolitan areas can attest, and represents an extreme crisis of inequality produced by the uneven nature of metropolitan development and growth. The city continues to provide the prime socio-spatial context within which economic and political elites and ordinary people construct and act out the processes of disinvestment, fiscal crisis, and inner city “renaissance.”

In recent years, scholars have begun to study redevelopment with an eye toward clarifying the links between macrostructural processes, specific urban redevelopment efforts, and locally lived realities. This review issue will therefore consider the significance of urban redevelopment as a focus for urban theory and urban research, outlining what such theoretical and methodological
contributions and changes may mean for the future of urban scholarship. The study of cities, urbanism, and urban change – redevelopment, disinvestment, and so on – has a rich tradition in urban scholarship. Europeans such as Marx and Engels, Weber, and Simmel devoted much thought to the importance of the city, for example, as a seat of the emerging capitalist economy, a site of political and economic power, and a force of cultural change that affects mental life. In the United States, the early Chicago School urban sociologists focused their empirical attention on the spatial distribution of people and organizations, the causes and consequences of neighborhood racial succession, and ethnic and racial group “adaptation” to the urban environment. Robert Park (1925), Ernst Burgess (1925), Lewis Wirth (1938), all commented on community structure and local institutions, often drawing analogies to biological systems. From these writings there emerged a theory of urban and neighborhood change as a “life-cycle” beginning with investment and growth and ending with inevitable decline. By the 1930s, social scientists around the nation were employing the insights, models, and analyses developed by the Chicago School to study cities, as well as influence public policy. Yet a lacuna of American urban scholarship in general, and the Chicago School in particular, was the lack of specificity in identifying the webs of interconnections between urban life and wider macro-level processes. Early urban sociologists, in short, were primarily concerned with the internal organization and dynamics of cities, while ignoring the larger macrostructures that linked urban change to extra-local processes.

In the early 1970s, several Marxist social scientists including Manuel Castells (1977), David Harvey (1973), and Henri Lefebvre (1991), among other scholars began to revise Karl Marx’s ideas to explain uneven metropolitan development, urban industrial decline, and other urban trends. Castells proposed that urban scholars focus on the collective consumption characteristic of urbanized nations and way in which political and economic conflicts within cities generate urban social movements for change. David Harvey, in contrast, argued that the central issue in making sense of cities was not collective consumption but the more basic Marxist concern with capital accumulation. Influenced by Lefebvre, Harvey (1973) argued that investment in land and real estate is an important means of accumulating wealth and a crucial activity that pushes the growth of cities in specific ways. Processes as diverse as urban disinvestment and decay, suburbanization, deindustrialization, urban renewal, and gentrification are part and parcel of the continuous reshaping of the built environment to create a more efficient arena for profit making. According to Harvey (1989), powerful real estate actors invest, disinvest, and reshape land-uses in a process of “creative destruction” that is continually accelerating, destroying communities and producing intense social conflicts and struggles over meanings and uses of urban
space. Despite their different emphases, the work of Marxists helped focus scholarly attention on the capitalist system of for-profit production generally, and class struggle and capital accumulation specifically, as analytical starting points for understanding the nature of urban redevelopment and disinvestment (for overviews, see Jaret, 1983; Tabb & Sawyers, 1984).

By the late 1970s and continuing into 1980s, a new critical approach to the study of cities and urban redevelopment had developed. Usually called the “critical political-economy” or “sociospatial approach,” this perspective emphasized several major dimensions of cities: (1) the importance of class and racial domination (and, more recently, gender) in shaping urban development; (2) the primary role of powerful economic actors, especially those in the real estate industry, in building and redeveloping cities; (3) the role of growth-assisted government actors in city development; (4) the importance of symbols, meanings, and culture to the shaping of cities; (5) attention to the global context of urban development (for overviews see Feagin, 1998; Gottdiener & Feagin, 1988; Hutchison, 2000; Savage & Ward, 1993; Smith, 1995). Gottdiener (1994) and Hutchison (2000) prefer the term “sociospatial” perspective to describe the critical political economy paradigm, a term that accents the society/space synergy, and emphasizes that cities are multifaceted expressions of local actions and macrostructural processes. They also use the term to distance themselves from older Marxist approaches of Gordon (1984), Dear and Scott (1981), and Storper and Walker (1983) and highlight the diversity of theory and method within the broad paradigm. Molotch (1999, 1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) prefer the term urban political economy and have developed their own “growth machine” theory to explain urban redevelopment. Other critical scholars have embraced a more eclectic and multi-perspectival focus in their empirical work, attempting to develop middle range variants of general theories as an expedient to moving toward constructive dialogue and common ground in the direction of synthesized theory building (see e.g. Smith, 1995; Orum, 1995; Squires, 1994; for an overview, see Gotham & Staples, 1996).

Despite ambitious theoretical and analytical contributions in critical urban scholarship, discussions of “redevelopment” have been slow to deal with the complex nature of the interrelationships that exist between the macro-micro, class/race/gender, the economic and cultural, and the dialectic of space and social, among others. Indeed, these relationships manifest themselves in urban settings making urban redevelopment an auspicious process fraught with many dilemmas, conflicts, and contradictions regarding the links between space, capital, and power. A number of edited collections on urban redevelopment have appeared in the 1980s and 1990s, including the work of Rosenthal (1980) and contributors on “urban revitalization” in the 1960s and 1970s, the work
of Squires (1989) and colleagues on “unequal partnerships,” Fainstein and Fainstein’s (1986) first and second editions on the political economy of urban redevelopment, Cumming’s (1988) edited volume on the role of business elites, Kearns and Philo’s (1993) collection of essays on culture and the “selling of cities,” Stone and Sander’s (1987) edited book on the “politics” of urban development, and King’s (1996) edited volume on transformations in “world cities.” As these collections show, the social context, strategies, and meaning of urban redevelopment have changed dramatically throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, areas such as law, transportation, housing, policy, and local financing devices are important mechanisms for promoting urban redevelopment and exacerbating urban disinvestment. In addition, conflicts over disinvestment and redevelopment reflect broader struggles over an array of social issues, for example, poverty, race, and schools, among others.

The contributors to this volume add to this growing literature but also tackle several unresolved issues and unanswered questions: What are the historical sources of continuity and variation in the structure, influence, and composition of public-private partnerships and related growth coalitions in U.S. cities? What impact have global level changes had on the transformation of cities into places of leisure and entertainment in the 1970s and later? How are these changes related to the dynamics of race, class, and gender? How have changes in federal funding and bureaucratic arrangements affected the content and process of local redevelopment measures? What ideologies, themes, symbols, and motifs undergird current and past redevelopment strategies? What forms of conflict, opposition, and collective mobilization have occurred in response to local redevelopment efforts? What new theories, methods, and data sources have proved more useful than others in helping scholars understand the causes and consequences of urban redevelopment?

