INTRODUCTION: WHERE ARE THE WOMEN AND GIRLS?

Public policy teaching cases serve two important pedagogical purposes that intersect for me. First, they fulfill the professional school student's demand for “real world” materials and skills (Barnes, Christensen, & Hansen, 1994; Kenney, 2001a). Second, a central tenet of feminist social science calls for examining social policy from the point of view of the objects of policy, giving voice to women’s experiences. Yet when I looked for cases for courses on the politics of public affairs, women and public policy, and feminist organizations, I faced, as case writers would say, a daunting challenge. Policy schools have lagged behind the disciplines in integrating women, gender, and feminist analysis into their curricula (Kenney, 2001b). The absence of women, women's issues, gender analyses, and feminist perspectives in policy schools' curricula is stark, despite the fact that women have been a majority of public policy students for many years (Webster, 2003). While feminist sociologists, historians, and political scientists have developed a rich scholarly literature of feminist case studies (Ferree and Martin 1995), they have not converted such materials into teaching cases.

Using the most inclusive classification system, I searched for cases with a female protagonist, cases that raised a women and public policy issue (broadly defined), cases about a women's organization, or cases that gave any indication of gender as a category of analysis. The result was a grand total of less than 1 percent of existing
cases. According to my best estimates, the Kennedy School of Government has 1680 cases, of which 32 have a female protagonist and 35 raise women's issues—0.74% percent of the total. I read 27 Kennedy School cases. The University of Washington's Electronic Hallway has 15 cases with a female protagonist and one that raises some gender issues on women and development in Nepal and one on sex tourism. For this paper, I read five Electronic Hallway cases. Georgetown University's Pew Case Studies in International Affairs collection had only one case of 283 with a female protagonist (0.7 percent), on Margaret Thatcher's demise within her party, but it has recently added three others, all of which I read.

Women characters and women's concerns fared little better among the 6766 Harvard Business School (HBS) cases. At least 78 have female protagonists, and 29 are about women's issues, women's organizations, or women and leadership, for a total of 0.72 percent. I read six HBS cases that raised public policy issues. The University of Virginia's Darden School of Business has 2150 cases of which 144 have a woman protagonist and five are about women's issues (7.7 percent). I read one of the Darden cases. The COLIS case clearinghouse holds 18,364 cases, largely for European Business Schools. One percent have female protagonists and one-quarter of 1 percent are on a women and public policy issue. Four of these are by Christine Barrett of the University of York, and I read all four. Lastly, the Case Research Journal has published 415 cases in its 23 years of operation: 26 have female protagonists; 11 additional cases are on women's issues, half of which are on sexual harassment or consensual relationships in the workplace (0.79 percent). I read four of these cases. This paper analyzes 67 cases.

Lest one think this paucity of gender cases is a mere anachronism of history that will be rectified effortlessly as women become the majority of public policy students, become scholars and, ultimately, faculty of policy schools, it is important to note that the percentages do not increase when we examine only those cases produced in the last 3 years. The severe underrepresentation of gender analysis, women, women's issues, and feminist organizations is ongoing.

All cases convey messages about gender, and we could deconstruct each case for its gender message, explicit or submerged. Chetkovich and Kirp (2001) critiqued the top 10 best-selling Kennedy School cases, and analyzed the implicit messages cases convey about who counts as a policymaker, what is a policy problem, and what politics is. Cases are designed to serve a particular pedagogical purpose, although they are versatile texts, amenable to use by others with different purposes. It is somewhat unfair to criticize cases for failing to fulfill a purpose for which they were not designed. Moreover, texts yield different lessons according to the skills and

1 Counting cases is no simple feat. The first question is whether parts of the case and teaching notes should be counted separately. I think not, and we were careful to not overcount the gender cases, but I can be less certain that we have not inflated the overall total number of cases. We used various clearinghouses for totals, such as COLIS, but they do not necessarily include all the cases of a particular source, such as the Kennedy School. If we had better information, our numbers might be more accurate, but I do not believe the overall conclusion is faulty—few existing cases address gender. Allusion is to Dreze and Sen (1995, pp. 140–178).
2 <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/caseweb>. Many of these cases and supporting materials are in Winston and Bane (1993).
4 <http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/ecase/>.
5 <http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/cases/cases_home.jhtml>. It is hard to get an accurate count, since a number of HBS cases are for internal use only.
7 These include the Harvard Business School, the Darden School, and the JFK School of Government <http://www.ecch.cranfield.ac.uk/>.
objectives of the teachers, and we must analyze them in action rather than merely as texts. Their very shortcomings may create openings for exploring the issue the text seems to foreclose. After noting these caveats, however, I proceed to analyze the cases as texts. Most teachers considering a case will not have the luxury of observing them taught by many different teachers, but rather, will have to decide if they are good enough to try. Some of the cases I write about I have taught several times. Even if a production of a play produced differs from a script, one can still analyze the text itself. Appropriating the methods of Chetkovich and Kirp, I analyzed the 67 gender cases I read and developed several categories for my analysis, although any given case could easily illustrate other points as well. One final caveat: Just because a case demonstrates shortcomings in supporting a discussion of gender does not mean the case is not an excellent vehicle for advancing other pedagogical purposes.

GENDER AS AN ANALYTICAL CATEGORY

Gender is not a euphemism for biological sex, an attribute of bodies; rather, it is a social process by which we assign meaning and value to presumed biological differences (Kenney, 1996; Martin, 2003). Feminist scholars have described and analyzed how gender varies over time, cross-culturally, and across other categories of difference such as race and class. The gender order may allocate power and status with significant consequences, but such an order is never monolithic. It must be continually reproduced at the same time it is contested and resisted.

Feminists have long critiqued the view that men and women are different creatures (from Mars and Venus, for example) with dichotomous nonoverlapping traits. To argue that all women are nurturing and consensus-oriented, while all men are selfish and domineering, is essentialism. Some of the cases I read take this flawed essentialist perspective and try to explore how all women are different from all men. One of the common features of a gender order is that women, “the other,” possess all the gendered (usually disadvantageous) traits, while men remain the unexamined neutral norm. While laudably trying to include women and women’s issues and explore how institutions are structured to disadvantage and exclude women, some of the cases ascribe all difference to women. A more theoretically sound approach would be to explore how the variable meaning of gender works to women’s advantage as well as their disadvantage, how it can simultaneously be strategically mobilized as an asset while it also must be resisted as a limitation.

