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ANALYZING RACIST DISCOURSE: VARIABILITY AND STABILITY

Introduction: it did not come as a surprise

"It came as a surprise to nearly everyone when this icon of northern European welfare-state progressivism, and the erstwhile poster child of liberal immigration policy, descended into an inflammatory election campaign last November. The issues of immigration and refugees took center stage, despite Denmark's record-low unemployment and the fact that less than 8 percent of its population is of foreign origin," wrote Sasha Polakow-Suransky in *The American Prospect*'s June 3, 2002 issue. This was indeed a common reaction in the international media to the victory to right wing Liberal Party that used an anti-immigrant rhetoric in its election campaign. Danish People's Party (DPP) whose political program is based on two pillars – reducing the number of immigrants and opposing Danish membership of European Union, finished third with 12 percent of the vote. But the important aspect in all this, many reporters noted, is not only that DDP won such a big share of the vote, but that mainstream political parties quietly adopted rightwing extremism, or as Stephen Smith also wrote in *The Guardian* on June 5, 2002: "what we are witnessing in Denmark is nothing less than the return of rightwing extremism to respectability … through the quiet adoption of their stance by mainstream political parties."

The American Prospect's article captures quite well what the whole debate is about and what is at stake: DPP brought immigration to the forefront of political debate in Denmark. At its core, this debate is about social solidarity and the nature of the welfare state; about who is entitled to remain in the Danish welfare system's benevolent realm and who should be pushed out. DPP's success came as Social Democratic Party (SDP) moved steadily toward the center, working to unite its constituency behind a pro-EU stand, and certain members of the party's working class base saw it as a betrayal of the party's working class roots. According to Polakow-Suransky, this silenced, disillusioned, blue-collar constituency found a voice when DPP raised a voice for reducing the number of immigrants and against further integration of Denmark in the European Union. These two issues both of which spoke to working class anxieties about globalization and postindustrial economy struck immediate chord with working class constituency of SDP. In other words, "rapid demographic change, postindustrial economic malaise, and fear of competition for generous welfare entitlements have propelled the DPP to prominence… At the core of DPP worldview is the firm belief that the welfare state can exist only in a 'closed circuit'." Having seen the coming of DPP success, the entire political spectrum was infused in xenophobia. Even SDP entered the fray with several of its ministers expressing views that could as well have been taken out of DPP statements on immigration. It is a debate, Polakow-Suransky concludes, ultimately, about what it means to be Danish; whether Denmark is an ethnic community or civic one; an exclusionary body politic or an inclusive one. Denmark is in a crossroad: "In one direction lies a regressive policy of isolationism – one that idealizes a nostalgic image of an innocent Danish past. The other envisages a multicultural society, enriched by the benefits of cosmopolitanism but also beset by its challenges."

The article in The American Prospect is in many ways a perfect analysis of the situation in Denmark and could easily be the main argument in my project that also focuses on changes in public discourse on immigration in Denmark. If the political discourse in Denmark can be

analyzed in a four-page article that summarizes the major trends in discourse and sets up important questions for further thinking, what, then, are we left with? Do we really need an academic dispute of some hundred pages to understand what can be summarized in a short and concise article?

Yet, I am still tempted to produce many thousands of words that will partly confirm the main points of the Polakow-Suransky article but also put its conclusions in a different theoretical perspective. A leading question will be: why, and more importantly, how did the debate come to focus on immigration rather than any other issue? For example, it could easily have been focused on the economic performance of the government that is also closely related to the future of Danish welfare system. After all, the SDP-led government that took over a devastated economy with an unemployment rate over 10 percent in 1993 was capable of turning the economy upwards making Denmark one of the most successful economies in Europe, putting down the unemployment rate to less than 5 percent. Related to this, one can also ask if the nature of the issues should be taken for granted. To ask it in another way: are "rapid demographic change, postindustrial economic malaise, and fear of competition for generous welfare entitlements" really given social and economic facts "that have propelled the DPP to prominence", or is it DPP or rather, the xenophobic right wing groups that managed to articulate these questions in a way that they became the hegemonic framework in which these issues are discussed as the main concerns of Danish people today?

Let's begin with the claim that "DDP brought immigration to the forefront of political debate in a raw and uncompromising manner that was entirely new to the country's politics and did so at a time when few other parties were even willing to raise the issue." To an American journalist who occasionally visits Denmark, this may have come as a surprise, but to people who have been regularly following the Danish political climate, it was only the culmination of a popular debate that, since the mid-eighties, increasingly has focused on immigrants as a threat to a forged image of indigenous and traditional Danish national identity. Gaasholt and Togeby concluded their comprehensive survey of Danes' attitudes on immigrants and refugees and the media's coverage of immigration that during the eighties the xenophobic right wing parties had won the struggle for both getting the attention of the media, and the way the question of immigration is framed in the media. "They won the struggle for the symbols, metaphors and stories" (1995: 163). Gaasholt and Togeby concluded that the focus in media stories on immigrants had shifted from immigrants' legal and social problems in Denmark to 'their culture' (often synonymous with religion) as a major threat to Danish national culture, and as the greatest obstacle to their integration into Danish society. Necef (2000) even goes further back and sets the period in which the question of immigration was transformed from one framed as a labor question to a problem of culture, into mid-seventies. (p. 133).

In short, there seems to be a consensus among Danish researchers that there has been a significant shift in public discourse on immigrants at least since the mid-eighties. My hypothesis is that the shift can be traced to September 1986, when Søren Krarup, who became a leader of an anti-immigration movement and now is an MP for Danish People's Party, began a campaign against Denmark's immigration policy, which he described as the greatest threat to Danishness and accused the political elite to be deaf to Danish people's worries – a move similar to the conservative MP Enoch Powell's infamous speech, "Rivers of Blood" in April 1968 in Britain. Despite an overwhelmingly negative coverage of the campaign, Krarup and his company succeeded in convincing the political elite that it did not listen to people's concerns about immigration – a claim to which the elite responded by adapting the main lines of the proposed policy, continuously tightening immigration law and eroding immigrants' rights ever since

(despite the fact that they never included the extreme right in its ranks.) (Larsen 2001; Yilmaz 1997b; Yilmaz 2000).

How did this happen? Or rather: what is the nature of public opinion that makes it susceptible to right wing rhetoric? What are the mechanisms for qualitative changes in discourse on immigration that have occurred during the eighties almost all over Europe, as many scholars observed? (Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Benson 2000). These are the questions that I will discuss in this paper at a rather abstract theoretical level, as specific claims about how and why changes occurred need to be qualified through an analysis of data – a task that is beyond the limits of this paper.

The next section is about the nature of opinions and attitudes. The leading question for this paper is: do people really run around with opinions and attitudes on this and that, which they reproduce upon request? The discussion will be based on some preliminary analysis of qualitative interviews which a team of interviewers and I conducted during the summer of 2001 in Denmark. I will also draw upon interviews that were made in 1996. My approach here can best be described as constructivist based on a combination of two major discourse theories. As such this paper is also a review of different strands within discourse (analytical) theory. Through my discussions, I hope to suggest a particular method of analysis as well as combining the insights of diverse work on discourse theory. (I have mainly discursive psychology (Loughborough school) and Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory in mind.)

The nature of reality: towards a theory of public discourse

Some years ago, I was in a southern Turkish town together with a Danish photographer. We arrived in the town on its market day, (farmers' market). It is usually the women who are at the market selling their products while the men conduct other, normally official, business. This was partly a working holiday where I was supposed to write a series of articles on Turkey for Danish newspapers and magazines to be illustrated by her photographs.

The Danish photographer did not waste her time and began to take a series of photographs of the market place, and I noticed that she was focusing her lens particularly on the women in "traditional dress"[1]. Sipping on our cocktails in one of the countless bars at the harbor, she told me that this town reminded her so much a small Italian town where she spend some wonderful holidays a couple of times. Getting the cue, I asked her whether the town or Turkey in general really seemed to be so "traditional" in her eyes as she 'pictured' it. "No, that is not the point," she said: "how on earth can people otherwise see that these pictures are from Turkey?"

This anecdote illustrates three of the main points in this paper. Firstly, our accounts of the world are never merely simple and neutral descriptions of reality but particular versions of it. When the photographer frames her picture, she does not simply mirror the reality out there already defined by its nature, but frames a version of that reality which can never enter into human practice without first being described and categorized. In Rorty's words, "The world does not speak. Only we do." (1989: 12). This is not to say that "reality" does not exist external to thought or language, but that it is not readily categorized, or sorted out by its nature, which we then merely mirror in our language use. In other words, it does not mean that she distorts the reality out there but that descriptions, whether in photography or in language, are human practices. If we want to debate whether a description is a construction or reflection of the reality, the problem will be that reality cannot enter this debate except as another description, which will impose the same question (Potter 1996a; Tonkiss 1998).

Why do some versions, then, seem to be more realistic (factual) and natural than others?

There are two aspects of this issue. First, at a more abstract ideological level the realism effect is secured by the taken-for-granted quality of the premises for argumentation. As Rorty cites from Kuhn's *The Copernican Revolution*, the idea that the earth was the center of the universe was not discarded on the basis of some telescopic observations but rather as a result of "hundred years of inconclusive muddle, the Europeans found themselves speaking in a way which took these interlocked theses for granted" (Rorty 1989: 6). Realism, then, is a product of historically developed familiarity that is drawn on in discourse. In other words, if a description is regarded as realistic, it is because it is so familiar that it operates transparently. In Denmark, it would for example be taken for granted that a picture taken from a meeting with immigrant women wearing scarf is a reflection of reality; not only the reality of the actual meeting but also of 'the reality of immigrant culture'. My data sample is full of such descriptions of 'immigrant culture'. Consequently, the reporters and photographers also know how to 'illustrate' this 'reality' by using the codes that connote the familiarity of the Other.

However, this account of realism treats realism of descriptions as an outcome of an automatic process: when people see familiar forms of sense making, they take it as a natural reflection of the external reality. But if we look at actual data – that is how people account for their descriptions of the world – we would see that realism of a version often has to be achieved rhetorically in a given context through rhetorical devices and techniques. By building up one's credibility, managing issues of accountability, and producing descriptions as external and independent of the speaker, descriptions of the world are turned into facts; they are stabilized and reified as just how things are (Potter 1996a). The realism effect is, then, achieved mainly through argumentation which is the other aspect of the issue of realism.

The second main point that the anecdote illustrates is that depending on the context different and often contrasting versions of the same reality can be constructed. The intriguing thing about the photographer's account was her awareness of the effects she wanted to achieve with her picture. She was aware that she did not necessarily see the Turkish town as she framed it in her pictures. She would probably have framed the pictures otherwise if they had been meant for use in a different context, for example for an article about travel in Turkey, or for keeping memories. We use, in our descriptions of reality, those aspects of the reality most convenient for our purpose. It would not be surprising that the same person describes the very same reality in two competing versions depending on the context and the aim they are supposed to achieve. Our descriptions are not merely innocent reflections of reality but a form of social action that has an impact on the objects of that reality.

The third point is related to the second and concerns what in social and political sciences have come to be known as opinions or attitudes. In our modern times, we came to believe that people 'hold opinions', 'have attitudes', and 'possess views' on all manners of issues. Attitudes or opinions are understood as evaluations for or against things, issues, or people, and as such treated as mental entities that people would reproduce upon request. It may be argued that the photographer's pictures reflect her views on the Turkish town as an exotic place, the alien character of which was underlined by the pictures. But if her exotic pictures are to be understood as her evaluative statements on the town, what, then, are we to make her comparison of this town with an Italian (Western) counterpart? Which statement is closer to her 'real' views of the town?

One of the interesting experiences I had with doing qualitative interviews in summer 2001 in Denmark was the participants' reaction after the interview was completed. Asked upon how they thought the interview went, some of them replied: "I didn't know that I had opinions on such

issues!" Some of the other interviewers for my project reported on similar experiences. More interestingly, not only did they produce opinions despite not having thought of these issues beforehand, but also expressed varied and sometimes conflicting opinions on the same issue from occasion to occasion in the course of the interview. If the participants were not even aware that they had opinions on the issues that we were discussing, how come, then, they could, as if the most natural thing in the world, produce opinions on the matters discussed during the interview? And why were there variations in their attitude expressions?

Cognitivist approaches in attitude research would answer the first question in terms of mental processes in which we evaluate the world with some kind of mental schemes. According to cognitivist approaches, we do not have to carry around already formed opinions. What we do have are some kind of mental schemes or considerations with which we process new information we are presented, and place it in an evaluative hierarchy producing opinions. Variations and inconsistencies are often explained as cognitive dissonances. Rhetorical approaches, on the other hand, move the focus from mental processes to the actual rhetorical context of utterance and thus provide better explanations for variations and contradictions.