It is the purpose of this volume to help clarify conceptual and theoretical issues, furnish relevant empirical data, and illuminate empirical relationships between the phenomenon of redevelopment and broader process of urban and global change. In the first section of this introduction, I present a broad history of urban redevelopment in the United States through the 1960s. Second, I discuss trends in urban redevelopment from the end of the 1960s through the end of the 1990s. In the final section, I consider some of the significant ways in which urban redevelopment has emerged as a key focal point of urban scholarship in general, and of urban sociology more specifically. As the contributors to the volume show, the factors that are responsible for urban redevelopment do not operate in a uniform way and there is a noticeably uneven pattern of urban redevelopment and disinvestment across cities. Questions about the full extent, meaning, significance, and empirical study of urban redevelopment remain a
source of much debate and controversy. While the contributors to this volume may not offer definitive answers, they do provide additional evidence for assessing the impact of urban redevelopment and present new ideas, models, and methods for future research.

**URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION THROUGH THE 1960S**

The economic and social circumstances of urban areas have stimulated calls for redevelopment and renewal since the Industrial Revolution transformed the economic base and spatial makeup of America cities during the second half of the nineteenth century. Industrialization not only brought about a fundamental transformation in the nature of work, but also systems of transportation, the structure and operations of city government, the experience of poverty, and the demographic movement of racial and ethnic groups on an unprecedented scale. Henry Mayhew, Charles Booth, and Lewis Mumford, among others, documented in graphic detail the pathological nature of uneven development characterizing urban growth under industrial capitalism in the United States. The erosion of subsistence production and the rise of mass production, the emergence of the factory system dominated by hierarchical lines of authority, urbanization of wage labor, and the gradual spatial separation of home from work were the hallmark of the industrialization during the late nineteenth century (Saunders, 1981; Taylor, 1993; Sugrue, 1996, pp. 88–92; Katz, 1986, chapter 6). During this time, attempts at redeveloping and planning the city were typically haphazard, uncoordinated, and chaotic. Indeed, early twentieth century planning schemes such as zoning laws, building codes, land-use ordinances, annexation drives, and subdivision regulations were attempts to segregate land-uses, class and ethnic groups, and other social activities to facilitate profitable investment and economic development (for an overview, see Sies & Silver, 1996). Economic and political elites and planners offered many blueprints for change, ranging from the utopian solutions proposed by advocates of the “garden city,” to the development of parks and recreational spaces by the City Beautiful movement (Wilson, 1989), to the class and racially homogeneous residential environments marketed by the emerging real estate industry (Gotham, 2000; Weiss, 1987).

By the 1930s, many American cities were experiencing increasing physical deterioration of their core neighborhoods and commercial districts, forced concentration of inner city blacks into crowded areas, and loss of population
and industry (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Silver, 1984; Mollenkopf, 1983; Teaford, 1990). The population of central cities essentially stopped growing after 1920 and the collapse of economy because of the Great Depression stimulated calls for federal and local governments to attack the problems of urban deterioration. In New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Atlanta, and many other cities, real estate elites and political officials recited the same litany of ills – dilapidated neighborhoods, eroding property values, declining revenues from commercial and industrial sites, snarled traffic, and increasingly “drab appearance” (for overviews, see Mohl, 1993; Teaford, 1990).

In several cities, the Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” provided federal grants to urban officials to revitalize their deteriorating cores. In Kansas City, the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Projects Administration (WPA) brought thousands of new jobs to the city and paid the construction of costs for several new downtown skyscrapers, a country courthouse, police station, a new City Hall, a municipal auditorium, and a new convention center and baseball stadium (Gotham, 2001; Reddig, 1947). In Detroit and New Orleans, federal funding through the WPA helped establish a nascent urban renewal program, a housing authority with the legal power to acquire and clear slum areas, and money to rebuild city parks (Darden, Jill, Thomas & Thomas, 1987; Mahoney, 1985). Yet New Deal federal programs and subsidies were insufficient in eradicating urban blight and facilitating large-scale urban redevelopment. By the early 1940s, local and national real estate elites openly called for federal and local government assistance in revitalizing downtown business districts and eliminating blighted areas (Gotham, 2000b; Weiss, 1987).

Beginning in the early 1930s, the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) took the lead in developing and lobbying for a national urban redevelopment policy. During this time, the NAREB devised a series of policy proposals that could facilitate public acquisition of land in blighted areas for clearance and resale to private builders (Davies, 1958, pp. 182–185). These proposals included state acts empowering municipalities to redevelop slum areas, close public-private coordination of urban land-use and control, long-term federal loans to cities at low interest rates, and generous tax subsidies and write-offs for local redevelopers. In 1939, the NAREB formed a research agency, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), to study and research the causes and consequences of urban blight and to identify the policy and financial tools needed to revitalize cities. The ULI undertook as its first major research project a study of real estate values in 221 cities (Urban Land Institute, 1940). During the next two years the ULI published case studies of Boston, Cincinnati, Detroit, Louisville, Milwaukee, New York, and Philadelphia, recommending a plan by
which cities could condemn land in the blighted areas near the CBD and then sell or lease the land to private developers for replanning and rebuilding (i.e. eminent domain) (Gotham, 2001). Government aid and subsidies, as the ULI maintained, would be necessary to revitalize the central city, eliminate slums, and maintain profitable land sales and real estate markets.

During this time, officials of the NAREB along with downtown business elites agreed that state action – through eminent domain and public subsidies for private revitalization – was necessary to counter the specter of urban blight and obsolescence. Yet a number of problems forestalled private efforts to harness the legal and financial power of the local state to undertake slum clearance. First, private interests proved incapable of acquiring land in large enough parcels to permit large-scale revitalization. Second, the most desirable inner city land sought by downtown businesses tended to be residential land-use. Hence, private business did not have the organizational capacity or legal right to acquire such properties. Financing also proved to be a major problem since few private firms and redevelopers possessed the huge cash reserve necessary to pay for clearance and revitalization (Davies, 1958, pp. 183–184). Thus, while real estate elites wholeheartedly supported public-private action for urban revitalization, the existing political structure in many local areas of the country did not possess the legal or fiscal capacity to undertake large-scale slum clearance and redevelopment during the 1930s and 1940s (Hirsch, 1993, pp. 87–88; Gelfand, 1975, pp. 151–156, 275–276; Hays, 1985, chapter 5; Kleniewski, 1984; Weiss, 1980; Wilson, 1966).