A good example is the Kennedy School case about Republican Representative Lynn Martin who must decide how much to emphasize gender in her campaign for the chair of the Republican Conference, the number three spot in the leadership (Kennedy, 1989). The case narrates Martin’s strategizing over how to play the gender card with Republican colleagues, who may not be wildly enthusiastic about women’s entry into the political world but want to neutralize Democrats’ appeal to women voters. As well as posing an engaging dilemma that should generate interesting discussion, the case lets us see into the mind of a real-world political operative, a feminist involved in mainstream politics, and even better, a Republican feminist. Gender, a social construct, is something the skillful political operative seeks to manipulate and capitalize on at the same time she resists gender-based barriers to women’s political participation. This case would tie in well with contemporary debates about how the media have portrayed Nancy Pelosi, the first woman House Minority Leader.

“Run Before You Get Shot Down” (Tanaka, 1998) is the story of a Japanese aid worker in Nepal, who is thrown into the field with little training, most of it on lan-
gauge rather than on Nepal’s complex system of segregation by gender and caste, or on conflict resolution. She has gender power struggles with both a native male aid worker and the male chair of the Village Development Corporation. Her vague mandate seems to be to secure women’s participation in democratic decision making for development programs that will reduce inequality and impede deforestation. The “big man” wants a bridge, and enlists the support of her colleague behind her back. She favors having women raise goats as an alternative project. It is a good case, one destined to provoke a lively and important discussion of the difficulty of cross-cultural development work, the difficulty of changing caste, class, and gender inequalities, and the link between poverty and environmental degradation. I have a couple of reservations, however. Perhaps to dramatize the case, the title emphasizes the danger and risks women encounter. A better alternative would be “Getting the Goats” (or, as a take-off on the suffrage slogan “Votes for Women,” “Goats for Women”), emphasizing the tenacity of the naive, yet passionate development officer. While the narrative invites us to think about her mistakes—perhaps she is too bossy and has missed opportunities to listen, as well as communicate and persuade—I am skeptical that gender-power problems are surmounted simply by good “heart-to-hearts,” however necessary such exchanges might be. A skillful instructor might explore the apparent objectivity of the “difficult” woman in situations where women are meant to follow and obey, not lead. I like how the case has both a female protagonist and a clear gender issue. The focus, however, too easily turns to her behavior, rather than on how unequal gender relations pose a barrier to development.8

WOMEN, BUT NO GENDER: IS A WOMAN PROTAGONIST ENOUGH (ESPECIALLY IF SHE FAILS)?

A truly wonderful case that I teach with great success is “A Towering Dilemma” (Simmons and Dunrud, 2000). Female protagonist park manager Deborah Ligget must decide how to reconcile competing demands for the use of Bear’s Lodge (Devil’s Tower), a rock formation with religious significance to many Native Americans and of great value to rock climbers. On first read, the case seems to propel one toward the conclusion that Ligget should simply conduct her own policy analysis and impose a solution. In class, however, the case soon generates a discussion about process—who needs to be at the table as opposed to whose interests Ligget must accommodate. The case ultimately supports the conclusion that the lone decision maker cannot impose a sustainable solution on the parties; rather, she will need to initiate an inclusive process to secure consensus and any hope of a lasting solution. My objective in teaching the case is to undermine the conception of the policy process as one where the lone policy analyst chooses and then executes. Further analysis of the actual controversy (Burton and Ruppert, 1999) reveals that the courts stepped in to impose a different solution. I try to foster a discussion of the different arenas of conflict, to show how moving to the legal arena reframes policy questions with significant consequences. One could perhaps stretch the case to discuss leadership styles, contrasting the stereotypical leadership styles of the macho male “command and control” model versus a more inclusive consensus model, although such a discussion is not supported by the text. “A Towering Dilemma,” thus, despite having a female protagonist, does not support a rich discussion of gender issues.

8 Another case that puts gender front and center which is likely to be of greatest appeal to women’s studies undergraduates and may lack sufficient sophistication for graduate students or prospective development workers is “Family, Feminism, and Nation: One Woman's Quest for an Answer in War-Torn El Salvador” (Shayne, 2001), which presents, in a series of dialogues, the tormented decision process of a 19-year-old woman deciding whether to be a combatant with the Popular Forces of Liberation.
Other cases with a female protagonist also contain subterranean gender issues ripe for analysis, but the gender issues are subtle, would take time and skill to unearth, and a discussion of them is not really supported by the text. Much is left to guess or infer. The case about the Conservative Party’s rejection of Margaret Thatcher’s continued leadership (Ortmayer, 1995) is an excellent comparative politics case for showing the broader political consequences of how parties choose their leaders. Its insightful teaching note also leads instructors through drawing out the implications of a leader’s continued support of an unpopular policy (the poll tax) and illustrates concretely how the party’s division over membership in the European Union matters. The teaching note invites discussion of the paradox of yearning for both a strong, decisive leader and someone who listens, consults, and shares power. Without fanfare, the case refutes the claim that women leaders are always more inclusive and consensus-oriented, but other gender aspects of this case are not supported by the narrative.

In “Twisting in the Wind” (Dickert, 1991a), readers are encouraged to ponder whether Ambassador April Glaspie failed to communicate American foreign policy adequately or was made a convenient scapegoat for the Administration’s failure to deter the invasion of Kuwait. The case richly supports a discussion of the difference between career diplomats and political appointees and how the Administration rewards or fails to reward loyalty. One cannot help wondering whether Glaspie, as the first woman ambassador to a Middle Eastern nation, made an easy target to label “too soft on Saddam,” but the text does not really provide the material needed to discuss the role of gender. Like the Thatcher case, gender issues may be present and a gender analysis fruitful, but this longtime feminist analyst finds it difficult to imagine how. Somewhat worrying, as well, is the fact that some readers will interpret the failure as April Glaspie’s, and the only story we have in the case of Margaret Thatcher is the one on her demise, not her incredible reign. If these two women protagonists are the only token women in international relations cases, the overall lesson is one of women’s failures, even though each case has merit on its own.