My argument is that opinion expressions were a product of the interview situation where I as a researcher provided intentional or unintentional cues which then created responses that address the requirements of the situation, and these interpretative procedures varied in accordance with variations in the context. That is, opinions, attitudes or views are evaluative expressions produced to do something in that particular context in which they were uttered and cannot, therefore, be taken as reflections of already constituted mental structures that determine how people think about the world. In traditional opinion research, an attitude is considered to be separate from the object it evaluates; it is as such a measurable entity. But what if, as my anecdote indicates, the object and the evaluation of it (attitudes toward it) are not two separate entities? There would be two major implications of such a perspective: 1) the same object may not have the same meaning for different people, and then the notion of comparing attitudes ceases to be useful, 2) and the same person may have different 'attitudes' on the 'same' object (the town) dependent on the context in which these attitudes are expressed.

I want to dwell on this point with another example from my interview sample from 1996. The interviewer asks Jesper if he ever had any problems with immigrants. Unfortunately, the transcription does not follow any particular convention. A more detailed transcript would allow us to see more clearly how the interpretative work is accomplished through features such as pauses, repairs, hesitations and silent consensuses or challenges that help produce the overall meaning of the narrative. The two dots indicate that he disrupts himself in the flow of the discourse indicating hesitation or repair.

> JESPER: Nooo, I can't say I did, I mean.. No I didn't. It.. it.. uh.. it was.. no! Then I would have remembered it, right? It.. it is.. but there is much, some of them are a little dominant in the streets, right? Yeah, I mean, I did.. I didn't, it wasn't myself, right? And it… I wouldn't want to judge anybody in that case, but I was in a discotheque where there was, uh, a friend of mine, he knew, uh.. yeah he knows a rocker, right? And uh, this rocker and some of his friends, they had probably provoked some Turks, right? And then, uh, one of the Turks, he hit the rocker on the head with a bottle, right? And it.. it was you know, it was.. I am not saying that there is something he can't, I mean, I am not on the rocker's side here, okay, not at all, but I am just saying, it is such a typical reaction from an immigrant, or I just feel so, right? When they are out, you know, then they are very aggressive, like, and they.. by definition they are not afraid of anybody. They.. they have, like, their honor … I would never dare hitting a rocker on the head with a bottle, so, uh,

or, there are some people who just scare me, right? But it is as if, it doesn't apply to them. They just don't.. they just don't care, so, they were only two, the Turks together, right? …

In this extract, Jesper does not merely report on an incident as it happened out there in reality and then tell what he thinks about it – although he presents it that way – but actively constructs both what happened and the people involved drawing on a number of rhetorical strategies. The language he is using is not simply referential to the categories he is speaking of (the immigrants/Turks, rockers) or the event (fight). The categories and his views of them are weaved together. The aggressive nature of immigrants is not treated as an undisputable fact; its factuality is achieved argumentatively. In fact, at no point does he make a clear distinction between the category of immigrants and his attitudes toward them. On the contrary, he makes several attempts to avoid expressing any views unless they are warranted as facts. Let us remember that he is answering a question about if he ever had problems with immigrants, and he begins with stating that he never did. So, the 'problems' that one may deduce from the description of the event is not presented as a view that has to do with his mental dispositions about immigrants, which in this case would indicate prejudice against immigrants. Instead, the problems are tied to the immigrants' own nature – the way they generally act. The argumentative scheme seems to be simple: if you dare hit a rocker on the head with a bottle, then you must have an aggressive nature, since [as we all know] everybody else would be scared by rockers. The concept 'honor' as a value system provides the link from the two individual Turks to the generalized category of immigrants. To support his conclusion, Jesper uses a variety of rhetorical devices – categorization and particularization, a combination of vivid and systematically vague formulations, narrative techniques, invoking common sense – through which he warrants the realism of his descriptions and the factuality of his conclusions.

One of these rhetorical devices is eyewitness account. They are powerful rhetorical strategies; they provide epistemological ground to tie the evaluations of people to the 'real' events in the world. They locate the evaluative conclusion out there as a self-evident fact rather than an expression of his mental dispositions on Turkish immigrants in which case he may be accused of prejudice. In other words, they convey a sense of rational inference in contrast to the possibility that he may be prejudiced. In fact, rhetorical moves to avoid being taken as prejudiced are a pervasive feature of all types of discourse. Rationality has become the dominant value for judgment in our kind of societies (I would expect it to be a pretty universal feature), and consequently prejudice is seen as undermining the factual ground for judgments. Eyewitness accounts provides such factual grounds for judgments but they come rarely alone. Jesper's statement that 'it is such a typical reaction from an immigrant, or 'I just feel so' looks rather inconsequential in an argumentative discourse. One might wonder what this "I just feel so" is doing here, considering that he has already established the epistemological grounds for knowing what he is talking about, but it seems to serve a rhetorical purpose in establishing facts. The statement, 'it is a typical reaction from an immigrant' sounds rather categorical and bold, but 'I just feel so' helps mitigate – or repair – the first part of his statement, which may convey the sense that he is presumptuous and biased. This is the kind of move Edwards (forthcoming) calls, "beliefs reluctantly arrived at, knowledge unlooked-for" which is "another very powerful way of attending to the rhetorically dangerous notion that you believe what it suits you to believe, what you believed before you looked, that your beliefs are a function of mental predisposition rather than external reality…" This kind of formulations can be used to imply that one has not worked up one's position artfully, as a prepared, rehearsed, prior position on things. Edwards notes that this is a general, basic feature of factual accounting, not specific to the arena of sensitive issues such as racism. In fact, the extract is full of such expressions that help built up Jesper's credibility

as an open-minded person who arrives at his (negative) conclusions rationally – but reluctantly – on the basis of facts.

This is what I mean by the claim that the realism of a description has to be rhetorically achieved in interaction by turning descriptions into facts through rhetorical devices and techniques such as building up one's credibility, managing issues of accountability, and producing descriptions as external and independent of the speaker. In Shotter's words, "It is by the use of such rhetorical devices – as reference to 'special methods of investigation', 'objective evidence', special methods of proof', 'independent witness', etc. – that those with competence in such procedures can construct their statements as 'factual statements', and claim authority for them as revealing a special 'true' reality behind appearances…" (1993a: 25) And this is because factual versions are not only constructed to make an argument but also to undermine alternative versions that are often absent from the explicit argumentation (Billig 1988, 1991) except in situations of dispute such as courts or political debates.

One of the factors that render representations realistic is, as I said earlier, the familiarity of a situation because it provides a reassuring and solid common sense to discourse for which there is no need to be further accounted. Jesper offers also a common sense understanding of a situation as a way of knowing and offering judgments which in turn warrant his description of the nature of immigrants as aggressive. Rockers are well known for their ruthless brutality but what is interesting here is that he feels he has to account for his use of common sense although the shared knowledge to which he appeals should be an enough warrant for his claim. In argumentative discourse propositions that warrant the claim (here the aggressive nature of immigrants) and which can be assumed to be known by the communicative partner, or which can be derived by semantic and pragmatic inferences do not have to be explicated (Quasthoff, 1978). So, I hear his explication of the shared knowledge and its link to his claim as potentially prejudice-relevant. Jesper is aware of the danger that expressing negative views on immigrants could be taken as a reflection of his subjective views (ungrounded, prejudiced). A vague statement such as 'it is as if, it doesn't apply to them' helps locate the negative view in an inferential link (rationality) rather than in his psychology.

Jesper's extract is rich with such rhetorical moves that serve the purpose of establishing factual robustness of the described events and derived conclusions. As my analysis demonstrates, descriptions of reality are not merely linguistic expressions referring to an independently existing world but social actions designed to do something in the context they are uttered. In other words, we actively construct the objects we are speaking of through our descriptions as external and independent facts rather than as features of our own psychology (Potter and Edwards 2001) and the distinction between objects and opinions offered on them is not as clear-cut as traditional opinion and attitude research would want to make us believe. The following extracts are from the 2001 sample.

> PIA: … Now what I am saying here is not coming out anywhere, is it?
> INTERVIEWER: No, it's not.
> PIA: That I won't suddenly have a lot of Turks standing here.. and beating me up?
> INTERVIEWER: (laughs). You don't have to be afraid of it. No.. because Turks are that kind who beat people?
> PIA: What?
> INTERVIEWER: Are Turks the kind who beat people?
> PIA: No, but you don't have to say much to them. Those young people. But the Danes are also like that, well. Then they get involved in fights, take Voldsmose [Vollsmose]. The police become afraid, they couldn't cope with it.

INTERVIEWER: Is it a particular incident you are thinking of in Voldsmose [Vollsmose]?
PIA: It was that thing that they.. they knock on the door and then just walk in and then steal from an older lady. And then they kick the door in.. well, I could tell you about many incidents. It hasn't been so fun out there, but they are about to gain control over it now. Then there was somebody who got beaten up dead, not dead but was almost dead.. had to escape, go underground. And it doesn't look like anything, when it is our country.

This extract is similar to the earlier one both in its content (immigrants are violent in their essence) and the rhetorical strategies that locates the conclusions in the 'real' world rather than in her subjective opinions (the narrative on incidents that illustrate her point, and mitigations such as her 'acknowledgement' that 'the Danes are also like that', which imply that she is not expressing any negative attitude on immigrants but merely speaking of facts.) Just like in the previous example, Pia actively constructs the object she is speaking of (Turks as a token for immigrants) and what kind of people they are. I am not going to conduct another detailed analysis here, although I cannot help notice the way the interviewer unwittingly misspells the name of the neighborhood in the transcription. Vollsmose in Odense has a bad reputation because of its dense immigrant population and their 'violent behaviour'. The misspelled *Voldsmose* means in fact the place of violence (vold: violence). The connotation of Vollsmose to violence has become so prevalent that she does not even notice the misspelling.

'Immigrants' in this extract are also constructed as the same category as in Jesper's example with the same kind of evaluations. It is therefore tempting to jump into a quick conclusion that people share both the understanding of objects they talk and their attitudes toward them. It would imply that the categories do somehow correspond to an external reality, and that language is a referential medium rooted in corresponding cognitive structures in people's minds. But let us look at another extract from the same interview with Pia on the same object (immigrants):

PIA: … Why should we have them [immigrants] all here and feed? We others, we have been working, earning money, and paying taxes all these years, and what do they do? It rains with cuts and cuts on us.. because they come here.
INTERVIEWER: Do you have any personal experiences with it?
PIA: No, on the contrary I only had positive. Because I go to an evening school, and there are many of them, too, and they want to do something with their lives. And they are very competent.

Here, Pia is still speaking of the category of immigrants, and even in negative terms, but the negativity is now tied to the economic consequences of their being here rather than what they are and their nature. On the contrary, she makes it clear that their nature is not the point of criticism; rather, they are purposeful and competent people. My sample is full of such varying descriptions of immigrants both within the same interview and across the interviews. Of course, what I am saying is not that this description fits better with the immigrants than others, but that the descriptions of immigrants are produced interactionally dependent on the rhetorical context in which the utterance is made. The interview situation itself defines the nature of the interaction: a combination of the way the questions are asked and understood, the identity of the interviewer, the cues that are given by the interviewer as well as the common sense understandings and prejudices all play a role in how people talk about other people and events, resulting often in variations in their descriptions of the same people or events even during the course of the same interaction. Gotsbachner (2001), although his overall conclusion is different, also demonstrates in his analysis of recorded conversation among elderly people in a community center in Vienna that the way the same person speaks of immigrants shifts momentarily because the context of meaning

shifts. In the first half of his example, Mrs. Forster, an elderly woman praises the immigrant janitor in their housing complex describing immigrants as hard-working and extremely clean people, when the talk about immigrants is integrated with their talk about their own social position, where they agree that having problems with immigrants is a matter of social status and distinction. When Mr. Huble joins the conversation with another story that shifts the focus on immigrants themselves by assigning the positive characteristics to the social pressure on them rather than their own their personal nature, Mrs. Forster shifts her characterization of her janitor into a negative one (pp. 733-735).