In many cities, public housing provided a partial answer to the problem of freeing inner city land for private redevelopment. The Housing Act of 1937 empowered local communities to create local housing authorities with the legal power of eminent domain to acquire privately-owned land for slum clearance and rehousing (McDonnell, 1957; Quercia & Galster, 1997, p. 537; Bauman, 1987, pp. 40–42). By the mid-1940s, a number of cities and states had passed legislation to enable local governments to designate, acquire, and clear “slum” areas and sell the land to private developers. Yet early on there were opposing views over whether public housing legislation was supposed to be legislation that authorized local housing authorities to build low-income housing or whether it was legislation to allow the clearing of land and the subsidization of the local redevelopment industry (Hoffman, 1996, p. 425; Marcuse, 1986; Jackson, 1985, chapter 12). Proponents of public housing, including progressive housing advocates, social workers, and union officials argued for the building of low-rent housing for working- and middle-class workers by the federal government (Bauman, 1987, 1981). On the other hand, real estate industry and home building officials rejected a strong federal role and embraced a privatist vision of slum
clearance with no government regulations on private redevelopment. Moreover, the NAREB and real estate elites attacked the view of public housing shared by labor unions, social workers, and housing activists as “creeping socialism” and opposed any federal building of low-income housing on the grounds that it would put the government in competition with private housing construction and real estate (Keith, 1973, pp. 30–38, 94–95; Bratt, 1986, pp. 336–337; Bauman, 1981, p. 8). The NAREB favored a trickle down model of housing distribution, where excess production of suburban housing would free up dwelling units at the lower end of the housing market for low-income families displaced by slum clearance (Davies, 1958, pp. 180–182; Gelfand, 1975, pp. 184–204; Checkoway, 1984).

The Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 appropriated the model of federal funding and local decision-making provided in the 1937 Housing Act and empowered localities to create urban redevelopment authorities to designate and clear “blighted” areas. Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 provided federal subsidies for property acquisition and slum clearance while requiring federal and local governments to finance one-to-two thirds of the site preparation. The Housing Act of 1954 changed the name of the program from “urban redevelopment” to “urban renewal” and required each city to submit a Workable Program detailing its plan of clearance, demolition, and redevelopment. The 1954 Act intended projects to be “predominantly residential” but in later years the federal government waived this requirement for projects that would benefit universities, hospitals, business parks, and industrially depressed districts (Barnekov, Boyle & Rich, 1989, pp. 38–39; Gelfand, 1975, pp. 151–156, 275–276; Hays, 1985, chapter 5; Kleniewski, 1984; Weiss, 1980; Wilson, 1966). While the stated goal of Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 was “To provide a decent home and suitable environment for every American family” urban leaders and real estate elites considered the Acts less as a “housing” program and more of urban “redevelopment” program (Gotham and Wright 2000). According to housing activist, Charles Abrams (1971, p. 244), “No sooner had the federal law [Housing Act of 1949] been enacted then two facts became plain: (1) there were no houses available for the slum-dwellers to be displaced from the sites; (2) these slum-dwellers were largely minorities to who housing in new areas was banned.”

Over the next two decades, local redevelopment authorities used the legal mechanisms and public subsidies of the urban renewal program to acquire residential and commercial land, clear the residents and buildings, and rebuild their aging downtown business districts (Adams et al., 1987; Hirsch, 1983; Squires, Bennett, McCourt & Nyden, 1987; Feagin & Parker, 1990, chapter 9; Wilson, 1966). Although urban renewal officials justified the urban renewal
program based on attacking substandard housing conditions, very few officials used federal resources and subsidies to improve deteriorated or dilapidated housing or “renew” slum neighborhoods (Teaford, 2000; Greer, 1965, p. 3; Jacobs, 1961; Hartman & Kessler, 1978; National Commission on Urban Problems, 1969, p. 153). Nationally, the program destroyed thousands more units than it replaced, dislocated tens of thousands of small business and residents, and became the target of intense civil rights protest from leaders who labeled it “black removal” due to the large number of African American residents and neighborhoods cleared under the guise of “urban renewal” (Bayor, 1989; Friedland, 1982, pp. 81, 85, 195; Gans, 1962; Jacobs, 1961; Weiss, 1980; Kleniewski, 1984). According to Scott Greer (1965), blacks occupied nearly 70% of the dwelling units condemned for urban renewal projects. This was primarily due, Greer felt, to their “central locations and deteriorated conditions, but the effects [were] the same as they would be if dehousing Negroes were the goal.” As a program for “pushing people around,” Greer argued, urban renewal was about, at best, “slum-shifting”; and, at worst, increasing slums by eliminating housing (pp. 55–56). Herbert Gans’s (1962) case study of the “urban villagers” in Boston’s West End, Arnold Hirsch’s (1983) study of Chicago, Ronald Bayor’s (1989) analysis of Atlanta, and John Bauman’s (1987) examination of Philadelphia show that the urban renewal program involved long delays, cost overruns, painful dislocation of thousands of people, and long periods where cleared land remained vacant.

A vast literature has focused on the mobilization of downtown real estate elites, the formation of growth coalitions, and the reshaping of business-government relations in the post-World War II era as a result of urban renewal (Hoffman, 2000; Barnekov & Boyle, 1989; Fainstein & Fainstein, 1986; Mollenkopf, 1978). In many cities, urban coalitions of downtown real estate and business elites worked to establish and legitimize a “public-private partnership” (Squires, 1989) of private actors and government redevelopment officials dedicated to redeveloping the downtown. In the 1980s and later, critical scholars such as Nancy Kleniewski (1984), Heywood Sanders (1980), and R. Allen Hays (1985), among others, showed that urban renewal was never a single, national program, as researchers and policy analysts contended during the 1960s and 1970s. Many cities did not participate in the urban renewal program (e.g. Houston and New Orleans) and the meaning of urban “renewal” (e.g. slum clearance, neighborhood rehabilitation, etc.) changed considerably from its inception in 1949 through the early 1970s. The physical shape of the program, its economic benefits and liabilities, levels of funding, site selection, and project duration displayed much local variation. Arnold Hirsch (1983, 1993) and Marc Weiss (1980) have shown how urban renewal programs were largely
initiated and carried out by local business and real estate oriented groups with the assistance of federal subsidies and local government. Downtown real estate and other business elites not only helped frame the laws under which renewal proceeded, but they controlled the character, location, and pace of redevelopment efforts (for overviews, see Barnekov, Boyle & Rich, 1989; Barnekov & Rich, 1989; Squires, 1989).

**URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, FISCAL AUSTERITY, AND FEDERAL RETRENCHMENT, 1968–2000**

In the 1960s and later, the character of urban redevelopment underwent a shift in emphasis away from large-scale clearance, unilateral taking of private property, and urban displacement. During the middle and late 1960s, the nation experienced five consecutive summers of racial unrest in its cities. The riots in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and many other cities followed a decade of massive displacement of people and neighborhoods because of urban renewal slum clearance, large-scale expressway building, and public housing. Critics such as Jane Jacobs (1961) and Herbert Gans (1962) blasted urban renewal for destroying neighborhoods while Martin Anderson (1964) and other conservative critics castigated urban renewal as symptomatic of “big government,” a “federal bulldozer,” and a “housing” program imposed on cities by the federal government. According to John Mollenkopf (1978, p. 141), “[m]ost of the community turbulence of the 1960s was firmly directed against urban renewal, highway construction, the declining availability of decent inexpensive housing, expansion of dominant institutions, and city bureaucracies tightly dominated by ethnic groups being displaced in urban population by minority newcomers.” As the costs of urban displacement became apparent, neighborhood constituencies that had previously supported urban renewal began to swing into opposition thus fanning the flames of urban protest and provoking mobilization for reform (Piven & Cloward, 1974). In Detroit, Kansas City, Chicago, San Francisco, and other cities, resident dissatisfaction with displacement helped spawn combative coalitions of housing activists, civil rights organizations, and historical preservationist groups dedicated to halting slum clearance (Adams et al., 1987, pp. 120–121; Gotham, 1999; Hirsch, 1983; Bennett et al., 1987; Hartman & Kessler, 1978). In 1974, the federal government discontinued the urban renewal program amid widespread urban protest and neighborhood discontent surrounding the destabilizing effects of the program on inner city communities (Hoffman, 2000; Teaford, 2000; Hirsch, 1983; Weiss, 1980).
By this time the NAREB, central city businessmen, and local economic and political elites had apparently not fulfilled urban renewal’s stated goal of providing a “decent home” for every American family. Urban renewal was supposed to reverse central city decline, counteract decentralization trends, and revitalize blighted neighborhoods. However, by the 1970s urban renewal had not saved the central city but had exacerbated disinvestment and decay, and aggravated racial tensions and neighborhood unrest. David Bartelt (1993, p. 149) has pointed to two faulty assumptions embedded within the urban renewal program concerning the causes and consequences of urban disinvestment. First, the program assumed that private capital would flow into renewal areas once local officials had cleared the blighted structures, relocated the previous occupants, and rebuilt infrastructure. However, what usually happened was that large-scale clearance produced vacant lots and abandoned dwellings rather than revitalize neighborhoods and generate new jobs (Weiss, 1980; Sanders, 1980; Gotham, 2000a). Second, urban renewal assumed that residents within affected areas would support large-scale clearance of their impoverished neighborhoods as evidence of improvement and progressive change. In fact, however, neighborhoods often opposed renewal efforts because of their destabilizing and segregative consequences (Hartman, 1966; Bennett, 1986). Nancy Kleniewski (1984) and Gregory Squires (1989) also pointed out that neighborhoods opposed urban renewal because local officials often earmarked tax subsidies and other federal resources for the expansion of universities, hospitals, large corporations, and other elite institutions that tended to employ middle- and upper-income residents rather than lower-income inner city residents (Kleniewski, 1984; Bartelt, 1993; Squires, 1989).

In 1974, the federal government replaced the urban renewal program with the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) that gave cities more control and discretion over the use of federal funds. With the new CDBG program, the amount of money assured solely for urban renewal areas was now competing with demands for federal assistance from all areas of the city. By this time, many cities had embraced a “triage” strategy in which government officials divided federal money into three categories: deteriorated areas, transitional areas, and healthy areas (Downs, 1975; Metzger, 2000). In this way, cities could use federal money to revitalize moderately deteriorating areas, little money would be spent in the most deteriorated areas, or in healthy areas that could survive without federal assistance. Despite this emphasis on a more efficient use of federal resources, two contradictory goals plagued the CDBG program: on the one hand, the Carter Administration intended CDBG dollars to go to low- and moderate-income areas; on the other hand, the Administration encouraged cities to use CDBG money to stimulate private sector investment.
Not surprising, in many cities, local officials and elites sacrificed the former goal to accommodate the later goal (Judd & Swanstrom, 1998, p. 230).

Another important federal subsidy for private development was the 1977 Housing and Urban Development Act, which created the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program to dispense monies to local governments to encourage private investment in depressed areas. Unlike the CDBG program, the UDAG program required applicants to propose and accomplish specific projects, and to leverage private money to supplement the federal grant. Between 1977 and 1987, the federal government spent nearly $4.5 billion on nearly 3,000 UDAG projects in 1,180 cities (Feagin & Parker, 1990, p. 135). Yet evidence from several cities showed that UDAGs were frequently used for the streets, utilities, and other services needed for various types of private residential, commercial, and industrial projects that directly benefitted businesses and affluent suburbanites, rather than needy residents and poor neighborhoods (for an overview, see Hubbell, 1979). For example, local officials and elites in various cities used UDAG to convert Union Station in St. Louis to a festival mall, rebuild Harborplace in Baltimore, and expand the Bartell Hall convention center in Kansas City. In the 1980s, the federal government folded UDAGs earmarked for specific purposes into block grants. This shift in funding strategies gave local political authorities considerably more control over the allocation of federal funds during a period in which interurban competition for federal monies and private capital rose sharply in the United States (Blair & Nachimas, 1979; Helen & Yinger, 1989; Feagin & Parker, 1990; Ladd & Yinger, 1989).

Shrinking federal resources, devolution of policy implementation to state governments, and increased reliance on market-centered strategies have been the core features of federal urban policy since the 1970s (Kincaid, 1999; Cummings, 1988; Fainstein & Fainstein, 1986; Gotham, 1998; Gotham & Wright, 2000; Squires, 1989). Barnekov, Boyle and Rich (1989, pp. 100–101) pointed out that from the 1930s through the 1970s, the view that cities were important to national economic prosperity and growth had guided U.S. urban policy. Yet by the 1980s, policy analysts at the federal level no longer accepted this assumption as valid and, as a result, gave little attention or priority to the redevelopment of central cities (see also Bartelt, 1993; Block, Cloward, Ehrenreich & Piven, 1987; Piven & Cloward, 1982). In the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations eliminated general revenue sharing and public works monies. Moreover, funding for the CDBG program dropped from more than $6.2 billion to $2.8 billion from 1980 to 1990, a decline of 54% in constant 1990 dollars. Other budget cuts also affected cities. Economic development assistance went from $717 million in 1980 to $160 million by 1990 (a 78%
loss), and funding for the UDAG program was cut by 41%, from $357 million in 1980 to $209 million by 1990. In 1980, federal government monies made up 14.3% of city budgets in the nation. In 1992, federal government dollars account for less than 5%. That same year, federal assistance as a percentage of city budgets had dropped to 64% below what it had been in 1980. Devolution of federal policy accompanied these budget cuts. State governments spread federal funds across many jurisdictions and gave little priority to distressed urban areas (Kincaid, 1999; Cole, Taebel & Hissong, 1990; Judd & Swanstrom, 1998, pp. 238–240; Wolman, 1986).