Other cases with female protagonists do raise gender issues but then do not fully support discussion of them in the text. One of the top 10 best-selling Kennedy School cases is “Ellen Schall and the Department of Juvenile Justice” (Howitt, 1987). Schall has the difficult task of stepping in to head the department following the resignation of a popular commissioner, who disagreed with the mayor’s closing a large institution for detention of juveniles. Schall faces many challenges at the outset, including the fact that her predecessor’s deputy wanted the job and remains in office. How does Schall handle him? Does she retain him as an indispensable asset, or dismiss him for undermining her own authority? We do not know, because the case never tells us. Although Schall is a female protagonist, the case does not support a discussion of the role gender might have played in her difficulties, if any. A different text might have invited students to assess whether gender played a role, and, if it did not, caution them against hasty assumptions. But, at least, such a case would have acknowledged the possibility that gender structures workplace interactions in complex ways.

We get only slightly more insight into these gender power and control issues in the companion case, “Taking Charge: Rose Washington and Spofford Juvenile Detention Center” (Warrock, 1989). Schall hires Washington, an African-American woman, to head Spofford, a juvenile detention center with many minority staff and juveniles. Washington, too, confronts a man who wanted her job, a deputy who refuses to vacate her office and desk chair. Washington tries waiting him out and coming in earlier but

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9 It would be interesting to pair this case with a reading of Nancy McGlen and Meredith Reid Sarkees’s (1993) excellent book on the integration of women in the departments of state and defense.
finally after three days has to say, “Could I have my desk, please?” Although the deputy is quoted as saying he felt “castrated” by Washington, and portrayed her to co-workers as a tool of the white commissioner (Schall), we know little more of the specifics of the deputy’s intransigence or how Washington overcame it, if she did, other than that she “took over” during a riot. Her deputy drops off stage, never to reappear.10

FRAMING OF THE ISSUE: WOMEN AS THE PROBLEM TO MANAGE

Just because a case raises a women and public policy issue does not mean that the chosen frame will prove useful—and the frame is the organizing principle for the information presented and the information left out. I use “Tailhook: The Navy Response” (Simon, 1995) in my politics of public affairs course because it deftly reveals the contrast in the standard operating procedures of the Naval Investigation Service and Naval Inspector General, perfectly illustrating both Allison and Zelikow’s (1995) and Wilson’s (1989) arguments about organizations and bureaucracy. By situating the issue of sexual harassment and sexism within an organizational context, the case shows how organizational capacity, rather than merely will or attitude, constrains managers and makes addressing the problem so difficult.

Despite the many virtues of the case, a limitation becomes immediately apparent. Because the case centers on the management challenges, the central problem for the protagonist becomes women rather than discrimination. The case laudably assumes that Lieutenant Paula Coughlin is telling the truth about her sexual assault by “the gauntlet” of male aviators. At one point, however, the author hints at what should have been done. The narrative subtly suggests that Coughlin’s boss should have said something like, “We’re never going to find the culprit and looking for him will do a lot of damage. But we can make sure that this never happens again.” The idea that a single commander could eliminate sex-based violence in such a large organization through the force of will, of course, is, sadly, ridiculous. (So, too, is the proposition that an organization that not only condoned but facilitated such behavior would reverse years of practice because of the horror of one woman’s complaint.) But the lesson remains that Coughlin would have been less of a “troublemaker”—going to the media, which resulted in the firing of high level officials—if her superiors had appeared to take her complaint seriously. The complaint of sexual harassment becomes the management problem rather than sexism and sexual harassment. One can hope that a skilled facilitator will use the discussion to highlight the way the case structures the problem. I would feel even more confident of the likelihood of such a prospect if teachers were supported in doing so by a teaching note (no note exists), or if teachers at policy school had some training in gender critiques.

Similar problematic framing comes in the case, “Walking a Fine Line” (Varley, 1991). We get no real analysis of the history of discrimination (by race and gender)
in the fire service and the long, tortured history of employment discrimination litigation proving intentional discrimination. We know nothing of the civil rights or women's rights' movements. Instead, we encounter the situation as a personnel problem for management. Unspecified outside pressure calls for hiring women. Yet few women pass the fitness test. Perhaps more worryingly, many veteran firefighters cannot pass the new fitness tests either. And what should be done about the concerns of wives about husbands fraternizing with women at the firehouse? Despite framing the integration of women as the problem for management (while offering some textual support for the conclusion that fitness and difference more generally is the issue, as is reconceptualizing what it means to be a firefighter), the case does generate fruitful discussion. Yet, women's voices are muted; they are minor characters, given voice only by men. We know little of their views, other than knowing one woman was a model firefighter. More troubling, as these cases currently exist, it would be too easy for the untutored instructor to shift the focus from the culture of organizations and a male norm to women's difference. Rather than questioning to what extent women differ from men, it is more common to assume the answer and then interpret the essential difference as a shortcoming (Kenney, 1992) necessitating affirmative action by an enlightened manager.

A perfect example of this danger is the case, “A Policewoman's Use of Deadly Force” (Dickert, 1991b). The text implicitly assumes that women will use force differently from men, feel differently about it, and that the incident will mean something different to the community. But is this so? The case superbly documents the hostility to women entering the police service in Houston. Tinsely Guinn-Shaver, the first woman police officer in Houston to use deadly force, is contemptuous of the dominant culture's “shoot first, ask questions later” policy. That policy has created disaffection within the minority community, whose members were disproportionately likely to be shot. The case offers a wonderful opportunity for discussing the use of deadly force. In contrast to “Walking a Fine Line” (Varley, 1991), the case has the virtue of showing how the integration of women might lead to better policing, rather than to declining standards, if women recruits bring strong interpersonal skills to the job, as well as a greater aversion to settling disputes with violence. It also undermines assumptions about women's lesser strength and ability to perform to standards created for men. I worry, however, that the case supports rather than challenges essentialism.11 I wonder what sort of discussion the case generates and fear its potential for misuse.