Variation in discourse indicates that people's utterances should not be taken at face value or treated as the straightforward reflections of the speaker's mindset about the world independent of the context of utterance, as is the convention in much traditional social science research. For example, in public opinion research – one of the most trusted and heavily funded areas of social science –there have been some discussions on how far polls are able to measure people's attitudes, but these discussions have mainly been limited to whether or not the question wording was neutral or biased. The assumption here is that there is a factual form of description which captures reality, and that the question wording may distort that reality (Potter 1996a). However, social scientists are also aware of the ambivalent nature of people's answers to questionnaires – they have already discovered that – but the need to sort out the answers in order to construct a pattern in attitudes unwittingly force them to treat ambivalence as an attitude category itself. For example, Entman and Rojecki (2000) in their study of Whites' attitudes toward Blacks state that they run from "racial comity and understanding to ambivalence, then to animosity, and finally to outright racism" (p. 16). Another way of dealing with ambivalence is to introduce a distinction between different aspects of the 'same' question as if ambiguity arises due to the dual character of the reality. Cornelius (forthcoming), for example, argues that American public opinion recognizes the economic utility of the immigrants but is afraid of their socio-cultural impacts. This perpetuates the assumption that there are 'real' issues such as 'economic utility' and 'socio-cultural impacts' which can be described neutrally, and that people's attitudes are merely reflections of these different realities. The question is rather whether the notion of attitudes, and consequently opinion polling techniques can deal with variation in attitude expressions (Potter and Wetherell 1987).

This is not a problem of simple qualitative-quantitative distinction. Some qualitative researchers also share the same notion of attitudes and opinion as reflections of people's mindset that easily can be mapped out as such. It is fairly easy to find attitude patterns in interview transcripts, if that is what one is looking for. My sample is full of stereotypes, clichés or similar descriptions of the objects in question, e.g. violent nature of immigrants. Having shown that descriptions of violent incidents and violent immigrants regularly appear in transcripts, we may either conclude that this is an indication of the facts 1) that immigrants are violent, 2) or that Danes in general have a perception of immigrants as aggressive and violent people. The typical steps for such research would be recording statements by interviews or by ethnographic work, look for broad similarities that occur frequently and take these statements as accurate accounts of what people think, and then construct a generalized version of these accounts as one's analytical conclusion (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). However, as I demonstrated, similarities between statements indicate only some shared interpretative resources used flexibly for different ends in discourse rather than accurate reflections of their opinions about matters. Without detailed examination of the linguistic exchanges between researcher and participant, and without some kind of informed understanding of the social generation of participants' accounts, it is not possible to analyze these accounts and obtain sociologically valuable information about the actions of the participants. Once we begin to conceive of the social world in terms of an indefinite series of linguistic potentialities, which can be realized in a wide variety of different ways and which are continually reformulated in the

course of an ongoing interpretative process for particular rhetorical purposes, the simple procedure of sifting good from bad accounts becomes inappropriate (ibid.: 7). What we need are ways of critically analyzing those purposes, alive to the way versions are constructed and stabilized as independent of the speaker (Potter 2001), but also without loosing in sight the 'ideological character' of the way versions are constructed. Discourse analytical approaches, despite their own tensions and shortcomings, provide the theoretical and methodological answers to many of the questions with which I have dealt.

Before elaborating on these approaches, I have to clarify two interrelated issues. First, discourse analysis not only designates a methodological approach but also a theoretical-philosophical current closely related to poststructuralist and postmodernist strands of theory[2], and to the so-called 'linguistic turn' in humanities and social sciences. On the other hand, it is also intimately linked to an analytical methodology as it is developed as a critique of traditional social science research that sees language as a referential medium between the world and mind and accordingly meaning as a measurable feature of language through quantitative methodologies. Nevertheless, although I share the basic concerns against quantitative methodologies, I do not want to give up the idea that quantitative methods can also prove useful. To some extent, the choice of method depends on the nature of the questions the researcher takes to the data.

Roots and concerns of discourse theory

There is a growing interest in discourse analysis and discourse theory across academic disciplines as a result of an increasing awareness of non-transparent nature of language as a medium. Virtually all social science depends on discourse for its judgments about reality, but in most social science research involving experimentation, surveys, questionnaires, some styles of grounded theory, ethnography and most content analysis, language is treated as a relatively transparent medium through which the 'real' matter – be it events, identities, cognitive structures, cultural, social, institutional patterns or causal relations – can easily be accessed by the researcher. Language in this sense has been pervasive but invisible (Potter, forthcoming).

However, the so-called 'linguistic turn' in 60s in human sciences has also found its way into social sciences, as textual analysis of commercials, political speeches and other everyday phenomenon have become integrated into social science research. The linguistic turn became a discursive turn, after which ontologically privileged points of references such as economic structures or a subject's interpretation of the surroundings are no longer taken for granted as for the formation of meaning. Rather, meaning is produced in historically specific social and cultural contexts in which both the nature of objects and subjects are seen as constructed and transformed. Social change becomes, in this perspective, also related to changes in discourse.

The diversity of approaches in the field of discourse studies is also reflected in the way different scholars construct the trajectory of discourse studies, but since they all share the common concern with the ways language produces and constrains the meaning of the world it represents, there are some common reference points.

Early impetus
It is possible to say that linguistic studies of pronouns and semantic coherence, the first observations of turn-taking in talk, the ethnographic studies of 'ways of speaking' in various cultures, or the early experiments with text comprehension were precursors for modern discourse analysis (van Dijk 1996: 31). Philosophically, discourse analysis is often related to Wittgenstein's notion of language games and Austin's speech act theory. Wittgenstein argued against "logical treatments of language as an abstract system of concepts whose principal role was to refer to

objects in the world" (Potter, 2001: 40). The philosophy of language, at the time of his writing, was concerned with the issues of reference and logical connections. Wittgenstein suggested the alternative view that consideration of meaning should start from looking at actual uses of language rather than abstracting words from their natural contexts of use. He used the metaphor of 'language game', which means that the user of language is doing something – indeed different things - with language: giving orders, describing an object, reporting an event and so on. The implication of this perspective for discourse analysis is clear: discourse analysts also see discourse as a social practice rather than an exchange of mindset between people. He also focused on definitions and description as open-ended performatives. The practical and open-ended nature of description is a key part of discourse analytical perspective.

Austin's speech act theory also emphasizes talk as a human practice. Austin challenged the idea of language as an abstract system whose central function is the description of states of affairs (Potter and Wetherell 1987; Potter 1996b; Potter 2001). He distinguished between performative utterances such as 'I name the dog Lassie' and descriptive ones – what he called constatives - 'The dog's name is Lassie', but at the same time he argued that this distinction could not be sustained. The descriptive sentence, 'The dog's name is Lassie' can be checked for truth or falsity but there have to be appropriate beliefs for the utterance to function. If someone says, 'I don't believe the dog is called Lassie', the sentence becomes troublesome. Unlike descriptive statements, the performative ones could not be straightforwardly true or false, but for an utterance like 'I name the dog, Lassie' to be accomplished, certain conditions have to prevail. If the person is not in the position of naming the dog, or it is not a dog but a horse, the statement becomes problematic. The implication of this is that certain conditions have to exist before all kinds of statements can be considered successful. He called these conditions, 'felicity conditions'. All utterances are both performing actions and also have features that depend on issues of truth or falsity; all utterances state things and do things. Thus, the distinction between performatives and constatives could not be sustained. At his time, this was a radical point, because these ideas started "to move the discussions away from the idea of statements – descriptions, reports – hanging in some conceptual space where they can be compared to some feature of the world and focuses attention on statements as actions performed in settings with particular outcomes" (Potter 2001: 11).

Structuralism
The social constructionist view of language and consequently discourse studies owe a great deal to Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure who developed what is today known as semiology or semiotics, the science of signs. He is known as the founder of 'modern linguistics' or 'structural linguistics'. The basic idea behind his theory is that the relationship between language and reality is arbitrary. Meaning does not emerge from the relationship between language and reality but from the differential system of the language itself. It is easy to recognize this line of thinking from the constructionist approach that has influenced most discourse analytical approaches.

Saussure's ideas were articulated around two fundamental principles and three basic distinctions. "The two principles were that in language there are no positive terms but only differences … and that language is only form and not substance" (Laclau 2001). The first of the three distinctions was made between 'signifier' and 'signified'. A 'sign' refer to the relationship between a concept (signified) such as the concept of 'flower', and a stream of sounds that constitutes a word for it (signifier) in this case the word, 'flower'. This is the relationship that is arbitrary. There is no natural or inevitable relationship between the word 'flower' and the concept flower. Danes, for example, refer to the concept as 'blomst'. Words do not get their meaning from their relationship to the concept but from a differential relationship to each other. What signifies is not wine or the essence of an alcoholic drink called wine, but the difference between the words wine and vodka.

The meaning of wine can only be defined in terms of its difference from other terms used for beverages. However, in order to produce meaning, the signifiers have to be organized into a system of differences, which brings us to the second distinction between syntagma and paradigm. Syntagma refer to relations of combination between signs, and paradigm to relations of substitution. If we consider a dinner menu in a particular culture as a syntagmatic chain with its order of starters, main dishes and desserts, the paradigmatic chain would be each group of dishes that can be substituted with each other.

The third distinction was between 'langue' and 'parole'. Parole is an actual speech or writing that is made possible by 'langue', which is the structure of the language. For Saussure it was langue, the underlying structure of rules and codes, which could be studied scientifically because of its closed nature, and it was because of the notion of this 'deep structure' that people call his model of language structuralist. Parole, the individual speech act or utterance, lacked those structural properties and was therefore difficult to study scientifically.

The significance of Saussure's ideas was that he challenged the status of language as a relatively transparent medium between things and meaning by pointing at the constitutive nature of language. From here, it is not difficult to see how linguistic structuralism could be used to explain culture and ideology. If we take a broader definition of language, which includes all forms of symbolic exchange, then one can argue that culture is the sphere of meaning production, i.e., signifying practice. Indeed, Saussure's ideas were deployed as a paradigm for the scientific study of culture in diverse fields. Hoggart (one of the founders of Cultural Studies) drew upon Saussure's model of structural linguistics in literary criticism, Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Lacan in his reinterpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis, and Barthes in his semiotic studies of everyday images in literature and popular culture.

Influenced by Saussure's ideas Levi-Strauss introduced structural anthropology that focuses on the way elements of cultural system combine together. Cultural life cannot be explained in terms of the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon in question, or empirically by facts deemed to speak for themselves. 'Difference' and 'relation' are the key notions in his anthropology. One of his most important contributions is the term 'floating' or 'empty signifier', which has no symbolic value in itself but can assume a multitude of meanings, introducing into language the aspect of contingency (Lechte 1994) much like the zero in mathematics that signifies an empty place but becomes the signifier of the geometric system itself as that which is lacking: zero is a signifier of signification (Laclau 1998).

The notion of 'empty signifier' is similar to Lacan's 'phallus' that signifies what is missing (with woman), that is it signifies absence, and thus becomes the signifier of signification (of the system of sexual difference). The notion of 'empty signifier' is an important one for my discussion of Laclau and Mouffe's model of hegemony as a discursive model that can bridge between the notion of discourse as a signifying system and the inherently contingent nature of discourse understood as actual language use.

Barthes (1972) developed Saussure's structuralism into the science of sign, which is generally known by the term semiotics. The underlying idea behind semiotics is the same as linguistic structuralism: "since all cultural objects convey meaning, and all cultural practices depend on meaning, they must make use of signs; and in so far as they do, they must work like language works, and be amenable to an analysis which basically makes use of Saussure's linguistic concepts…" (Hall 1997: 36). Barthes analyzed items of popular culture such as commercials, photographs, movies, and even a sports genre like wrestling much like a language. In Barthes' semiotic approach not only words and images but objects themselves can function as signifiers. A

'Jaguar XJ6' signifies a specific car with a particular body shape (the denotative level), but at another level it also signifies notions such as 'wealth', 'luxury', 'glamorous living' and so on (connotation), hence the distinction between two levels of signification. Barthes wrote many articles for newspapers on everyday items such as wine, striptease, Einstein's brain, and so on. He was interested in demonstrating that these apparently simple cultural artifacts were associated with complex meaning systems, and that "these taken-for-granted meanings are not natural, inherent properties of these things but essentially arbitrary, culturally constructed conventions" that could easily have been otherwise (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 27).

Critique and emerging concerns

To sum up structuralism meant a completely different view of the relationship between human beings and their social world compared to the dominant behaviorist-positivist paradigm. For structuralists there could be no such thing as a neutral or 'raw' experience of the world; experiences were the products of culture as something that has already been made sensible, but this notion of culture also implied that people could not escape their culture because there was no outside to which they could run. This is one of the basic criticisms against structuralism. "When the linguistic model was introduced into the general field of human sciences, it was this effect of systematicity that predominated, so that structuralism became a new form of essentialism; a search for the underlying structures constituting the inherent law of any possible variation" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 113). The scientific dream behind structuralism led to the ignorance of the 'parole' part of the language (actual spoken and written utterances); the level at which the meaning is produced through interpretation as a human practice in social interaction.