A report released in 1980 by the President’s Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties (1980) foreshadowed this shift in funding and thinking about cities. Appointed by President Carter to review urban policy and recommend policy changes, the Commission essentially adopted a “hands-off” approach to cities recommending that the “best interest of the nation” would be to promote “locally neutral economic and social policies rather than spatially sensitive urban policies that either explicitly or inadvertently seek to preserve cities in their historical roles.” According to the Commission, suburbanization of people and industry was an inevitable outcome of broad-based economic change and the “historical dominance of more central cities will be diminished as certain production, residential, commercial, and cultural functions disperse to places beyond them” (pp. 66–67). The function of the federal government is not to aid deteriorating cities but to allow the process of decay to run its natural course. Cities can adapt and change in response to economic and social forces and this process of adaptation can be encouraged, but not altered, by the federal government. Glickman (1984, p. 471) referred to this non-urban or anti-urban federal approach as a policy of “spatial trickle-down.” Numerous scholarly studies and prominent institutions such as the National Research Council and the Brookings Institute supported much of the Commission’s analysis. In a widely cited book, The New Urban Reality, Paul Peterson (1981) arrived at conclusions similar to those of the Commission and proclaimed that the “industrial city has become an institutional anachronism” (p. 1). The implications of much of Peterson’s work suggested a Pollyannaish outcome where the transition to a technologically dynamic, post-industrial city would benefit all cities and regions equally, a view sharply criticized by John Logan and Todd Swanstrom (1990), Mark Gottdiener (1994), Ray Hutchison (1993), and other critical urban scholars.

Within the intellectual and policy environment defined by President’s Commission’s report, and carried on during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, federal officials and policy analysts have endorsed the view that cities must make substantial monetary and policy concessions to attract capital
if they are to survive. The advocacy of Enterprise Zones and Empowerment Zones reflects this view and represents the latest in a series of market-centered federal efforts to revitalize cities by promoting economic competitiveness between places. Both the Reagan/Bush Enterprise Zone program and the Clinton/Gore Empowerment Zone (EZ) initiative embrace a supply-side policy approach that provides economic incentives to the private sector to invest in central city communities. However, under Clinton/Gore, officials attempt to target economic incentives to resident-based “empowerment zones” rather than industry-based businesses as the Reagan/Bush initiative. Whereas the Reagan/Bush program included no direct, citizen-based participation, a hallmark of the Clinton/Gore initiative is the creation of partnerships between government, business, and community organizations to encourage and sustain grassroots participation in the policy making and implementation process. Yet, as Baum (1999) has recently noted, the structure of partnership and success of community participation varies widely throughout the United States. Case studies of Detroit and Chicago suggest that government/business/community partnerships of the EZ process tend to reflect the prevailing power structures and political alignments of the particular cities and, as a result, community participation varies considerably, from high to almost nonexistent (Bockmeyer, 2000; Herring et al., 1998).

To compensate for declining federal resources and tax revenues, many cities have attempted to redevelop themselves as entertainment destinations, devoting enormous public resources to the construction of large entertainment projects, including professional sports stadiums, convention centers, museums, redeveloped riverfronts, festival malls, and casinos and other gaming facilities (Eisinger, 2000; Fainstein & Judd, 1999; Hannigan, 1998; Zukin, 1997; Kearns & Philo, 1993). The justification for spending huge sums of money for engineering economic growth through entertainment lies in the hope that (1) economic revival can bring the middle classes back to the city, not as residents but as visitors and spenders; and (2) the benefits of urban entertainment facilities will “trickle down” into the local economy, generating ancillary investment, high employment in the hospitality and retail sectors, and bring in needed tax revenue. As noted most recently by Peter Eisinger (2000), while the expenditure of local public resources for entertainment is not entirely new, the current pattern of local government spending and investment is very different from earlier eras in U.S. history. First, the pace, scale, cost, and variety of construction have markedly increased since the 1970s with huge investments in casino gaming, sports stadiums, convention centers, and other forms of entertainment. Moreover, unlike previous periods in U.S. history, “in the contemporary period, many local governments have been making large public
investments in entertainment facilities at the same time that the municipal tax base is declining and social welfare needs are rising” (p. 321). Lastly, during the nineteenth century local elites designed and built urban recreational facilities for the local population. Today, however, large-scale tourist promoters market entertainment facilities vigorously, to bring visitors to the city. As much research has shown, building cities for the interests of “visitors” rather than the concerns of “residents” translates into a skewed public agenda, declining quality of municipal services for residents, and increasing social division and conflict (Baade, 1996; Euchner, 1993; Sanders, 1992; Hudson, 1999; Rosentraub, 1999; Felsenstein, Littlepage & Klacik, 1999).

In short, since the 1970s, U.S. cities have developed new strategies and tools for engineering urban redevelopment in response to broad economic changes and shifts in the nature of federal intervention. Market-centered initiatives such as enterprise zones and empowerment zones have accompanied the proliferation of new forms of local tax subsidies such as tax abatements, industrial revenue bonds, business improvement districts (BIDS), tax increment financing (TIF), and the rise of community development corporations (CDCs) (Gotham, 1998; Gotham & Wright, 2000; Harrison & Bluestone, 1988; Squires, 1991, 1989; Barnekov & Rich, 1989; Barnekov, Boyle & Rich, 1989; Gaffikin & Warf, 1993; Marcuse, 1993; Cowan, Rohe & Baku, 1999; Gittell & Wilder, 1999). These new strategies and policy tools reflect a wholesale shift in the priorities of local governments, which are increasingly less concerned with issues of social redistribution, provision of public services, and so forth, and the more concerned with promoting economic competitiveness, attracting investment capital, and the creating a favorable “business climate.” In the 1980s, Logan and Molotch (1987) and Squires (1989, 1991) showed how the increasing use of tax subsidies and other redevelopment tools to attract capital had weakened democratic processes and safeguards, strengthened the power of private capital in both private and public life, and “depoliticized” local decision-making and policy implementation. In the 1990s, much research has shown that the building of urban entertainment facilities and the traditional public subsidization of the private sector has done little to improve living conditions for the majority of urban dwellers and, in fact, has exacerbated inequality and the fiscal problems of local governments (Felsenstein, Littlepage & Klacik, 1999; Feagin & Parker, 1990; Gotham, 1998; Hudson, 1999; Lord & Price, 1992). As a result, today many local governments find themselves deeply in debt, forced to slash funding for public schools, infrastructure, and other public services while financially pressured to expend greater funds to leverage capital investment.
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The contributors to this volume of *Research in Urban Sociology* document the diverse urban redevelopment strategies, different land-use techniques, and novel market-based funding tools cities are using to redevelop themselves. There is much diversity in the ways cities attempt to engineer economic growth and the key actors and organized interests involved in planning and redeveloping the city have changed considerably over the last two decades. Fainstein (1991, p. 79) notes that as urban planners have become more directly involved in economic development, “market rationality and local competitiveness have replaced comprehensiveness and equity as the primary criteria by which planning projects are judged.” Hannigan’s (1998) discussion of the “maverick” developers of the new entertainment-based “fantasy city” points to how national- or international-scale corporations today dominate urban redevelopment and have the economic and political power to take their investments elsewhere should local officials not prove compliant, a trend observed by Bennett (1986), Feagin and Parker (1990), Smith (1996), and others. Today, economic shifts on global level, transformations in federal policy, the development of new modes of consumption, and the accompanying processes of privatization and commodification have helped to create a new context for urban redevelopment (Featherstone, 1991; Gottdiener, 1997; Gottdiener, Collins & Dickens, 1999; Judd & Fainstein, 1999; Urry, 1995). The articles in this volume provide illustration of some the key expressions of urban redevelopment, seen from different methods and theory. Collectively, their endeavor highlights the multifaceted relationship between urban redevelopment, public policy, and extra-local forces.