11 No teaching note exists for this case, but Winston does write about how he developed the case with one of the participants and his experience teaching it (Kleinig and Smith, 1997). Although Winston's explicit purpose is to invite students to question their assumptions about gender difference, he assumes, for example, that women have a disposition to nonviolence (p. 167) and supplements the case with readings from Carol Gilligan and Sara Ruddick (p. 170). Feminist scholars have long criticized Gilligan for both her methods and her assumptions, and have analyzed the interesting phenomenon of her “take up” with nonfeminists as a representative or ascendant feminist position about gender difference (Kenney, 1995). Despite his having the best of intentions, my fear is that Winston introduces conservative notions of feminism, oblivious to a long and deep literature within women's studies and, inadvertently, reinforces essentialist notions of difference that he seeks to challenge. Winston is clearly trying to move from women to gender as a category of analysis, which I applaud. And, as I have documented in this paper; even introducing women into the curriculum would be a major step forward for policy schools. Winston also deftly shows how facilitators can lead students to the realization that the discussions of gender difference may obscure the wider issue of when police should use deadly force. My goal, however, would be to introduce gender as a category in public policy education without starting where scholars began in the 1970s but informed by the rich body of thinking of the last 30 years. Perhaps no topic was more written about in the 1970s than the construction of difference. I wrote a book showing how biological difference is assumed and constructed rather than discovered through law and how that difference works to women's disadvantage (Kenney, 1992). This case has the potential to be paired with the latest scholarly writings on the construction of difference. But what is the mechanism for pointing teachers to that literature if case writers are unfamiliar with it?
Something in particular about the bookends of the case—ending with her lying in a hospital bed traumatized by having taken a life—troubles me. Are we to assume that she will quit? By ending this way, after dramatically recounting her heroic chase of a perpetrator, does the case suggest that women are not tough enough for either police work or changing institutions? Does it imply that the price of police work is too high for women? Does it imply that institutional culture can never be changed? What is the moral we are to draw?\(^\text{12}\) Perhaps all instructors whatever their background will apply the same filter I bring to the case and challenge our culture’s convention of drifting toward essentialism, skillfully teaching against the thread of the text. I worry, however, about those who may not.

**ISSUE FRAMING II: A WOMEN’S ISSUE, BUT NO WOMEN**

Perhaps the starkest example of problematic framing comes from a business case, “Dow Corning and the Breast Implant Controversy” (Emmons, 1994). By taking the CEO’s point of view, the controversial issue of breast implants becomes a management problem of marketing and presentation. Dow must figure out what to do about complaints from sales reps that plastic surgeons who fondle the implants at conventions recoil when the implants ooze silicone, leaving a slimy residue on hands and in the carrying cases. The leaking of the implants presents a problem of presentation and marketing rather than flagging that the implants may leak inside women’s bodies. The company must also decide how to quell the escalating concerns of company scientists about safety. And ultimately, of course, the manager’s problem is how to avoid liability and the ensuing falling stock prices. The case never addresses how to protect women’s health. Framing women and public policy issues exclusively as management problems erases women’s concerns and perspectives, thereby reproducing the very devaluation of women that having a token case about women was presumably meant to rectify.

“Cocaine Mothers” (Gomez-Ibanez, 1990) has been completely overtaken by events that include the Supreme Court’s overturning South Carolina’s practice of drug testing pregnant women without their consent in public hospitals,\(^\text{13}\) but its shortcomings illustrate a wider problem. The case invites students to take a position on a public policy problem: Should states (prosecutors and courts, and ultimately, legislators) extend child abuse laws to cover prenatal exposures? The case lacks any social context for this decision, however. We get no perspective on the gender, race, and class issues. Why are African-American women tested for cocaine in public hospitals (and why are they in public hospitals—because they lack access to private health care) while white women are not tested for alcohol or other substances of abuse whose harm to the fetus is better documented? What evidence do we have that this problem is indeed an epidemic, when it has all the hallmarks of what sociologists call a “moral panic,” having little to do with the issue of babies’ health? The complexity of the legal issues is erased when “legal experts” are introduced as a monolith. The case never asks why those most knowledgeable about prenatal health and those on the

\(^{12}\) A case that nicely addresses the integration issue without framing women as the problem to be managed is “Women in the Navy” (Schumacher, 1988). Like Tailhook (Simon, 1995), the case presents the personnel issues in all their complexity. The case makes the argument for the importance of an inside watchdog investigating group, such as the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), illustrates the importance of who gets appointed to leadership positions, and demonstrates how sexual harassment and sexuality issues can easily crowd out other gender issues, such as combat restrictions.

front lines of health care delivery vociferously oppose the policy. Feminist legal scholars have written extensively on this issue from its emergence, yet the case cites only a handful of sources. While we want more cases, want to encourage case writers to go beyond their narrow scholarly expertise, and want people to draw on newspapers for current topics, the implicit analytical framework of this case, like the breast implants case, is so problematic that it renders the case unusable even if it were not simply dated.

Cases do not have to make a gender analysis of a women and public policy problem the central focus in order to be excellent cases. In fact, if more than 1 percent of all women and public policy cases had female protagonists, it would be a helpful corrective to have men dealing with women and public policy issues and women dealing with nongender issues. Two excellent cases explore the consequences of returning the abortion question to the states after *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*. Two pro-life Republican men legislators were happy to restrict abortions up to a point, but when they drew a line, they were savaged by pro-life activists in the party and drummed out of office. “A Change of Heart: Abortion and the Missouri General Assembly” (Kates, 1990) and its companion case, “Senator Scott Heiderpriem and the South Dakota Anti-Abortion Bill” (Dickert, 1993), are both beautifully written and well researched, although the first is half the length of the second, which perhaps makes it more usable. The case shows constitutional law as cover for legislators whose conscience will not permit them simply to reflect the views of a majority of their constituents. Although more than 10 years old, the cases are relevant today. They show social movement strategy and fragmentation in both the pro-choice and pro-life communities. But most importantly, the cases bring to life the agony of two men wrestling with difficult legislative choices, who sacrifice their career for a principle. While advancing the important point that women's issues concern us all—men as well as women—the cases lack women characters and women's voices. It would have been pedagogically useful to do a third case of a pro-choice Republican woman wrestling with the same issue, or even to have the Missouri or South Dakota stories told from the standpoint of women abortion providers or social movement activists. As before, my main criticism remains the pool, and not these two individual cases.