Already in Barthes' semiotics, Saussure's positivistic approach was 'loosened' in the sense that his semiotic method was much more loosely and interpretatively applied. In fact, in his later work Barthes "is more concerned with the 'play' of meaning and desire across texts than he is with the attempt to fix meaning by a scientific analysis of language's rules and laws" (Hall 1997: 42). Because of his later work, Barthes is also classified within the following 'poststructuralist' theory that is basically a criticism of structuralist notions such as 'deep structure' and 'reality behind appearances'.

Another criticism of structuralism was the lack of theorization of the nature of the subject. In the structuralist approach the subject is displaced from the center of language; language 'speaks through' us. Critics returned to the question of subject, without putting the subject back as the source of meaning. They observed that some subjects had more power to speak about other subjects, thereby, focused on broader issues of knowledge and power. The first name that comes to mind is the French philosopher Michael Foucault who was concerned with the production of knowledge and through knowledge power and subject positions. Foucault is doubtlessly the figure almost all discourse analytical approaches feel compelled in one way or other to relate to, and his approach is increasingly gaining wider attention across academic disciplines all over the world. I will return to Foucault's work later when I present an overview of contemporary discourse approaches.

Most discourse analytical approaches owe their understanding of subject to Foucault who argued that subject positions are constituted in discourse and are therefore an effect of social processes rather than being their point of origin. "One consequence of this view is that subjects appear as dispersed and fragmented" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 123). In his view of the subject, Foucault was influenced by his teacher Louis Althusser who combined structuralism with Marxism. In Althusser's structuralist Marxism the subject is related to ideology, which is defined as a system of representation. In thi view, ideology is that which embodies people's imaginary relationship to their real world, precisely because it forms them as subject. In other words "the

subject is the defining feature of all ideology, and all ideology works or functions by taking individuals and placing them, that is 'interpellating' them, as subjects within the framework of ideology" (Strati 1995:154). From Althusser's point of view, people have little control over this process and no chance to avoid it. Coupled with the classical Marxist idea that the base (economic relations) – however in the last instance – determines the superstructure (the ideological sphere), the implication was that Althusser could not break with classical Marxist notion of determinism.

Althusser had a great influence on Cultural Studies and their understanding of communication. Early research in Cultural Studies focused on analyzing the products of popular culture for ideological messages as if these were unambiguous and passively consumed by the audience.

By the late 70s, Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies group in Birmingham challenged the assumptions of structural Marxism. Stuart Hall, then the leader of CCCS, brought agency back into theory with his influential article 'encoding/decoding' where the message of a text is not necessarily interpreted in the way it is meant (Hall 1980). In other words, although there was a dominant encoding (meaning in the text), people were able to decode it in different ways depending on their own cultural circumstances. Morley (1980) demonstrated this point in his analysis of interviews with focus groups from different class backgrounds who watched the TV-program Nationwide[3]. Cultural Studies drew also on the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'common sense' to break up with Althusserian notion of ideology. Gramsci (1971) located both the subject and ideological struggles in what he called 'common sense'. He made a distinction between formal ideologies such as liberalism and organic ideologies, that is common sense. The latter is the domain of fragmented and contradictory corpus of knowledge and practices. It is a depository of the diverse effects of past ideological struggles, and the target for ongoing ideological (hegemonic) struggles. It is here ideologies become effective to the extent they become naturalized and automatized, and thus achieve hegemonic status. The implication is that subjects are structured by diverse ideologies implicit in their practice, which gives them a composite character. Gramsci tied ideologies to classes and saw these contradictions as flaws or weaknesses, which needed to be overcome. However, many in Cultural Studies tradition and related discourse studies appropriated Gramsci's insights without necessarily also adapting his conclusion.

Foucault on the other hand totally discarded the notion of ideology. For Foucault, truth, subject and the relationship between subjects are all constituted in discourse and there is no need for truth beyond discourse.

In short, his critique of structuralism, which broke with the view of a fully constituted structural space, has in general terms come to be known as poststructuralism. Poststructuralism continued the structuralist notion that meaning is constructed in language rather than in a direct referential relationship between language and reality, but abandoned the view of language as closed and static entity that could be studied scientifically. For poststructuralists, the meaning of a sign, which in structuralist theory gained meaning in a closed differential system, is produced in actual use (parole) that permits transformation and fluidity. Thus, they abandoned the strict distinction between langue and parole – started already with Barthes' analysis of actual language use and cultural products – focusing on the latter as the locus of interpretation. Poststructuralist theory was also concerned with the position of subject in language, something which had not been elaborated in structuralist approaches.

In fact, the idea that meaning is a product of utterances rather than language per se had already been launched in the early years of last century by Russian dialogists. In 1929 Saussure's Russian

student and opponent Sergej Karcevskij wrote that "the signifier (sound) and the signified (meaning) slide continually on the 'slope of reality'" (in Holquist 1983: 3). However, it is Mikhail Bakhtin who is best known for his theory of contingency in language,[4] although due to late translation and the historical circumstances under which he lived, his ideas were only introduced to the West as late as in 70s and 80s. Nevertheless, his influence on academic paradigms such as social constructionism, cultural studies and discourse analysis has been increasing through last decades. In his critique of Saussure's distinction Bakhtin argued that Saussure's ignorance of actual utterances renders doubtful the usefulness of langue in explaining the essential working of language. He also rejected the structuralist tendency to analyze texts as self-contained units without also looking at the contexts they were uttered or written. To understand parole, one must take into account the circumstances, assumptions and the time of the enunciation of the utterance, that is, one must take into account the multiplicity of voices in language, or what he also called heteroglassia (Bakhtin 1981). In Billig's words, Bakhtinian ideas mean that "language is not an abstract, static system but it exists through use. Through usage it is constantly changing, for speech-acts do not exactly reproduce previous acts. This implies that ideology, because it is realized in acts of language, is also in a state of constant change, or creativity. Yet, at the same time, these acts of language are shaped by the social and historical context" (Billig 1997: 217).

There is a further theme that some contemporary discourse analysts have discovered before they realized that Bakhtin already had written about it: the relationship between language and mind. The study of ideology is the study of consciousness, but unlike the cognitivist paradigm (that for instance pervades almost all public opinion research in the United States), Bakhtin argued that language did not reflect inner psychological states or consciousness but rather – in line with social constructionist argument – psychological states and consciousness were constituted through acts of language (communication), and thereby through ideology (see also Vygotsky 1962). This tenet has become a guiding principle for social constructionism (Billig 1996: 19).

There is one more point that ties contemporary discourse analysts to Bakhtinian ideas. Internal thinking is connected with dialogue or indeed is itself modeled upon dialogue. In this sense thinking can be said to be rhetorical and dialogic (Billig 1996, Shotter 1993a, 1993b). Shotter, one of the main figures of social constructionism, calls his model, 'rhetorical-responsive version of social constructionism' using Bakhtin and Wittgenstein as starting points (Shotter 1993a).

I mentioned that one of the shared reference points for discourse theories is a shared constructionist basis. If poststructuralism is one reference point for discourse theory, another is social constructionism. Although social constructionism has a similar view of language as Foucault, they are more focused on interpersonal processes of construction. Burr (1995) traces social constructionism to 'symbolic interactionism' (Mead 1934) according to which we construct our own and each other's identities through our everyday encounters with each other in social action (p. 10). American ethnomethodologists such as Goffman (1959) tried through empirical studies to understand the processes by which ordinary people construct their lives and make sense of it to themselves and to each other. Ethnomethodology is today the main force behind conversation analysis and is one of the cornerstones of discursive psychology.

The Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer and Jürgen Habermas) needs to be mentioned here briefly as they constitute a reference point for Critical Discourse Analysis, which I will discuss in the next section. Frankfurt School had a different place in Marxist thought with their argument that cultural products could not be treated as mere reflection of economy as implied by the deterministic distinction between base and superstructure in Marxism. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 261) Habermas refers to his own work as discourse theory. His vision that an 'ideal speech

situation' or rational discourse can overcome distorted (ideological) communication has influenced, among others, Wodak's version of Critical Discourse Analysis. His notion of rational deliberation will be one of the main reference points for my discussion of public discourse.

Approaches to Discourse Theory

The term discourse has become fashionable in the last few decades and is used in many scholarly texts across disciplines. Discourse or Discourse Analysis are labels that refer to a broad spectrum of approaches developed in a range of different disciplines, notably linguistics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, literary studies, philosophy and media and communication studies. It is, therefore, difficult to give a general overview of discourse approaches without leaving out some major currents (Potter and Wetherell 1987; Burman & Parker 1993; Jørgensen and Phillips 1999; Torfing 1999; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Torfing, Hansen and Dyrberg 2001; Potter forthcoming).

Sometimes discourse analysis refers to analytical practices that cover diverse analytical traditions such as speech act theory, narrative analysis, rhetorical and argumentative analysis, and conversation analysis, and sometimes to theoretical positions without explicit analytical models (Foucault 1972; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Some approaches are concerned only with how participants themselves make sense of their world in spoken interactions or how they relate to each other through turn taking and interruptions; others with the relationship between linguistic units at different levels of texts, and again others with patterns in language use across sentences or turns of talk, while sociolinguists study variations in the language use of different social groups.

Despite the huge differences between approaches that are generically called discourse analysis, they all are engaged in some kind of analysis of language use. What they basically share is a common concern with the ways language produces and constrains meaning. Put in another way, they all treat language as more than a simple medium of communication, and pay attention to the ways in which language does more than reflect what it represents, with the implication that language also constructs what it represents. The analytical concern is not so much to reveal the reality beyond and behind appearances, but how reality is described and maintained in language use.

In line with the differences in theoretical and analytical models, the term 'discourse' is also used in many varying and confusing ways. Normally it is used as a linguistic concept meaning passages of connected writing or speech. Sometimes it merely means a single, particular conversation or a public speech, other times all forms of spoken interaction and written texts (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). In more cognitive oriented studies, the term discourse also refers the communication of beliefs and opinions (cognition) (van Dijk 1984, 1991,1996). It is also used to describe broader, historically developed, systematic linguistic practices such as medical discourse or legal discourse (Foucault 1972). In the latter sense, it refers to an "assembling of ways of speaking and concepts that together construct an issue in a particular way" (Schierup 1994). In Foucaultian approach, discourse means a system of representation; a set of linguistic and rhetorical devices that give a topic meaning. To analyze discourse in this sense means describing the components of such language use, how these components are ordered and combined into larger constructs (van Dijk 1996). To make it even more confusing, Gilbert and Mulkay would

use the term 'interpretative repertoire' as an alternative to Foucaultian notion of 'discourse' with the implication that interpretative repertoires are linguistic patterns used flexibly in interpretative contexts rather than a code that structures the meaning of the text. One central figure of social constructionism, Shotter (1993a; 1993b) emphasizes the contingency of language in interaction but does so only in abstract terms without engaging in analyzing actual language use.

The diversity of the field is also reflected in surveys or introductory books on discourse analysis. Already in mid 80s it was possible to find books with almost no overlap in the subject of matter (Potter and Wetherell 1987, Potter, forthcoming). Consequently, it is also difficult to construct classification schemes to identify different approaches as 'schools' or 'groups' according to similarities with or differences from each other. One distinction can be made between cognitive approaches on the one hand, and rhetorical on the other. Cognitive approaches look at cognitive processes as the locus of meaning, whereas rhetorical approaches focus on the rhetorical context as the locus of meaning. Or alternatively, one can also classify different approaches according to whether they conceive discourse at the utterance and text level or as abstract orders of meaning production. With such a distinction, it is possible to place under the same umbrella all the Foucaultian approaches for which discourse does not refer to actual utterances or written text but much broader meaning systems that enable the production of single utterances. Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory would clearly belong here, but this classification scheme would ignore a vital difference between Foucault, who makes a distinction between discursive and non-discursive fields – a distinction that is completely refused by Laclau and Mouffe for whom the distinction itself would be a discursive practice of constructing a non-discursive field. Laclau and Mouffe's approach would in this sense be closer to discursive psychology that refuses to discuss discourse as an abstract structure. Fairclough, on the other hand, maintains this distinction, although his focus is on discourse as spoken interactions and written texts.