The chapter by James Dickinson, “Monuments of Tomorrow: Industrial Ruins at the Millennium,” is concerned with how past structures and buildings – e.g. pyramids, temples, warehouses, and so on – become cherished monuments, relics that add historical depth and continuity to a civilization. As the era of industrial production and concentrated urban life winds down, a new class of structures is appearing in the landscapes of the Europe and the United States: abandoned and derelict factories, warehouses, steel mills, refineries, office buildings, railway stations, and dock facilities, as well as unused prisons, workhouses, asylums, and housing projects. Dickinson suggests that these obsolete commercial and industrial structures of the industrial era are potentially the monuments of tomorrow, contemporary rivals to the antiquities admired in other, older cultures. He uses the ideas of Austrian philosopher and art historian Alois Riegl to identify four possible fates for today’s large-scale
remnants of the industrial age: (1) demolition and disappearance; (2) recycling into new (primarily commercial) uses; (3) transformation into historical monuments; or (4) persistence in the landscape as conventional ruins. He illustrates this typology with examples of urban and architectural change drawn from the recent history of the United States and Europe. His purpose is to clarify how local people, economic elites, and public officials negotiate and assign new meanings and values to recently antiquated utilitarian structures. Moreover, Dickinson’s purpose is to increase our understanding of the role of meaning and discourse in the framing of urban redevelopment and the role of derelict structures in the urban landscapes of the future.

Aldaberto Aguirre and Jonathan Brooks (“City Redevelopment Policies and the Criminalization of Homeless: A Narrative Case Study”) examine the relationship between city redevelopment policies and the treatment of the homeless in the city of Riverside, California. They illustrate how elites have used redevelopment policies to dislocate the homeless from the principle business district of the city. In particular, they focus on how local law enforcement has worked alongside with city government to design redevelopment policies that criminalized the homeless. The city’s efforts to revitalize the downtown, for example, have resulted in the police department creating new ordinances that prohibit loitering, panhandling, sitting on a park bench, and sitting in grassy park areas. In short, city redevelopment policies and law enforcement procedures have turned public space into contested terrain in which the homeless have become the victims, defined as deviants and impediments to local reform. Thus, local crime control measures impose hierarchical control over the homeless and urban space, transforming public space into privatized space reserved for middle class consumption, a theme echoed by Davis (1992), Judd (1995), Marcuse (1993), Wright (1997), and others who link contemporary urban redevelopment efforts with the militarization of urban space.

The development of new electronic and computer technologies are becoming a major topic of urban research in the United States and elsewhere, especially the role of the Internet in fashioning new (cyber)spaces of community identity and economic growth. For example, in “Innovation, Speculation, and Urban Development: The New Media Brokers of New York City,” Michael Indergaard draws attention to how new media districts in major cities are becoming focal points for innovation related to the Internet, drawing in billions of dollars in speculative investment into many cities. Indergaard uses the case of New York’s “Silicon Alley” to examine the role of new media districts in organizing speculation and in diffusing its risks across the city. He draws on theories of innovative districts and more general network models to explain how the same ties that aid innovation are now supporting speculation. He proposes that “new media
“districts” are arenas for various kinds of market brokers: new media entrepreneurs who use their networks to create markets, and venture capitalists who weave new media firms into networks of risk capital. Recently, many entrepreneurs and their venture capitalist allies have shifted their emphasis to positioning themselves vis-à-vis the stock market. Moreover, these networks of speculation are extending into the rest of the urban economy as new media suppliers and other interests accept new media stock as a sort of currency. Thus, while the new media has emerged as the leading producer of new jobs in New York and has helped fuel a business boom, especially in the real estate market, the role of speculation casts doubt on the sustainability of the development achieved.

Greg Crowley ("Regime Structure and the Politics of Issue Definition: Urban Redevelopment in Pittsburgh, Past and Present") examines the politics of urban redevelopment in Pittsburgh to demonstrate the relationship between urban regime structure and issue-definition strategies available to actors for influencing the policy process. His study compares two phases of urban redevelopment in Pittsburgh, each pursued under a different regime structure. At mid-century, a “corporatist” partnership between an elite business community and the Democratic political machine formulated and carried out urban renewal in Pittsburgh. The stability of this public-private alliance depended upon reciprocity, cooperation, and trust between regime partners. Under this corporatist regime, insiders to the regime monopolized the process of policy issue-definition. Regime outsiders, and opponents of urban renewal generally, were only minimally successful at exploiting strategies of issue redefinition to shift the balance of power in their favor. According to Crowley, the corporatist regime in Pittsburgh has gradually become more open and pluralistic than it was at mid-century. With declining trust and predictability among members of the policy community, and with coalitions more likely to form around specific issues rather than long-term interest affiliations, the politics of issue-definition are more important now than ever before in determining policy outcomes. Crowley finds that marginal political actors are increasingly successful at redefining issues and shifting policy debates beyond elite policy circles and onto the public agenda. Thus, the composition of community power has changed since mid-century. Crowley’s analysis corroborates the work of Zukin (1997, 1998), Croucher (1997), and Beauregard (1993), among others, who attempt to integrate structural analysis with a social constructionist approach to research the politics of local economic development.