A good counterpoint to the problematic framing of the case on breast implants is the (sadly, now dated) Harvard Business School case, “RU486” (Badaracco and Sturr, 1990). The protagonist of the case is the pharmaceutical company Roussel UCLAF (partially owned by the German firm Hoechst), which must decide whether to go forward and market the drug in France and China and whether it should seek FDA approval in the United States. Roussel faces growing opposition within the company, as well as from pro-life activists, who threaten not only a worldwide boycott but also violence. A 1993 case on the same subject published by the *Case Research Journal* (Bol and Rosenthal, 1993) takes up more directly the decision to seek FDA approval and highlights more strongly the company's fear of tort litigation. The first case more clearly makes the company the protagonist, while the second is about the issue more generally. Both cases mention women's groups and the significance of the issue for women. Both cases would work well for business students, but for a more complete public policy perspective, we need case studies that tell the story from other points of view, such as those of the World Health Organization, the Ford Foundation, the Feminist Majority, Planned Parenthood, or even

governmental agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration, or members of Congress. Why do we not have cases such as these in our large databases of cases? Even within their narrow frame, both cases would now need considerable updating.15

DEFYING CASE CONVENTIONS: PROVIDING THE RIGHT ANSWER?

As a new case teacher, I had enormous trepidation about whether texts could really leave questions open, whether case writers were in fact steering students to a correct answer or framework by the structure of the narrative and the kinds of information they presented. I found Chetkovich and Kirp’s (2001) analysis compelling precisely because, through textual analysis, they unmasked the implicit message of cases. Happily, even cases that are not perfectly constructed admit to many interpretations and can generate productive class discussion. In fact, the more a case seems to foreclose a discussion, the more provocative it may be to students who insist on discussing it. Teachers can teach against the text, and invite students to interrogate the silences. Yet the case-writing convention is that issues that have a right answer do not make good cases. The more a case explicitly or implicitly steers or forecloses, the less it presents a real dilemma, and the less productive it will be of good discussion.

The Kennedy School’s case on Emily’s List (Simon, 1994), its single case about a feminist organization, I read as favoring one side of the issue, and I am also deeply troubled by how it sets up the two sides, pitting feminists against campaign finance reformers. The case does a good job of describing the formation of the organization and Emily’s List’s activities and describing why Common Cause is opposed to PAC contributions, including bundling. As a political scientist, I find the case disappointing for singling out money as the sole cause of the power of incumbency rather than identifying the contributing factors of the creation of safe seats, first through racial exclusion and one-party states, and then through political gerrymandering. Moreover, if the purpose of the case (for which no teaching note exists) is to expose the many pernicious effects of money in campaigns, it would be useful to talk about Nixon’s campaign and corruption, or the role of television, or even the Supreme Court’s ruling that legislative attempts to equalize the speech of rich and poor (as opposed to preventing the appearance of corruption) are constitutionally impermissible. Instead, the case positions Emily’s List—not the National Rifle Association, the insurance industry, the pharmaceutical industry, or big tobacco—as the enemy of campaign finance reform. And this despite the fact that Emily’s List does not lobby the women it helps elect once they are in office. Moreover, it positions the women Emily’s List has elected as the corrupt insiders blocking progressive legislative changes.

Perhaps as run, the case does generate a discussion of why progressives might oppose campaign finance reforms independently of the issue of electing women. Perhaps students do consider whether Emily’s List’s bundling is the same as the insurance industry’s. Perhaps students will even suggest why it is problematic to construct women (the majority of the population) as a special interest group on a moral plane with the NRA and argue that this is an effective rhetorical strategy of those on the losing end of the gender gap. Perhaps those inclined to think structurally will observe, in fact, that feminist political scientists find the evidence very complex in deciding what electoral systems best favor women. Term limits, for

15 Women and Politics has six articles in its special issue on RU 486 in volume 24, number 3 (2002).
example, have not fulfilled their progressive promise. As it exists, however, I argue that the case presents the dilemma as asking whether we should elect more women by working the (implicitly corrupt) system or fix the system.

The case ends with the following pronouncement: “In 1994 House and Senate conferees were scheduled to meet to reconcile their differences, choosing, in the process, between the reform that Emily’s List had already brought to Congress and another kind of campaign finance reform that promised to bring even greater diversity to Congress and to give an even greater advantage to women than Emily’s List had” (Simon, 1994, p. 11). I read this statement as providing an answer to the questions the case raises, as choosing Common Cause’s position over Emily’s List’s. In so doing, it says that Ellen Malcolm and her organization are not just wrong in choosing electing women over campaign finance reform, but they are wrong about what will elect more women. I would prefer to support such a discussion more fully in the case (perhaps referring to the voluminous scholarship in political science over this very issue) rather than foreclose it through the text.

**FAILURE OF IMAGINATION: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE WRITER? WHAT DOES THE TEXT SUPPORT?**

Cases may depart from case conventions by not really presenting a dilemma at all.16 “Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor” (Neustadt, 1981) presents a well-researched and well-written account of the first woman cabinet member and her history as a progressive reformer. A firebrand molded in settlement and suffrage work who keeps her own name upon marriage, Perkins learns early on in politics that she appears less transgressive if she can remind men of their mothers. The case ends with how she overcomes the skepticism and hostility of men cabinet members as well as the media. Although the case provides a history of an important “first” and captures the flavor of the times and how progressive women entered politics through maternalist feminism (Gordon, 1994), the case does not work as a case. No decision point forces readers to embrace the protagonist’s dilemma. Nor is it clear what larger issues the case is meant to raise for discussion.