In his survey of approaches, Fairclough (1992) distinguishes between two types of discourse analysis according to their social orientation to discourse: 'critical' and 'non-critical' approaches (p. 6). According to this distinction, non-critical approaches are merely descriptive, whereas critical approaches are interested in showing "how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effect discourse has upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and beliefs, neither of which is normally apparent to discourse participants" (p. 12). On the other hand, he also acknowledges that even within approaches that call themselves 'critical discourse analysis' there is a considerable diversity of positions (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 7).

Van Dijk (1996) argues that approaches to discourse studies can be distinguished as general types, styles or modes of analysis. The distinction can be made on the basis of whether they study text or talk, or based on discourse types of genres; between more abstract and formal studies, for instance in grammar and artificial intelligence and concrete studies of actual texts and talk in specific contexts; between theoretical and descriptive ones on the on side and applied and critical ones on the other. However, he identifies three main approaches: a) "those which focus on *discourse* 'itself', that is on structures of text or talk; b) those which study discourse and communication as *cognition*; and those which focus on *social structure and culture*" (p. 24).

Vivian Burr (1995) distinguishes between two basic approaches to discourse studies: the first is influenced by French philosophical traditions of structuralism and poststructuralism, common among those interested in issues of identity, selfhood, personal and social change and power relations. Discourse in these approaches refers to a system of statements, which constructs an object. The second line of inquiry focuses "on the performative qualities of discourse, that is, what people are doing with their talk or writing, what they are trying to achieve" (p. 47).

Potter and Wetherell (1994) identify four types of discourse analysis: the first type is directed at a systematic account of organization of conversational exchanges; the second is a psychologically orientated analysis of discourse processes, particularly of mental processes. The third and fourth types are, they argue, very different from the first two approaches. The third is developed within the sociology of scientific knowledge, i.e. as a way of studying how scientists construct their acts as rational and warrantable. The fourth is related to post-structuralism, particularly that of Foucault, and studies the way in which the institutions, practices and the individual human subject are produced through a set of discourses (p. 47).

As my brief overview of overviews demonstrates, the field can be mapped out in different ways cutting across the many distinctions that scholars make. Due to its diverse character, any attempt to make an overview of the field has to be selective in regard to both the approaches to discourse, and the central arguments within the single approaches. In my overview, I have chosen those strands of discourse analysis that relate to the broader questions that inform my project. Furthermore, all of the chosen approaches share to some degree a social constructionist orientation.

Foucault: from archeology to genealogy
Foucault's work on discourse is normally divided into two distinct periods, each with different foci. Foucault developed his discourse theory in his earlier 'archeological works' while the 'genealogical' period is defined by his focus on the question of power.

In *The Archeology of Knowledge* (1972), his major work on discourse theory, he defines discourse as "as group of statements" that belong to the same discursive formation. Discourse "is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined." Discursive formation is "the general enunciative system that governs a group of verbal performances" (p. 117). The central concept in his analytical model is 'statements', but statement for Foucault is not a sentence, a meaning or an utterance. It is rather the system of rules that makes it possible for certain sentences or utterances but not others to occur at particular times, places and institutions. An analogy of a game is useful here. If we watch a game the rules of which we do not know, the actions of the players will be meaningless. Only when we know the rules does the game become meaningful and the more we become familiar with the practices in and around the game, the more we will understand the nuances (Bjerke 2002). Statement is the rules of formation for the particular set of statements which belong to a discursive formation. It is that which allows a sentence still to be meaningful even if it is not uttered in a concrete context. Consequently, discursive practice becomes more than the expression of ideas, desires or images, that is the "operation of the enunciative function." Rather it is "a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period". It is "the conditions of operation of the enunciative function" (Foucault 1972: 117). Discursive practice is not what a particular medical doctor says at a given time, but the totality of the medical practices that creates the conditions for what the medical doctor can say at all. Discourse analysis is, thus, the analysis of statements: it is concerned with specifying historically variable 'discursive formations'.

Foucault's notion of discourse analysis cannot be equated with linguistic or textual analysis, nor can discourse with language or text. The abstraction from text to discourse is the basis for his discourse analysis which is concerned with discursive formations and their rules of formation. A discursive formation consists more specifically of four types of rules: rules for the formation of 'objects', rules for the formation of 'enunciative modalities' and 'subject positions', rules for the formation of 'concepts' and rules for the formation of 'strategies' (1972: 31-39).

The main point in respect to formation of objects is that the objects are constituted and transformed in discourse. 'Object' means the objects or knowledge, or targets of investigation in a particular discipline. 'Madness', for instance, has been an object of psychopathological discourse since 19th century. It "was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it…" (1972: 32). The notion of discourse as constitutive is generally accepted as one of his most significant contributions to discourse studies, although structuralists had already questioned the referential view of the relationship between language and reality. The unity of discourse is not so much based on the permanence and uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed. The 'space' refers here to a given discursive formation in terms of a relationship between specific institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization" (1972: 45). Foucault has one more abstraction to make, that of 'order of discourse', the terrain on which different discourses operate. Although Foucault does not use this notion for an analytical purpose, the notion has been adopted by Fairclough (1993) to analyze interdiscursive relations (intertextuality). Different discourses on, for example, immigration, are dispersions in the same order of discourse; they share the same configurations of the object as well as the basic assumptions, and the concepts used are more or less the same (Diken 1998: 56-61).

Behind the notion of 'enunciative modalities' and 'subject positions' is the idea that the social subject that produces a statement is not an independent entity that exists outside discourse as the source of statement but is a function of the statement itself. "Enunciative modalities are types of discursive activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching, and so forth, each of which has its own associated subject positions" (Fairclough 1992: 43). As with Althusser's notion of 'interpellation', 'teacher' and 'student' are positioned so as a result of the discursive activity called 'teaching'. However, Foucault does not suggest unitary subjects; various modalities and positions manifest the fragmentation of the subject.

'Concepts' are the battery of categories, elements and types that are used for treatment of the field of interest in a discipline. Linguists have subject, predicate, noun, verb and word as concepts of grammar; however, Foucault talks more about shifting configurations and changing definitions rather than well-defined concepts. "But what …makes it possible to delimit the group of concepts disparate as they may be … is the way in which these different elements are related to one another" (1972:59). Within the 'field of statements' of a discursive formation, there are relationships along various dimensions. Relationships could be those of the statements of a single texts (intratextual) or interdiscursive. These relationships constitute the context for the single statement. Cutting grass in your garden is a part of the activity that also includes taking care of your house that is your private property and so on all of which constitute a discursive formation that also have similar relationships with other discursive formations. "It is the group of relations that constitutes a system of conceptual formation" (1972: 60). This is the basis for systematic investigation of relations within and between texts and types of discourse.

The fourth dimension of Foucault analytical scheme is the formation of strategies. The rules of formations discussed so far constitute an archive for the creation of strategies. The rules for the formation of strategies determine which possibilities are realized. "Economic discourse, in the Classical period," for instance, "is defined by a certain constant way of relating possibilities of systematization interior to a discourse, other discourses that are exterior to it, and a whole non-discursive field of practices, appropriation, interests and desires" (1972: 69).

The methodology in *The Archeology of Knowledge* aims at an analysis not of the formation of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies themselves (for example in economic discourse) but of the historical conditions for the formation of these (i.e., various and contradictory discourses can originate from the same principles, e.g. liberal or Marxist economic discourses).

The focus in Foucault's genealogical period shifts from discourse to power, or rather it adds power to his theory of discourse. Genealogy is the history written in the light of current concerns and as such an intervention in the present. Foucault's concern in his later works is with the way power is produced in social practices through technologies. Knowledge is the key concern here. Power in Foucault's terminology does not refer to the use of force to dominate those who are subject to it; rather it incorporates them. Power in this sense is disperse and intimately connected with knowledge, because it is produced through microtechniques (such as examination), which in turn is are developed on the basis of knowledge that is generated. What we call 'knowledge' is not a 'mere' explanation of reality; it refers to a particular version of reality that has received the stamp of 'truth' through scientific explanations in a particular society. Power cannot be exercised except through the production of truth. Analyzing institutions and organizations in terms of power entails analyzing their discursive practices. Discourse is decentered in this phase: it is not simply a vehicle that translates systems of domination but it is itself the power to be seized. The analytical focus in this period shifts from particular discursive formations to the salient discourse categories that are more generic (such as interview and counseling) and can be used in various institutions and thus compatible with various discursive formations.

Critical Discourse Analysis
If I have spent a substantial part of this paper summarizing Foucault's notion of discourse analysis, it is because the discourse analytical approaches that I have chosen to review relate, in one way other, to Foucault and his notion of discourse. However, with one exception, they all analyze specific texts or interactional materials in contrast to Foucault's broad-brush analysis of topics such as medicine, sexuality or criminology. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), particularly Fairclough's version, draws explicitly upon Foucault's ideas but tries to combine these ideas with other theoretical notions and apply them to analysis of actual texts.

One of the most prevalent criticisms against Foucault's model of discourse analysis is that his focus on power and knowledge exaggerates the extent to which people are manipulated by power and does not give enough weight to the possibilities of change. Although in principle he is interested in change, the totality of his work creates the impression that resistance is generally contained by power. Fairclough (1992) shares this critique which, according to him, is connected to another weakness in Foucault's approach, that is it does not include actual instances of discourse since his focus is on systems of historical rules to which he refers as discursive practice. Foucault's model is intended to account for actual practice but the assumption that one can extrapolate from structure to practice without directly analyzing real examples is a questionable one. Furthermore, his focus on structures cannot account for how structures have become what they are. Fairclough suggests that in terms of change Gramsci's concept of power in terms of hegemony is much more useful in that it conceives hegemony as an unstable equilibrium built upon alliances (Fairclough 1992, 1995). In actual instances, one would see a tremendous intertextuality: people draw upon various and sometimes contradictory discourses in their utterances or writings. Intertextuality as a mode of struggle between discourses is an important conceptualization. Fairclough also takes one step back from the radical constructionism offered by Foucault, because he does not want to give up the notion of agency. His argument is that "although objects and subjects may be shaped by discursive practices, these practices take place in a material reality that is already constituted with 'preconstituted objects and subjects', and that an analysis of real practice will provide an important correction to Foucault's overemphasis on

the constitutive effects of discourse" (1992: 60). Fairclough therefore makes a clearer distinction between social practice (as a sphere outside discourse) and discourse (as linguistic (semiotic) moment of it), and inserts that the two spheres are mutually constitutive. Such a conceptualization facilitates an interpretation of any instance of discursive practice in terms of its relationship to existing orders of discourse and discursive practices (micro-macro levels of analysis) as well as its relationship to *existing* social structures (ideologies, power relations). To accommodate these distinctions he adopts a three-dimensional conception of discourse and correspondingly a three dimensional method of discourse analysis. Discourse in this approach is seen as simultaneously 1) a spoken or written language text, 2) discourse practice (production and interpretation of text), and 3) sociocultural practice. The method includes thus description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between discursive practices and the text, and finally explanation of the relationship between discursive processes and the social processes (1995: 96-98).

The reason for my emphasis on the word 'existing' before social structures is that it is indicative of a blind spot in this approach. Like many scholars who are influenced by constructionist ideas but wants to sustain the notion of structure as an entity that exist beyond discourse, Fairclough is caught in the classical dilemma that can only be resolved by ignoring some obvious epistemological questions that the distinction arises. If social structures can be defined prior to discourse (although they may be transformed or changed by discursive practices), how and where does the researcher recognize and identify them? What has the epistemological primacy here, and why? Are not the recognition and identification of these structures necessarily themselves linguistic practices – by the researcher within the conventions of the respective academic discipline that is involved – which, to use Foucaultian terms, both constructs its object of inquiry and the subjectivity of the researcher as the expert? Consequently, because the nature of these social structures is not given and accessible except through discourse and by the researcher's own discursive practices, Fairclough's later works (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) flirt with Bourdieu's field theory in order to account for the social structures.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a designation Fairclough uses both to define his own approach (1995) and as an umbrella definition for a number of approaches (Fairclough 1992, Fairclough and Wodak 1997). I mentioned earlier briefly his criteria for his distinction between critical and non-critical approaches, but there is no consensus on what approaches belong to CDA[5]. I want to include in my overview two CDA approaches that have produced substantial work on racism and discrimination in discourse: the socio-cognitive discourse analysis (van Dijk 1984, 1991), and the discourse-historical analysis (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). The overview of these models involves a discussion of the points I made in the introductory sections of this paper, and also a discussion of more general questions such as prejudice, racism and ideology. Furthermore, I will discuss strengths and limitations of the models in order to open a path for a complementary model that I will be discussing in the last sections of this paper.