In his widely cited book, the *Condition of Postmodernity*, David Harvey (1989, p. 355) proposed that scholars direct their attention to how the “production of images and discourses is an important facet of activity that has to be analysed as part and parcel of the reproduction and transformation of any
social order.” In the decade since the publication of Harvey’s seminal book, a vast literature has examined the role of imagery, symbols, motifs, and discourse in representing the city. Beauregard’s (1993) examination of the “discourse of urban decline,” Smith’s (1996) focus on the frontier motif and the revanchist city, Sorkin’s and contributors (1992) discussions of the “theme park” city reflect a major trend in urban research toward examining how the production of imagery is integral to the process of urban redevelopment, growth, and decay (see also Holt, 2000). “On Fragmentation, Urban and Social,” by Judit Bodnar, is illustrative, concentrating, as it does, on the discourse of “fragmentation” in explanations of urban growth and decline. She suggests that there is a growing anxiety among urban people that the city is becoming increasingly fragmented, uncontrollable, and unmanageable. Her paper points out that, on the one hand, social fragmentation is not altogether new, as the discourse of fragmentation (and related synonyms) has long been a recurring theme of modernity (for an overview, see Berman, 1981). On the other hand, our present millennial concern with urban and social fragmentation is quite different from the advent of modernity, a theme discussed at length by David Harvey (1989) and Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1997), among others. Here her analysis departs from Georg Simmel’s thoughts on fragmentation, individual freedom, and the city, and examines public space as an exemplary instance of the modern city. She goes on to present a critical analysis of today’s urban and social fragmentation and highlights empirical and theoretical links between fragmentation and globalization.

Regina Bures examines the relationship between changing patterns of segregation and the development of the historic district in Charleston, South Carolina. Before 1950, people often cited Charleston as an anomaly, a Southern city with a historically low rate of segregation. Yet, this is no longer the case. Between 1950 and 1990, segregation increased significantly within the city at the same time law makers declared segregationist land-use practices were illegal. The establishment and ongoing expansion of the Old Historic District has played an important role in this increase in segregation. Over time, the expansion of Charleston’s historic district has led to gentrification, increased property values and taxes, and increased racial and economic segregation. Recently, economic and political support for historic preservation has contributed to the growth of tourism as a major industry in the city.

The relationship between gentrification and urban redevelopment has become a hot topic in the late 1990s. An entire issue of Research in Urban Sociology (1992) focused on gentrification and the contributors offered a wealth of insights on the meaning, causes and consequences of gentrification for U.S. cities from the perspective of the late 1980s and early 1990s. As we move into the next
century, scholars are again focusing their attention on gentrification asking how much gentrification is there? How much of the city does it cover? Where is it? And, finally, how is it related to macrostructural changes in the state and economy? In their paper, “Gentrification, Housing Policy, and the New Context of Urban Redevelopment,” Elvin Wyly and Daniel Hammel argue that the resurgence of gentrification in many cities emanates from recent transformations in federal regulatory policy and mortgage financing. First, they point out that the economic expansion of the last decade has revived inner-city housing markets, abet in a spatially uneven and unequal fashion. More important, they argue that the force, depth, and focus of resurgent capital investment have been sufficient to invalidate the predictions of “degentrification” voiced by many scholars in the early 1990s. Second, they suggest that decades of uneven development have helped create a new socio-spatial context for the reinvention of low-income housing policy. This shift is apparent in many local policies and public-private redevelopment efforts, but is most starkly illustrated by local endeavors under the federal HOPE VI program which, as they point out, attempts to recast the disinvested core as a profit opportunity and a testing ground for the devolved and privatized social policy of the federal government. Third, Wyly and Hammel hypothesize that restructuring of the national system of housing finance has altered key facets of the gentrification process itself, opening new markets for low-income and minority borrowers and neighborhoods, increasing access to conventional mortgage capital through automation and standardization, and accelerating class turnover in cities.

While Wyly and Hammel aim for breadth and generalizability in their analysis, the article by Joel Devine and Petrice Sams-Abiodun, and my article with Jon Shefner and Krista Brumley use ethnographic field observations and in-depth interviews with residents in a single public housing development in New Orleans currently undergoing redevelopment through the HOPE VI program. HOPE VI pioneers a new model of public policy that links the redevelopment of public housing with the twin goals of lessening the concentration of poverty and creating stable inner city neighborhoods. As a major component of the federal government’s attempt to “reinvent” public housing authorities (PHAs) and rebuild inner cities, HOPE VI permits expenditures for PHAs to cultivate “public-private partnerships” with local non-profit organizations, private businesses, and other agencies (Quercia & Galster, 1997). In the process, the program encourages PHAs to transform their public housing developments into for-profit developments that are competitive within the broader inner city housing markets (Salama, 1999). Finally, HOPE VI initiatives include a variety of innovative financing mechanisms, involving combinations of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funds, private lenders, HUD grants, and local
contributions (Epp, 1996). Overall, federal officials have designed the HOPE VI program to induce PHAs to develop creative programs to remedy public housing’s problems and become more “entrepreneurial” in attracting private investment to rebuild inner cities.

Devine and Sams-Abiodun use historical, census, survey, ethnographic, and focus group methods to provide a case study of the economic survival strategies employed by residents of the C. J. Peete public housing development (formerly Magnolia). While their motivating research question and ultimate focus is on how residents of this impoverished, inner-city community meet their material needs, they initially explore prevailing conceptions of households and families and scrutinize their applicability concerning a poor, inner-city, African-American population. Devine and Sams-Abiodun then discuss the history of C. J. Peete and interrogate the critical policy decisions that affected its development. Next, they examine tract-level census data and demographic and economic information gathered in a series of community surveys conducted over the past four years. Faced with the constraints imposed by these information gathering techniques, Devine and Sams-Abiodun subsequently undertook an ethnographically-based research strategy and a series of focus group conversations to investigate and more fully appreciate the formal and informal strategies people in a low-income community use to provide for their survival.

In the context of economic deprivation and social isolation, the redevelopment of C. J. Peete has become a potential resource for improving the lives of residents and a harbinger of insecurity and social instability. My article with Jon Shefner and Krista Brumley uses Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) conceptual tools of “abstract space” and “social space” to critically analyze the dilemmas, and conflicts surrounding the relocation of public housing residents. We argue that the redevelopment of public housing is an attempt to recommodify public housing space, to increase its exchange-value through privatization while diminishing its use-value for the inner city poor. The data gathered by Wyly and Hammel show that the derelict spaces surrounding many inner city public housing developments are currently being selectively re-valorized as a resurgence of gentrification, in some cities, has created “islands of decay in seas of renewal.” Yet this process is fraught with major inconsistencies and difficulties. Our ethnographic field notes of public meetings held over the last two years indicate substantial resident opposition to the redevelopment with residents condemning the housing authority for being insensitive to their concerns, disseminating inaccurate and conflicting information, and refusing to work with them to find affordable housing. We investigate how housing authority officials and other local elites use various rhetorical devices, imagery, and motifs to define public housing as an undesirable area of overcrowding and
social pathology and convince the public and housing residents of the necessity of redevelopment. The dominant discourse of urban redevelopment views public housing as a symbol of urban “decline” (Beauregard, 1993), a “failure” of federal policy, and a rampant ghetto of crime, drugs, and violence. This vision is a key to understanding the cultural and racial politics that supports the redevelopment effort and, at the same time, discourages alternative views.