The abstract on the Web site indicates that the case was written to be paired with “Mary Anderson and the Women’s Bureau” (Powers, 1981) for an exercise in “thinking in time” called “placing strangers.”17 Mary Anderson was the first director of the Women’s Bureau in the Department of Labor. The case tells her life story, but ends with the dilemma of what she should do about Secretary Perkins’s proposal to abolish the Women’s Bureau. In their excellent book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May (1986) teach prospective policymakers to use history “to understand people whose age, sex, race, nationality, or beliefs are different from one’s own” (p. xiii). By plotting a time line of historical events, then placing Frances Perkins and Mary Anderson on it (what they call the exercise of placement), readers immediately forecast trouble. Frances Perkins was a well-educated, relatively privileged social reformer who believed in professionalism and expertise. Mary Anderson was a Swedish immigrant who

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16 For example, the cases on women in philanthropy, such as “Mrs. Russell Sage” (Mulhearn, 2000), are not decision cases at all and only when illuminated by their teaching notes does one discover their pedagogic utility.
17 Unfortunately, the supporting teaching note, while listed, is not available for review on the Kennedy School of Government’s site. None of the teaching notes for the placing strangers exercises are downloadable from the Web site.
worked at menial jobs and rose within the ranks of the labor movement. The cases only offer a genuine dilemma when paired. Separately, they read as biographical essays. But when paired, and when informed by Neustadt and May's placement exercise, they are powerful. Readers are invited not only to develop a critical thinking skill in tracing through the likely implications of difference in developing strategies, but to reflect on the meaning of sex, gender, and feminist identification by two very different women. Anderson errs in assuming that sex and feminism would create an automatic bond—a lesson that remains important today. And Perkins fails to take into account their common constituencies and support network. My experience with nearly dismissing such cases as not useful for my teaching purposes underscores the importance of creating a community among case teachers and making available teaching notes. Those of us developing case teaching skills in isolation can easily miss the potential of any given case.

COMPLYING WITH CASE CONVENTIONS: MANUFACTURING A PROTAGONIST

By presenting policy questions as problems facing individual protagonists, cases may frame gender questions in ways that may well impede feminist insights. The case writers' trying too hard to follow the rules and conventions of decision-forcing cases may hinder the gender analysis. In “Sexploitation? Sex Tourism in Cuba” Mary Geske and Michael Clancy (2000), political scientists who taught international relations, sought to begin to rectify the total absence (the inexorable zero) of cases on women, gender, or feminism within the Pew Case Studies in International Affairs.

Feminist scholars in international relations have recently challenged the conclusion that, because few women have been heads of state or secretaries of state and defense, gender analysis, while perhaps helpful in understanding social policy, has nothing to offer international relations. Rather than asking whether women diplomats or heads of state are less hawkish than men (the ubiquitous different voice frame that feminists have routinely criticized), scholars such as Cynthia Enloe (1989) have simply asked, Where are the women? They are prostitutes servicing military bases, maids in large tourist hotels, workers on banana plantations and textile factories, consumers, and tourists. They are Oliver North's glamorous secretary, Fawn Hall, wives of servicemen, and Carmen Miranda, a singer used to sell bananas. International relations is not just about war (although feminists have analyzed rape as a weapon of war and the prostitution military bases generate). Women are both workers and consumers in a world economy radically structured by gender. Gender analysis thus can illuminate security policy and international political economy in important ways. Yet international relations has been one of the last subfields of political science to entertain gender analysis.

Geske and Clancy (2000) presented their case at an American Political Science Association panel on case teaching in 1998 and then substantially revised it. They provide the historical context of Cuba's economy and place prostitution within the world economic order (although they do not fully reflect the breadth of feminist writing and activism on this topic). They document the rise in sex tourism to Cuba. The earlier draft, in my view, supports the reader in placing the blame for the sex-

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18 In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Justice O'Connor writes about the inference one can draw from a discrepancy between the number of women in a given workforce and the number of qualified applicants for purposes of employment discrimination. While O'Connor is careful to restrict the pool to those qualified and seeking employment, she concedes that the total absence of women is incriminating, what she calls “the inexorable zero.” 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987)
ual exploitation of Cuban women on men from developed Western countries who travel to buy women who are cheaper, more compliant, and more “exotic” because of the racialization of Latin women. Tour operators who explicitly organize tours and market them accordingly, as well as those who encourage tourism for Third World development, are additional potential villains. The first version has no single protagonist, a “no-no” for a decision-forcing case. The case offers one example of international organizing to prevent the sexual exploitation of children as a possible way forward but also shows the economic constraints under which Cuban officials operate. As revised, however, the central characters are Cuban officials. The question posed is whether Cuban governmental policy should be to continue to market and sell Cuban women to tourists—to build on what economists would call its comparative advantage, cheap sex—or suffer even more severe economic consequences.

The case skillfully demonstrates how prostitution is produced, not only by intentional governmental policy, but also by the world economic system, rather than merely resulting from the “free choices” of women and men. The imperative to have a single protagonist, Cuban governmental officials, however, ultimately distorts our understanding of the issue by inflating the agency of the Cubans and, by leaving the other characters offstage, implicitly exonerating them. The revised version may have a single identifiable decision maker whose unhappy alternatives may generate student discussion, but the price of conformity to the formula is too high. Our understanding of prostitution in the world economic order has been diminished as a result.

DEFYING CASE CONVENTIONS: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES

One of the very best cases I found was “Privacy and Publicity: The Senate Confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas” by Jillian Dickert (1992). Without having a single protagonist, the case deftly handles the complex details of the episode as it unfolds. Should Anita Hill go public? Should the Senate Judiciary Committee consider her evidence without her consent? Should someone leak inside information? The case supports a discussion of the issue of sexual harassment and how we select Supreme Court justices, but also a broader discussion of race, gender, and sexual politics. While longish (22 pages plus appendices; sequel, 19 plus appendices), the narrative succinctly presents the story. Without seeing the story only through the eyes of one decision maker, the case actually permits thinking about multiple perspectives, never losing sight of the concrete dilemmas of each. In this case, you have women players (Anita Hill, Nina Totenberg), women’s issues (sexual harassment), gender and race politics, and the politics of sex while having some sympathy and sensitivity for the privacy concerns of Thomas and the problems faced by the all-male, all-white members of the Judiciary Committee. Like Tailhook, this case skillfully shows how institutional rules and capacities (reliance on the FBI for background checks, for example) shape how this dramatic confrontation unfolds. Even if one were not teaching cases, I would assign this case as an excellent and short account of what happened.