Teun A. Van Dijk: socio-cognitive model of discourse
Teun A. van Dijk is one of the most diligent scholars of racist discourse, and has influenced a large number of researchers all over the world (van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1997, 2000). He represents the socio-cognitive approach to discourse for which he has an elaborate theoretical and methodological model. For van Dijk discourse analysis is an analysis of the mental structures as they are expressed in language and the relationship between these and wider social structures. Like Fairclough and other CDA scholars, van Dijk distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive practices. The problem of racism for instance has not only to do with language and communication but also "manifests itself in many non-discursive practices and structures such as discrimination in employment, housing, health care, and social services, or in physical

aggression" (1993: 13). Consequently, his notion of discourse is limited to linguistic-semantic expressions of social practices and ideologies.

According to van Dijk, no serious account of discourse meaning or coherence is possible without 'mental representations' of groups, situations and 'cognitive processes of various kinds' (1987: 37). Consequently, specific utterances are taken to be linguistic expressions of what is going on in the mind. People carry around different kinds of mental models such as concepts, frames, scripts and schemas. A mental model is that which is located in the individual mind about specific people or events. However, attitudes – unlike models – are socially shared schemas because they are socially acquired. Prejudices are, in this cognitive perspective, a specific type of attitudes intimately related with their social basis, or more specifically, they are negatively dominated ethnic attitudes. Prejudices are the cognitive basis of all our information processing about members of a group. Attitudes, thus prejudices are not simply any evaluation people may have about members of a group or events but complex organized memory systems organized hierarchically. They feature a set of fixed categories in which similar information can be stored but also have open terminal nodes in which actual values of concrete situations can be fitted. They have semantic coherence and display causal, rational connectedness between subsequent actions or events.

However, van Dijk is interested in more than what happens in individual mind even if it may be formed socially. He is interested in studying how power relations are reproduced ideologically, that is, how racism as a system of social inequality is legitimized in discourse. Central to his approach is therefore a notion of social cognition that links dominance and discourse. The exercise of power presupposes mind management by shaping knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, norms and values. Ultimately mind management is geared towards access to the public mind that is conceptualized in terms of social cognition. Social cognition is defined as "socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning…" 1993b: 257). Social cognitions govern how individuals understand and act upon the world; they mediate between discourse and action, between micro- and macro-levels of society, between the individual and the group. As such they underlie the social and cultural organization of society as a whole. The elite are able to shape social cognitions by virtue of their access to discourse. These evaluative social representations are assumed to be organized schematically (as schemas men have about women or whites have about blacks). The general norms and values that underlie such beliefs may further be organized in more complex and abstract social cognitions that are basic ideologies. In other words, ideologies are "the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests and values of groups" (1993b: 258). As such they are tied to groups, and in many respects are the core definition of the (often) biased self-identity of groups and how they view their relation to other groups and their position, aims, and resources in society (1998:307).

In short social cognitions are mental structures and processes that govern concrete text production, and the media communicate social cognitions as well as the interpretation of specific events according to these socially shared, dominant cognitions. Critical Discourse Analysis is then a detailed description, explanation and critique of the ways in which the content of communication is organized, or in his words, it "specifically aims to show how the cognitive, social, historical, cultural, or political contexts of language use and communication impinge on the contents, meanings, structures, or strategies of text or dialogue, and vice versa, how discourse itself is an integral part of and contributes to the structures of these contexts" (1991: 45). Social and political structures are in this view manifest in the meanings or organization of the communicative event.

His analytical model is based on this view of language and therefore interested mostly in the description of linguistic features through which cognition is mobilized. He analyzes utterances for graphic and phonetic expressions, syntactic (sequential) structures of sentences and sentence pairs, lexicalization, semantic structures of both sentences (meanings) and sentence sequences (topics or themes), illocutionary functions (e.g. assertions) and other pragmatic properties (e.g. strategies of politeness), rhetorical operations (such as figures of speech), overall conventional text forms, schemata or superstructures (genres), interactional structures (such as turn-taking), cognitive processes, strategies, and knowledge and belief structures, and other properties of communicative event (such as relations between participants, goals, setting, institutional context and so on) (1993a: 28).

This kind of elaborate model of analysis creates the impression of a rigorous analytical approach that does not leave much room for arbitrary and subjective interpretations (which is one of the main criticism against qualitative methodologies). There is no doubt that his work has been enormously helpful in pointing out the detailed linguistic strategies involved in the justification of racist practices. On the other hand, the elaborate and systematized model of analysis is also indicative of something else: that the researcher knows exactly what he is looking for. Herein lies the greatest problem with van Dijk's methodology, which is intimately connected with his cognitivist view of language and interaction. In this view, discourse can be read as a reflection of mental structures and cognitive processes. Since we do not have a direct access to the workings of the mind, this may be the only way that we can observe how thinking is accomplished. But there is a crucial twist here: the actual discourse is not taken as the reflection of the way people think (i.e., their thinking is fragmented and disjointed). Rather, thinking is a property of the mind made up of coherent cognitive structures, and consequently, variations and contradictions in people's accounts are not understood as a normal feature of discourse (and thus thinking process) but explained in terms of conflict between impression management techniques and sincere thinking. Van Dijk distinguishes between the effective expression of semantic macrostructures and the interactional goal of creating a good impression. These two different sets of goals may cause conflict in accounts. Overall, the strategic moves are relative to the beliefs, scripts, and schemata. For example, less prejudiced people opt more for positive moves rather than accusation moves towards minorities.

I want to dwell some more on the term prejudice. Prejudice is – as it normally refers to irrational feelings and attitudes rather than facts – an epistemologically problematic term as it presupposes the objective identification of a social or cultural group the true nature of whom can be defined and categorized in order to define the prejudiced representation as a 'distortion' of this reality. As I demonstrated in the introductory sections of this paper, the 'object' of thought (the immigrant) is attributed various characteristics at different moments of discourse, that evaluation of the object cannot easily be separated from the description of the object, and that realism of the description are achieved rhetorically in discourse as if evaluations are embedded in reality rather than the speaker's mind. In this sense, any judgment – whether prejudgment or 'informed' judgment – would be normative. Moreover – as van Dijk often points out – people generally deny being prejudiced. As implied before, van Dijk deals with this issue by distinguishing between impression management as an external pressure in terms of social norms, and sincerity in terms of expressing what one really believes (attitude). But for pressure to work effectively it cannot only be an external force, it must have been internalized, which in turn would mean that the contradiction is not between the coherent cognitive structures in the speaker's mind and the external social customs, but one that is within the speaker who is dealing with two contradictory themes.

This distinction also has other problems. If attitudes are socially shared schemata, why would people assume that they would be judged as prejudiced by the other members of their social groups, particularly when their social group can be as inclusive as the white ethnicity in a European context? It cannot be satisfactorily explained by the fact that the researcher may be considered as someone who is holding different views and norms. Studies show that even fascists – for example the National Front in Britain – deny (and do so in their own publications directed to their own members who are supposed to share similar views) that they are prejudiced. Rather, they refer to the 'facts', while justifying racist propositions (Billig 1988, 1991).

The implication of this is that prejudice itself should be the topic of our discussion rather than the specific content of prejudices. Prejudice has come to be seen as "the evil of irrationality, which enlightened people should try to eradicate from their thinking" (Billig et.al. 1988: 102). Consequently, it is not that people try to avoid expressions of ethnic or racial prejudice on the moral grounds alone but any kind of prejudice that is seen as a sign of irrational thinking. People usually offer their judgments (which we conceive as prejudice) by referring to factual information rather than as their own subjective beliefs, which would indicate prejudice.

The second thing that happens in the analytical process as a consequence of cognitivist approach and of the elaborate analytical model is that the ideological themes (e.g. socially shared schemata such as prejudice) are not identified in terms of their functions in the context of utterance but theoretically constructed by the researcher prior to the analysis. With the predefined categories of social representations, the researcher's task becomes limited to looking for linguistic evidence for the categories identified prior to the analysis (i.e., linguistic evidence for prejudice). It is not a coincidence for example that the final products of van Dijk's analysis (1984, 1987, 1993a) are organized according to his model of analysis. *Prejudice in Discourse* (1984) for instance is organized in 9 chapters that are divided into linguistic features of prejudiced talk such as topics of discourse, stories about minorities, argumentation, semantic strategies, style and rhetoric, and pragmatic and conversational strategies. Even the chapters are organized in the same way. The chapter called 'stories on minorities' is further divided in subsections all of which are titled after the linguistic function he is analyzing in the text. The subsection 'the categories of narrative' for example is further examined under the headings, occasioning, summary, setting, orientation, complication, resolution, explication, evaluation, and conclusion. Under each heading, he takes some short extracts from the interview sample and discusses how these narrative categories function – for example how people use occasioning strategies to link the ongoing topic of discourse with an embedded story.

Let us take a closer look at van Dijk's analytical method to further discuss my claims and some other issues related to the claims. In his analysis of a news report from the British tabloid, the Sun, van Dijk first discusses the discursive reproduction of racism where he states that racism as a social practice has a cognitive dimension in terms of beliefs, attitudes, ideologies, norm and values (van Dijk 2000). He argues that the new racism avoids explicitly racist labels, and because of social norms, negative things are conveyed between the lines. But since attitudes about groups influence the lexical choice, the roles the participants are attributed in the stories, and the sources that are used, discourse analyst is able to explicate the racist meaning of text by analyzing how racist talk is managed. The following is the headline and the lead of the story from the Sun of 2 February 1989 (2000: 43).

> **BRITAIN INVADED BY AN ARMY OF ILLEGALS**
> BRITAIN is being swamped by a tide of illegal immigrants so desperate for a job that they will work for a pittance in our restaurants, cafes and nightclubs.

Van Dijk starts his analysis with the rhetoric of the headline pointing at the hyperbolic use of metaphors such as invasion (a common negative metaphor for immigration) and army (immigrants). These metaphors imply that immigrants are not only violent and a threat, but also that they are massive and organized as is the case with an army. The lexicalization of immigrants as 'illegal' associates them with crime. Britain is topicalized as the target of the army not only syntactically marked by the passive sentence, but also further graphically emphasized by the use of capital letters. The water metaphor is used to negatively describe the arrival of foreigners who are being described as illegal a form of rhetorical repetition that further emphasizes that the immigrants break the law and are hence criminals. When a word such as 'desperate' appears in the middle of the text, van Dijk interprets it as a local rupture in the dominant negative meanings because such a description usually implies empathy, and such empathy is inconsistent with the metaphors like army and tide. However, if we read the rest of the sentence, it becomes clear that the term 'desperate' is used to explain that they are here to work for a pittance, that is, it also implies that they are an economic threat to the country because they compete with legal workers. This implied meaning is consistent with the current prejudice about foreigners that 'they take away our jobs'. Finally, van Dijk points at the use of an ingroup designator, the possessive pronoun 'our', establishing a clear contrast between Us and Them (2000: 43-44). Van Dijk goes on analyzing the story in the same manner, but I think even this small piece of a news report and the analysis of it provides rich details to elaborate the points that I want to make.

The first feature of the analysis to be noticed is that it does not analyze what is happening in the text, that is how racism as cognition is worked in discourse. Rather, the ideological significance is already hypothesized and the analysis is limited to description of linguistic expressions of this ideological significance. The analysis functions in a circular manner: it hypothesizes the ideological meaning of statements and looks for linguistic features, and those in turn 'prove' the usefulness' of the model. Van Dijk's analysis is a remnant of ideology critique of 70s that was popular particularly among those who followed Althusser's notion of ideology as a structure that can be read out of the text[6]. This tradition of ideology critique, that is to read off ideology from the media content or cultural products has been kept alive within cultural studies and other related fields of 'critical studies'. There are several assumptions tied to this notion that can be questioned. First, ideological messages may not be as clear-cut as the researcher constructs them in his search for hidden grammars and codes. Take the example of the 'lexicalization of immigrants as illegal'. It can easily be argued that the reporter is making a distinction between legal and illegal immigrants rather than associating all immigrants with crime. In the same way the 'possessive pronoun 'our' may not connote exclusively the white English but include all those who lawfully are members of 'our society'. This brings me to the second problematic assumption. If the ideological messages are already constituted in the mind and then expressed in discourse, then the reading of them by the audience (the meaning of the messages) is also assumed to be already given. For example, according to van Dijk's interpretation, the term 'desperate' implies that the meaning of the sentence is consistent with the prejudice about foreigners that 'they take away our jobs'. First of all it is difficult to get into the mind of the reporter to know what is intended with the term 'desperate'. It may as well be, as van Dijk also notices as a possibility, an expression of empathy for 'illegal' immigrants who work under tough conditions. This type of contradictions is indeed a common feature of ethnic discourse. And also, ethnic discourse is full of contradictory 'prejudices' (even better 'ideas' or 'interpretative resources') each of which functions to accomplish different tasks in the concrete rhetorical context. While 'they take our jobs' in one context, 'they are unable to take jobs because they lack qualifications' in other contexts. My first sample of interviews from 1996 is full of both kinds of 'prejudices'. Since then there is a new interpretative resource that is introduced to discourse: 'we have to give them jobs if we want to integrate them' – a statement that could imply that immigrants are being discriminated against, but often the link is not there. Racism (here understood as a discriminatory practice or

justification of it) works not in spite of these seemingly discrepancies or ambiguities but rather through to them.