Following Lefebvre’s insights, we wish to understand the conflicts between public housing residents and housing authority officials over the redesign of public housing, broad policy shifts involving public housing space, and the role of the state in using space for social control.

The article by Jamie Paquin, “‘World City’ Theory: The Case of Seoul,” examines the global dimensions of urban redevelopment by applying world city theory to examine the contemporary economic restructuring of Seoul, South Korea. As elaborated by King (1990), Knox and Taylor (1995), and Sassen (1991, 1998), world city theory suggests that the processes driving urban change are global rather than national or local. A related argument is that a hierarchy of cities performing different functions within a global economy has been emerging in recent decades. Cities such as London, Toyko, and New York have become the major command centers for the global economy and are considered the preeminent “world” cities. Other cities struggle to achieve world city status by redeveloping their economic bases, others face stagnation and decay, and still others languish in chronic misery and despair. Paquin points to the significance of globalization, the problems scholars have with theorizing global processes, and the conceptual and empirical links between global processes and local redevelopment. His intent is to highlight how a country outside the United States and Europe experiences “globalization” and to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of urban economic change and its consequences.

Reflecting the increasing scholarly focus on the redevelopment of cities as sites of fun, leisure, and entertainment, Richard Lloyd and Terry Nichols Clark argue in the “City as an Entertainment Machine,” that cities are now in the business of leveraging culture to enhance their economic competitiveness. The components of the entertainment machine heuristic are not altogether new, as cities have long been sites of entertainment, consumption, and aesthetic innovation. In “Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” Walter Benjamin (1978) discussed how “art is brought in to the service of commerce” with the emergence of a capitalist entertainment economy as displayed in the World Exhibition of 1867 in Paris. Both Thorsten Veblen and Georg Simmel discussed the intersection of culture and commerce, focusing on the commodification of fashion, art, leisure, in early twentieth century Europe. The Frankfurt School theorists discussed the powerful impact of the “culture industry” in the
production and transmission of capitalist ideology and the massification of society. In the 1980s, both Zukin (1981) and Whitt (1987) noted the emerging importance of the arts industry and related art-oriented growth coalitions as an element of the urban growth machine. Today, urban scholars have identified ethnicity, culture, and historic preservation as important elements of a new postmodern (Harvey, 1989) or symbolic (Zukin, 1995) economy in which cultural strategies drive the production of commercialized urban spaces geared toward entertainment and tourism (Bassett, 1993; Boyer, 1992; Hannigan, 1998; Lin, 1995, 1998; Reichl, 1997; Strom, 1999; Urry, 1995; Whitt, 1988).

Lloyd and Clark follow the lead of John Walton (1993) and Todd Swanstrom (1993) in rejecting the conceptual and analytical separation of “culture” and the “economy” in urban theory and research. Their paper points to the growing importance of aesthetic production and consumption in redeveloping urban spaces as sites of consumption and entertainment. Echoing Zukin (1997) and Harvey (1989), Lloyd and Clark suggest that the business of cities has become the business of marketing culture and entertaining consumers, both residents and tourists (see also Wright and Hutchison 1997). They link the city as an “entertainment machine” to post-industrial occupational categories, and the competition among cities for tourists and expert labor.

In recent years, scholars have begun to examine the profound socio-spatial transformation of Times Square in New York City over the last two decades. Bart Eeckhout (“The ‘Disneyification’ of Times Square: Back to the Future?”) builds upon the insights of Hannigan (1998), Reichl (1999) and other scholars to investigate the conversion of Times Square into themed and revitalized space of hype, advertising, and cultural consumption. Eeckhout’s purpose is to interrogate prevailing explanations of the dramatic changes that have affected Times Square, critically assess the analytical merit of the concept “Disneyification,” and finally, suggest future avenues for urban research. In particular, Eeckhout provides a historical overview of Times Square and identifies seven core components or meanings of “Disneyification” that currently frame urban research on the transformation of urban public spaces into commodified spaces. His chapter brings together a number of recent themes developed within the urban literature on the arts, entertainment, and urban tourism: the construction of themed fantasy spaces geared toward pleasure and consumption, the transition to a postindustrial urban economy, the hegemony of consumerism and globalized tourism, the commodification of history and culture in preservation- and arts-based redevelopment, and the privatization and militarization of urban space. For Eeckhout, a “back-to-the-future” ideology is driving the redevelopment of Times Square where economic and political elites are superimposing images of a nostalgic small town Main Street – images developed by Walt Disney in the
1950s – upon the cityscape to foster urban redevelopment primarily for urban tourists, a process that is occurring in many cities today as recently noted by Sharon Zukin, John Hannigan, David Harvey, and others.

As should be clear from these brief summaries, the aim of this collection is to highlight ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the nature, meaning, and consequences of urban redevelopment. The contributors seek not to be definite about urban redevelopment but rather the explore the complexity of the major issues. Hence this edited volume brings together some of the latest ideas and research on the topic. The aim is to present to the reader a range of perspectives on the various aspects of urban redevelopment set in the context of the evolving political economy and uneven development.

NOTES

1. The major outlines of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts appeared at least as early as 1941 in the NAREB’s plans and reports for developing the means of teaming state action and private enterprise to carry out large-scale clearance of slum areas (Davies, 1958, pp. 182–185; Weiss, 1980). As early as 1932, the NAREB and its affiliated organizations called for government assistance to simplify and coordinate local building codes to promote new building and urban revitalization. In 1936, the NAREB’s Committee on Housing recommended that local government acquire land, undertake demolition, and sell or lease it back to private enterprise for the construction of housing or business facilities. By the time the bills that were to become the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 had reached Congress, leading officials within the real estate industry had already set the basic agenda and legislation. There were disagreements over administrative issues but not basic policy goals (Gotham, 2000a).

2. Title II of the 1949 Housing Act raised by $500 million the amount the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was allowed to offer as mortgage insurance. Title III authorized the federal government to build 810,000 new public housing units over the next ten years and required local public housing authorities demolish or renovate one slum dwelling for every public housing unit they built (Hoffman, 2000). Due to opposition from the real estate industry and conservative members of Congress, public housing never came close to the construction levels provided in the 1949 Act (810,000 units) (Gotham & Wright, 2000). The abandonment of the commitment to 810,000 units of public housing signaled a movement away from urban renewal as a “housing” program. By 1980, only 250,000 units had been made available and by 1979 only about 1 million total units had been built across the nation (Mitchell, 1985, pp. 9–11).

REFERENCES