A BOTTOM-UP RATHER THAN TOP-DOWN APPROACH: WOMEN PRODUCING CHANGE AS ACTIVISTS, NOT JUST ELITES, AND AS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NOT JUST INDIVIDUALS

By focusing on heads of governmental agencies as protagonists, many cases neglect social movements and the discursive aspects of politics—that is to say, politics as debates about meaning. Yet case teaching is flexible and instructors may choose to
focus on other characters. Rather than focusing on leadership at the top, as “Girl Scouts of the U.S.A.” (Heskett, 1989) does, “The Origins of the YWCA’s Anti-Racism Campaign” (Nelson, 1989) shows how black women organized themselves separately to change the mission of the YWCA to add “eliminate racism” to its mission of “empower women and girls.” Their separatism and extra-parliamentary maneuvering enabled the institution to integrate. Black women were in the minority of attendees at the national convention, yet they managed to persuade others to join their cause. The contest was not primarily about power, numbers, bargaining, and interest, but about persuasion, framing, and construction. For white women, to vote against expanding the mission, or for excluding the motion on procedural grounds, would have been to endorse racism within the organization and the wider society. Despite the fact that the YWCA case seems to defy case-writing conventions, it works—it provides enough material for a vigorous discussion. It has no named, heroic protagonists and no real decision point, yet it beautifully illustrates how dramatic change occurs within an organization.

Chris Barrett (1997a, b, c, d) from the University of York has written four cases on women’s issues distributed by the European Case Clearinghouse and upping their poor numbers considerably. Best among them is “Women-Only? The Labour Party and Positive Discrimination in Candidate Selection” (Barrett, 1997a). In 17 pages, Barrett shows how the Labour Party changed its policy to require women-only short-lists of candidates in one-third of all winnable constituencies with an open seat. The case leads to a discussion of the desirability of such quotas and the value of increasing women's legislative representation. The second case, “Confrontation at Creil: Secularism, Multi-Culturalism, and the ‘Head Scarves Affair’ in France” (Barrett, 1997b) also employs multiple perspectives surrounding the controversy over Muslim girls wearing scarves in French state schools. While the case nicely highlights the structure of the French state and public education, and supports a discussion of the social construction of any public policy issue, the text supports more discussion of the incident as a freedom of religion issue and less on the aspects of gender and feminism. Nevertheless, I think the case raises important issues about multiple Islams, as well as state power and minority rights. The case, “Is there a ‘Right to Reproduce?’ The One-Child Family Policy in China and Reproductive Rights” (Barrett, 1997c) does a wonderful job of setting out the policy dilemmas: explosive population growth versus individual rights, reproductive freedom versus collective needs (see also Hansel, 2003). Unfortunately, I cannot readily envisage how the fourth case, “The Failure of Feminism” (Barrett, 1997d), works as a case at all without the help of a teaching note.

Feminist scholars have, by and large, rejected a narrow definition of politics and taken a bottom-up rather than top-down approach to politics. For example, as Geske and Clancy (2000) do with Cuban prostitutes, feminists tend to start with the women affected by policies as important theorists of how the world works. Feminists more often focus on leaders drawn from everyday life, rather than constructing history as the moves in a game played by great men. Furthermore, early second-wave20 feminists in the United States pronounced that there are no personal solutions to social problems, only accommodations. Rather than trying to figure

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19 The case could now be updated to reflect the successful challenge under the Sex Discrimination Act and the role of the Women's Equality Unit in the cabinet in overcoming the Labour Government's recalcitrance to amending the law.

20 In the taxonomy of American women's history, scholars tend to refer to the campaign for suffrage (roughly 1848–1920) as the first wave of feminism and the explosion of the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s as the second wave. Some scholars dispute such a characterization of the interim period as the doldrums and others say they are now part of a third wave.
out the perfect retort to silence the sexual harasser, or the right clothes to wear to break through the glass ceiling or to avoid sexual assault, feminists tend to favor large, structural changes and collective action. While we do want to disseminate “what works” and applaud successful experiments, it would be misguided to believe that a Naval officer is going to “solve” sexism or racism or even create an oasis of nondiscrimination through his individual actions and good intentions alone. One can learn from approaches and strategies, but it would be a mistake to think managers or policy analysts could read a 10-page case and find the magic bullet to make an unsuccessful job applicant vacate one’s seat or placate disgruntled firefighters. Rather, one hopes that a lesson students take away from the case is the complexity of the issues and that the case provides a window for exploring that complexity through vigorous class discussion.

THE CENTER ON WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICY’S CASE PROGRAM