Furthermore, newspapers may have different perspectives on the same topic depending on the type of the story. While political stories on 'illegal immigration' would normally be based on political sources and thus framed by them, and particularly by the government, 'human interest stories' on 'illegal' immigrants would usually have single persons and their stories in focus thus written from a different perspective[7], often from the perspective of the person involved (Manoff & Schudson 1986; Eide 2002). While 'the tide of immigration' also was a perspective often used in Denmark (mostly in connection with asylum-seekers), Hussain's study in 1996 showed that the stories in the three months period the study covered, had overwhelmingly positive stories on this topic because half of the stories on immigrants and immigration in that period were about a Tamil girl whose asylum application was rejected and she was about to be expelled. The stories expressed explicit sympathy for the girl and critique of the authorities (Hussain 1997).

I am aware of the critique that the human interest stories treat the problems as isolated incidents. I am not rejecting the idea that one perspective may be dominant in the general coverage of a topic, but my point here is that this type of analysis does not reveal how ideological discourse unfolds. It defines the field of study at the outset as 'an investigation of social representation of immigrants' and then includes uncritically beliefs and attitudes as aspects of that social representation. As I tried to discuss, contemporary consciousness may not be as homogeneous as is implied by the interpretation of the text as dominantly negative. Here the term 'negative' is also problematic, not in the sense that I do not recognize the negative connotations in the analytical example, but in terms of the implied alternative of it. What would be a 'positive' description of immigrants? In his analysis, van Dijk uses the word 'undocumented' instead of 'illegal'. Does the use of 'undocumented' solve the problem of the negative representation of immigrants? In other words, would it challenge the hegemonic (essentialist) way 'immigration' is conceptualized in Britain? A careful reading of data will show that both positive and negative descriptions of immigrants – as well as ideas such as equality, democracy – are deployed to justify discrimination and legitimize racist practices. My argument is that positive descriptions are not the alternative to the essentialist definitions of immigrants as a culturally different group. Van Dijk uncritically adopts the common sense use of the category of immigrants – although he uses the term 'ethnic minorities' – for example when he criticizes the media for not representing the opinion of minorities. This critique is based on two interrelated assumptions: first that immigrants can be represented as a category, and second that immigrants' views on 'undocumented' immigration would be different than those of the white majority (which again would see subject positions as the source of meaning). These assumptions have to do with his notion of ideology as coherent cognitions tied to social groups.

The concept of ideology is itself troublesome in that it is difficult to find clear, consensual definitions of the concept or how 'it' functions. The most common view is that it is an intellectual system of ideas with an internally coherent pattern that structures beliefs, values and so on in a consistent manner and provides a totality of reality. It is in this sense some kind of code that patterns how people think. This notion of ideology can be traced back to Marx and Engels who in The German Ideology (1970) suggested that the dominant ideas of an epoch, particularly in capitalism, depict society as a coherent whole and conceal the contradictions. This notion of ideology can for example clearly be recognized in Althusser's thinking. As I remarked before, Foucault has discarded the notion of ideology altogether in his approach but replaced it with the concept of discourse that somehow also functions as a kind of totalizing code in the same way as an ideology.

The crucial question remains: what is ideology? How do we demarcate one ideology from another? What are the features of the 'liberal' or 'racist' ideology? Is liberalism (or racism) an ideology, a discourse, a concept, or a value? Concepts such as 'racist ideology', 'racist discourse', or 'racist practice' are often used indiscriminately and uncritically. It is for instance generally accepted that modern racism is deracialized in the sense that racist 'attitudes' and practices are justified by a mixture of liberal, egalitarian, ethno-centric, nationalist values or ideologies. But this creates problem: if racism is an ideology understood as a coherent system of patterned thought, how can it be a mixture of other ideologies without ceasing being an ontological category itself?

The contemporary consciousness as it is expressed in discourse is often too fragmented and disjointed to provide the researcher a coherent image of ideologies to be readily discovered. In this connection, the Gramscian term 'common sense' provides a useful analytical distinction (Gramsci 1971). Common sense for Gramsci is popular (organic) ideology as opposed to intellectual ideologies that are coherent philosophical currents. In other words, ideology works on two distinct levels. The coherence of an ideology is secured by its philosophical elaboration, while its effectivity can only be guaranteed when it enters into, modify and transform popular thought of the masses, or in Gramsci's words, "every philosophical current leaves behind a sediment of 'common sense'; this is the document of its historical effectiveness" (1971: 326, fn.). Consequently, popular thought, or common sense is not coherent: it is episodic and disjointed; it bears traces and 'stratified deposits' that 'coherent philosophical systems' have sedimented over time without leaving any clear inventory. It is the residue of basic and commonly agreed, consensual wisdoms. Coherent ideologies must contend for mastery on this terrain (Hall 1977). The notion of common sense as the locus of ideology has radical implications for conceptualizing the ideological subject and its utterances, namely discourse. If ideology is only effective as a sedimented proposition in popular thought, it is not possible to talk about a pre-given unified ideological subject, for example a working class with revolutionary ideology or 'ethnic minorities' or blacks with anti-racist consciousness. Ideologies, social cognitions or social representations – whatever a coherent set of ideas may be called – cannot in this way be tied to social, racial or ethnic groups; neither can people be incorporated into the ideology of another. The implication of such a conceptualization of ideology is the necessary complexity and interdiscursive character of the ideological field. At the same time, the concept of common sense as the popular consciousness that presents itself as 'the traditional wisdom or truth of the ages' enables us to think and analyze utterances as ideological products deeply embedded in history. In Hall's formulation:

> "Gramsci in this sense does not subscribe to what Abercrombie et al. (*The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980) calls 'the dominant ideology thesis' … 'There co-exist many systems and currents of philosophical thought.' The object of analysis is therefore not the single stream of 'dominant ideas' into which everything and everyone has been absorbed but rather the analysis of ideology as a differentiated terrain, of the different discursive currents, their points of break and the relations of power between them: in short, an ideological complex, ensemble or discursive *formation*. The question is 'how these ideological currents are diffused and why in the process of diffusion they fracture along certain lines and in certain directions' (1996: 433-4).

Van Dijk's methodological approach, in contrast, presumes that "many properties of content or style can only be explained as expressions of the dominant ideologies of class and ethnic group to which the journalist belongs – hence the White perspective…" (1987: 45). Racism in his view is "a societal system of white group dominance over non-European groups or peoples, implemented

by generalized everyday negative practices and informed by shared cognitions about socially construed and usually negatively valued racial or ethnic differences of the out-group" (1993: 24). Such a view of ideology that identifies dominant ideologies and ties them to groups prior to analysis blocks the researcher's sight for variations in discourse. Consequently, the analytical work consists merely of looking for evidence for expressions of the dominant ideology, which in turn is read into the data by the researcher.

Inconsistency is not the result of a flawed research design but an inherent feature of social interactions. People express racist ideas here and egalitarian ideas there. Nina Eliasoph's ethnographic study among members of a country-western club demonstrates that expressions of racism cannot be taken at face value as a mere reflection of racist mind but rather they function as markers of group belonging to the context they are uttered (Eliasoph 1998). Eliasoph argues that 'the group atmosphere was more racist and sexist than most of its individual members'; and that the same person would utter racist jokes 'just to keep the tone right' and 'to appear casual in social gatherings while expressing 'un-racist' attitudes in a moment of seriousness in more private settings – a discrepancy in attitudes which she explains with a distinction between 'backstage/frontstage' (in an inverted form) in terms of interactional needs (Goffman 1959). The implication is that beliefs, attitudes, and cognitions are not entities separable from interaction; rather they are managed and constructed in interaction (Potter 1998a).

What I am saying is not, then, that we cannot conceptualize racism or ideology as abstract analytical concepts, but that they are not to readily available for identification in discourse as expressions of mind and mind control. Racism as an ideology cannot be considered as 'basic social representations of groups' or 'some kind of group self-schemata'(van Dijk 1998: 308); as Eliasoph's example also indicates, people express various kinds of 'group self-schemata' depending on their assumptions about what the expectations in the group context are (in that sense, the group identity is also constructed in interaction, not necessarily because of one's class or social background).

A conceptualization of racism as a discriminatory (discursive) practice[8] on the basis of racial, ethnic or cultural difference seems to be more useful for understanding the ambivalent nature of (racist) discourse. If we accept the commonly agreed notion that modern racism is deracialized (in that racist practices are justified not on the basis of biological differences but by a mixture of liberal, egalitarian, ethno-centric, nationalist values, norms or ideologies), there is not much use in insisting on a definition of racism as an attitude in the mind or a structure outside discourse both of which readily available for analysis. In this connection I find useful the definitions of racism by Balibar (1988), Omi & Winant (1996), and Hall (1990) with some modifications.

According to Balibar, racism "inscribes itself in practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation and exploitation), in discourses and representations which are so many intellectual elaborations of the phantasm of prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify the social body, to preserve 'one's own' or 'our' identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated around stigmata or otherness (name, skin colour, religious practices)" (1988: 17-18). What Balibar is talking about here is a 'differentialist racism' that operates not on the basis of biological difference – it admits that the behaviour of individuals cannot be explained in terms of their biological features – but cultural difference. Differentialist racism inserts the insurmountability of cultural differences as the basis for the distinction between the 'us' and 'them'. Culture in the new racist paradigm functions like a nature "locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin." It has developed 'democratic' doctrines and an 'anti-racism' that turn upside down the argumentative logic; "it is an operational theory of the causes of social aggression. If

you want to avoid racism, you have to avoid that 'abstract' anti-racism which fails to grasp the psychological and sociological laws of human population movements; you have to respect the 'tolerance thresholds', maintain 'cultural distances'… The neo-racist ideologues are not mystical heredity theorists, but 'realist' technicians of social psychology" (pp. 22-23).

Balibar points at a very important aspect of the contemporary discourse on race and ethnicity. Essentialist ideas about culture (or religion) are easy to identify in most qualitative research on race and ethnicity. My interview sample and newspaper clips are full of many utterances on cultural differences as the explanatory frame for 'the way things are', that is, why immigrants are inherently different and should therefore be treated as different. It is one of the basic ideas by which discrimination is justified and legitimized in discourse. However, two qualifications should be made here. First, these ideas are not limited to the utterances by 'the neo-racist ideologues' but widely shared by the participants. In Balibar's view, the Danish People's Party in Denmark would be identified as the main source of the neo-racist ideology (unless, of course, he thinks of all mainstream political movements as inherently 'racist'), but as many studies across Europe have demonstrated, the binary opposition of 'us' versus 'them' based on essentialist categories of culture and religion cannot solely be tied to neo-racist sources. In other words, it is difficult to demarcate these ideas as components of a racist ideology; but we can show that they are often used for racist ends. After all, identity politics – often based on essentialist notions of identity – have also been a part of anti-racist strategy and promoted by minority groups as a way of challenging the 'negative' representations of themselves.

Second, these ideas do not work at an abstract theoretical level but are utilized, often in combination with other ideas, to flexibly accommodate the rhetorical needs of the context of the utterance. It is the hegemonic articulations of these different ideas that produce racist practices and institutions.

Hegemony, as I will discuss later, presupposes contingency in discourse. Thus, hegemonic articulation does not mean unidirectional thinking but that different ideological currents 'fracture along certain lines and in certain directions'. A particular articulation becomes hegemonic when different arguments are put together on the basis of some unquestioned assumptions as basic premises. A 'racist' articulation is hegemonic when even non-racists 'feel' that the parameters within which the issues of race, ethnicity or immigration are discussed are the only realistic and viable framework by which any individual case can be evaluated. The denial of racism should, then, be seen as an indicative of hegemonic thinking rather than an impression management device. People are often aware of the possible 'discriminatory' consequences of what they say or do, but in the name of long-term 'benefits' of a proposed action for 'all of us' they mobilize a battery of justificatory strategies not for racism but for describing their propositions as non-racist.