Operating on the assumption that it is easier to teach feminists how to write cases than it is to teach case writers how to think like feminists, the Center on Women and Public Policy embarked on a project to produce case studies in the summer of 2000, pulling together scholars, activists, and Extension educators from many different disciplinary backgrounds. We completed the second round in the summer of 2003. We produced eight cases, which are freely available on our Web site. A professor of rhetoric prepared a case on how direct entry (or lay) midwives in Minnesota strategized about how to secure the benefits of state licensing without having to give up procedures they routinely performed under the radar of legal and medical control (Lay, 2001). A historian described Emily’s List’s quandary over whether to endorse Geraldine Ferraro or Elizabeth Holtzman for the 1992 U.S. Senate race in New York (Evans, 2001). A political scientist looked at how feminist activists joined in coalition to secure the appointment of the first woman to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1977 and mobilized to help her win the ensuing judicial election where she faced three male challengers (Kenney, 2001c). The business manager of the Minnesota Women’s Press recounted the drama of how a bank officer’s refusal to allow it to make good on its promise to distribute profits to low-wage workers nearly led to the demise of the enterprise (Magnuson, 2001). A sociologist described how the deadlock over a development plan for Morocco, which included divorce reform, polarized French-speaking elite women reformers and Arabic-speaking fundamentalist women, dividing those who had previously found some common ground (Ghazalla, 2001). An extension educator recounted how African-American settlement house workers leveraged their networks of white supporters to advance the educational careers of African-American women in times of strict segregation (Stone, 2001). A professor in public health narrated the trauma and subsequent litigation arising when the management of a home for developmentally disabled adults refused to respond to repeated sexual assaults on women caretakers (McGovern, Cossi, and Findorff, 2001). And a women’s studies professor and creative writer analyzed how two rural women transgressed traditional gender roles to develop the legal expertise necessary to prevent farm foreclosures in rural Minnesota (Hunter, 2001). Synopses of six new cases on women’s human rights, produced in the summer of
The first was written by feminist historian Sara Evans as part of her research for the sequel to *Personal Politics* (1980), on second-wave feminism in the United States, *Tidal Wave* (2003). Evans's case (2001), “The Power to Choose,” narrates the dilemma of whom Emily's List should endorse for the 1992 Democratic Senate primary in New York. Feminists were forced to choose between Elizabeth Holtzman, the darling of the Watergate hearings and a longtime champion of women's causes, and Geraldine Ferraro, revered and loved for being the first woman nominated on a major party ticket for Vice President. Ultimately, Emily's List's decision turned on viability—Ferraro was thought to play better upstate, to be the superior fundraiser, and to appeal to moderates. The case generates a lively discussion of compromising and winning versus going for “what you really want.” It produces a rich discussion of feminist strategizing and questions of organizational risk and maintenance and the power of donors, insiders, and personal networks. It provides a wonderful opportunity to talk about a social movement coming of age and making hard choices with serious costs. It educates students about Political Action Committees (PACs), mainstream politics, and a powerful feminist non-profit organization (NGO).

A second case, “The Value of Women's Words and Women's Work” (Magnuson, 2001), concerns the financial viability of a feminist institution, the Minnesota Women's Press. Devoted to sharing profits, whenever they existed, rather than raising wages and jeopardizing the financial health of the organization, the managers of the Press discover that its banker does not see its largess as a sound business practice. The Press is faced with having to renege on its promise or lose its loan. The writer of the case, Kathy Magnuson, was frustrated by the paucity of material about running a feminist business and the readiness of most feminists to see such an entity as an oxymoron. Profits, money, and business are to be eschewed by pure feminists. The case is also useful for highlighting the difficulties of maintaining fringe organizations (or any small business, for that matter) and turns the reader's attention to the important question of how feminists are going to preserve their institutions. The case also celebrates creativity in solving economic problems.

Third, Pat McGovern et al.'s case (2001), “Institutionalized Violence: When Does Care Giving Become Submission to Violence? Work Related Risks for Health Care Providers,” unlike the other two, is retrospective rather than decision forcing. It recounts the sequence of events leading up to a sexual harassment lawsuit against an operator of community-based care for developmentally disabled adults. McGovern, a professor of public health, was frustrated by the paucity of suitable case material for her occupational health graduate courses. The case quickly outlines sexual harassment law, but more importantly, captures the anguish of the caretakers, the human cost of management's insensitivity to their harm, and management's mistakes at numerous points in the saga. Educators at the National Institute of Health, hungry for materials to help health care professionals think through management problems productively, have already sought out McGovern's case.

In the summer of 2003, the Center on Women and Public Policy held its second case-writing institute, funded by the Otto Bremer Foundation. Six cases on women's human rights are in production. Two cases deal with crisis points in domestic violence shelters. One is on electing the first African-American woman mayor of Minneapolis. The fourth is on working in partnership for domestic vio-
lence legislation in Bulgaria. The fifth is on the abuelos of the Plaza de Mayo. And, the sixth is on the appointment of women judges to the International Criminal Court. All six will be available free on our Web site.

CONCLUSION

Cases have many virtues. Through storytelling, cases present lessons of public policymaking, bringing to life the dilemmas faced by real people. They convey the wisdom to be gleaned from successes and failures, compensate somewhat for the lack of experience on the part of students, and facilitate not only vigorous participation and engagement by students, but critical thinking. Cases breathe life into theory by showing its relevance, even for students who are practically oriented and just want the “tools.” Nevertheless, these stories, when read carefully, reveal the underlying theoretical orientations of the case writers. Cases, like the policy schools that produced them, have almost completely ignored women’s issues. The paucity of case materials on gender is unacceptable. Yet, even when they are not directly about women’s issues, or even if the protagonists are not women, cases contain powerful messages about gender—messages feminists wish to expose and challenge. Despite having a female protagonist, many of the cases I examined ignore gender as an issue, although it is clearly shaping the political environment. Or, women protagonists appear only as the architects of failure. Some cases that try to take on gender frame women rather than institutional sexism as the problem facing managers. In other cases, women’s concerns—often presented unsympathetically—are obstacles to be swept away or themselves obstacles to reform. Sometimes, by focusing on a lone decision maker or only elites, cases sideline women’s concerns as irrelevant. Or, focusing on a single decision point obscures the causes of women’s oppression. Forcing episodes into the narrative structure of a case may distort our understanding of social movements, social and economic structures, and human agency, as well as spotlight individual leaders rather than collectivities.

We need women protagonists in more than 1 percent of the cases, regardless of the topic. We need cases on women and public policy issues, and there has been no shortage of them on the public agenda, from abortion restrictions to violence against women. We need cases that highlight the dilemmas faced by women’s organizations, be they battered women’s shelters or NGOs working on women’s international human rights. And we need cases that explore how gender shapes public policy. Cases whose texts have many shortcomings may still provoke lively and fruitful discussion. But, I think particularly for cases that explore gender as a conceptual tool and the dilemmas facing feminist organizations, we need case writers who are immersed in the scholarly literature on the topic to provide some exemplars. That has been the goal of the Center on Women and Public Policy’s case project. The question of why the number of cases is so low, and why faculty in schools of public policy lag so far behind the disciplines in incorporating women and public policy into the curriculum is a topic for another day.

This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management, November 2001, Washington, D.C. Thanks to John Boehrer, Ellen Schall, and Carol Chetkovich for their helpful comments. Thanks to Heather Calvin, Jessica Webster, and Natalie Elkan for research assistance.

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