Racism as a hegemonic articulation is underlined in both Omi and Winant's and Hall's understandings of racism. Omi and Winant (1996) speaks of 'racial formation' as a way of reformulating 'race' as a political definition, which allows for a non-essentialist understanding of race as the site of hegemonic struggles. In this sense, it is similar to Lipsitz' definition (1998: 66). Racial formation for Omi and Winant is "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (p. 53); it is the result of multiple racial projects in a contest for hegemony. "Racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines" (p. 56). A racial project that has secured hegemony controls – if only precariously – the meaning and interpretation of race and thus the allocation of resources in society. Not all racial projects are racist, only those that "creates and reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race" (p. 71). Omi and Winant's

concept of 'racial formation' breaks away from the more traditional conceptions of racism as a matter of prejudiced attitudes and bigotry, and discriminatory practices. However, for Omi and Winant, race is a matter of both social structure and cultural representation. By this distinction, they introduce the same problematic notion that 'race' as a social structure can also be analyzed outside its discursive articulations – a distinction that they probably feel is necessary because discourse is understood as 'merely' cultural representation. To repeat myself, my position is that 'structure' is itself a product (representation) of the scholars' own representational practices rather than a 'natural object' that exists outside discursive practices.

Scholars of race and racism have developed different conceptual categories to deal with the deracialized and ambivalent nature of racial discourse. Stuart Hall (1990) distinguishes thus between 'overt' racism and 'inferential racism'. The later means 'naturalized representations of events and situations relating to race, whether 'factual' or 'fictional' which have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a set of unquestioned assumptions" (p. 11). In this view, inferential racism is the hegemonic articulation of 'race' and 'race relations' in that different positions operate within the same paradigm, or what Foucault call 'system of dispersion' within the same order of discourse (1972: 38). For example, once the problem of immigration is defined in terms of numbers and this definition is accepted, then all the statements would somewhat relate to this basic premise: whether or not the number of immigrants is 'too high' or 'tolerable'. The discussion will be imprisoned by the logic of the 'numbers game'. This is, for Hall, a racist logic, and it comes from a chain of reasoning whose representative on this occasion was Enoch Powell who set the agenda for the media, and thus public discourse. This racist logic does not become effective by creating racist subjects but by constraining 'a very great variety of individuals: racist, anti-racist, liberals, radicals, conservatives, anarchists, know-nothings, and silent majoritarians" (1990: p. 20).

The advantage of all these approaches is that they not only break with the essentialist conceptions of race but also break the necessary relationship between groups and ideologies, and more importantly have a conceptual framework that can accommodate contingency and ambivalence inherent in ideological thinking. On the other hand, none of these approaches really deal with actual utterances. The contingent and precarious nature of hegemony arise in part because utterances (text and talk) are designed to carry out interactional (rhetorical) tasks and do not therefore entail descriptive closure or cognitive consistency (Wetherell 1998: 401), and thus is a consistent threat to stability of hegemony. Ideological thinking should be identified in the contingent field of utterances rather than as theoretical concepts on the basis of assumptions about how ideologies in general work. Methodologically, this would mean considering the rhetorical meaning of the utterances, that is situating utterances in their rhetorical context. Utterances are often designed to counter alternative constructions of reality, but they do so among others by rendering counter-positions invisible and unthinkable.

The implication of this modification is that racism is defined in terms of its rhetorical effects: as the way a discriminatory practice is accomplished, justified and legitimized on the basis of ethnic, racial or cultural differences, which themselves are constructed as differences in discourse. As such it is not only a break with the conception of racism as an ideology, attitude or belief system, but also with the notion that people intentionally argue for racist effects. This approach has several advantages. It expands the scope of studying racism into everyday practices (which is already common in studies of modern racism) without necessarily tying it to the intentions or ideologies of individuals; it enables us to understand how the racial, ethnic or cultural discrimination is maintained despite the almost hegemonic norm that one shall not be racist; and it also opens up for an argumentation (dialog) with people who reproduce racist effects in discourse but express non-racist or anti-racist attitudes and beliefs. Moreover, it enables us to link

the justification of discriminatory practices with an urge for maintaining the status quo that is structured around racist practices, motivated by a 'possessive investment' (Lipsitz 1998) in race or ethnicity as a key to the distribution of resources, and as an investment in the future.

Discourse-Historical approach
What I have said about van Dijk's concern with looking for linguistic evidence for racist and discriminatory ideas applies to many studies conducted within 'CDA' tradition (for examples from Denmark see Hervik 1999, Holm 2001). This is equally true for 'discourse-historical approach' associated with Vienna School of discourse analysis the most prominent name of which is Ruth Wodak, although they distance themselves from van Dijk's monocasual, unidirectional understanding of opinion-making and manipulation. They too associate themselves with the term 'Critical Discourse Analysis' and adopt several of van Dijk's concepts and categories such as 'positive self-representation' and 'negative other-representation', but they find his sociocognitive emphasis incompatible with the hermeneutic basis of their model. As alternative to van Dijk's monocasual opinion influence model, they emphasize multicasual, mutual nature of influences between different groups and persons within a specific society (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 31-32). Furthermore, they also reject "Foucaultian and postmodernist theories of discourse and power, which reify or personify language and discourse as autonomous, collusive actors which steer the speakers and hold the reins" (ibid.: 31).

And what I have said about elaborate analytical models – that they end up prescribing the findings through the questions it asks to the material – is also true for the 'discourse-historical approach'. They too have a very elaborate model of discourse analysis with which they trace linguistic expressions of 'discriminating utterances'.

The discourse-historical approach as elaborated through a number of studies has three dimensions: 1) content or topics, 2) discursive strategies, 3) linguistic means and realizations. First they establish the specific content or topics of a specific discourse with racist, anti-semitic, nationalist or ethnicist ingredients. This is done by asking five basic questions to the text: "How are the persons named and referred to linguistically? What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others? From what perspective or point of view are these namings, attributions and arguments expressed? Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified or are they mitigated?" (p. 44).

Second, according to these questions, they look for five types of discursive strategies, which are all involved in the positive self- and negative other-presentations. Strategy here means a more or less accurate intentional plan of practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. The first kind of discursive strategies are what they call 'referential (or nomination) strategies'. Categorization of ingroups and outgroups by tropes, metonymies, and biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors as well as synecdoches (a part standing for the whole or a whole standing for the part). Second are 'predicational strategies' that may be realized as stereotypical, evaluative attributions in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. Third, there are 'argumentative strategies' through which positive and negative attributions are justified. Fourth, people express their involvement in discourse through 'perspectivation, framing and discourse representations strategies' by positioning their point of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation of discriminatory events or utterances. Fifth, there are 'intensifying strategies' and 'mitigation strategies' both of which help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition.

Each strategy is further specified with respect to sub-strategies, and these in turn are studied in terms of their linguistic realization, types and so on. Referential strategies for instance is further specified such as strategies of collectivization, spatialisation, originalisation, actionalisation, somatisation, culturalization, economisation, politicization and so on, and these selected strategies are studied in terms of linguistic means (such as deictics or collectives, toponyms, somatonyms), and realization types (such as we, us, them, Germany, Blacks, Negroes, Turks, Muslims etc). All these strategies are systematized in this type of analytical categories in an extreme detailed fashion.

Such a detailed systematization of what the analysts are looking for in the data makes the analytical model appear rigorous and carefully designed – as one that avoids the common critique of most qualitative-interpretative analysis for being arbitrary and 'subjective', but the rigorous look is in fact achieved by the model's own rhetoric – that the analysts prescribe findings by limiting their search to the linguistic realizations of theoretically constructed categories while ignoring the situated nature of utterances or in the best case explaining this nature in terms of impression management techniques.

Let us take a look at how the analytical model functions in actual analysis with an example from Reisigl and Wodak (2000: 65). The following extract is from the Austrian tabloid Kronenzeitung of 15 November 1997. The article is entitled, 'Two Africans in detention. Drugs dealt 6000 times'. The first paragraph is the lead.

> A 'record' was achieved by two dealers from Africa. In just four-and-a-half months, the duo dealt cocaine and heroin more than 6,000 times to addicts in Vienna! Only hours before they were apprehended, they had transferred their 'weekly profit' of AS 150,000 to Senegal.
>
> Either the Döblinger Steg or the Friedensbrücke in Vienna served the men – daily exactly from 5 to 7 pm. – as an 'office'. Two Viennese addicts were the look-out, giving a signal if police approached. According to the investigations, the Africans – in the scene they were known as 'Jimmy' and 'Ali' – had about 40 to 50 customers daily. And that was for a good 120 days. During questioning, the two, having forged identity cards with them, claimed not to know anything about it. Even their own names did not come to them. Just once, 'Ali' suddenly looked at a file, read the company name, and said: 'May name is 'Bene'… An accomplice named 'Rene' is still at large.

This extract is analyzed in terms of discriminatory referential strategies. First, they notice that the two dealers are referred to in terms of their continental origin, and then they are referentially identified to as 'two dealers from Africa', 'the duo', 'the men', 'the Africans', 'Jimmy and Ali' and as 'the two'. Only once in the article Senegal is mentioned as the possible country the perpetrators come from. This is, according to Reisigl and Wodak, because these two men are referred to de-toponymically as 'Africans' thus standing for 'Africa' as a macro-toponym (not a particular geographic entity). This rough reference to the continental origins contributes to the strengthening of the prejudice that 'all Africans in Vienna are dealers', and in a broader sense, that 'many foreigners are criminals. They suggest a substitution test where 'African' is replaced with 'Austrian'. If the dealers had Austrian passports or from another EU state, the author of the article would not have referred to them as 'two dealers from Austria or EU', they argue. What we learn from this example, they conclude, that prejudices are not always expressed directly and by explicit ethnicist, racist or sexist slurs, but that "negative predications can be expressed more suggestively, insinuatingly" (ibid.: 65).

This is the typical outcome of linguistic analytical models applied to texts. What this type of analysis does is to describe the inferred meaning of the text in terms of how it is linguistically organized. However, the inferred meaning (the prejudiced predication of foreigners) is not a feature of the text. All of the information in the article can easily be verified (or ruled out) as mere 'facts'. The prejudice 'all Africans are drug dealers' cannot be read out of the text – it is an external category that is assumed to be shared knowledge (it is questionable that anybody would actually utter such a prejudice in any setting). The naming of the dealers as Africans is linked to this 'prejudice', thus inferring the linkage on the part of the readers. The question then is, if 'prejudice' were the issue here, whether the prejudice is a function of referential strategies. Reisigl and Wodak argue that in every racist, anti-Semitic, nationalist, ethnicist and sexist prejudice there is inherently a fallacious generalization (p. 63). The problematic aspect of distinguishing between fallacious and non-fallacious generalizations aside, the main problem with the notion of prejudice is that a statement that can be seen as prejudiced can be qualified by a reference to numbers (facts) which in itself will be an argument against prejudice. Rather than discussing these kind utterances in terms of prejudice, we should begin asking questions such as 'why it is relevant to include the ethnic or national background in a story about criminality'. The relationship between Africans and criminality works through associations – through unsaid assumptions about what the person's background means in relation to his conduct (see my discussion of argumentative model in later sections). Methodologically, then, merely pointing at the negative connotation of a naming or predication cannot substitute a thoroughgoing analysis.

Let me make my point clearer by using the suggested substitution test. My qualified guess (I have seen similar stories on Danish drug dealers arrested abroad) is that if a drug dealer of Austrian origin were arrested in another country, they would also be referred to as 'Austrian' in the Austrian media. The reference to the national background would depend on the context. On the other hand one can question whether it is the explicit reference to the continental background that creates the racist effect: even if the ethnic, racial or continental background of the perpetrators were not mentioned in the article (provided that any clue to their background were unintentionally provided), it would still enable the readers to infer the connection and evaluate the story by the presumed prejudice. If this is so, the implication is that the explanation for the 'prejudiced' nature of the story should originate somewhere else than with the referential strategies in this particular text. It could be the broader interpretative framework or some broader assumptions that steer the reception of the text along into a 'prejudiced' reading. In such an analysis, it may be necessary to go beyond the immediate text and to interpret it in relation to wider argumentative contexts. A broader question could be: would the paper still print the story if the perpetrators were Austrians (rather than whether they would be referred to as Austrians), or at least would the story have the same prominence in the paper? Methodologically, this question would imply identifying 'interpretative repertoires' (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984, Potter and Wetherell 1987, Wetherell and Potter, 1988, 1992) that are constructed across texts on migrants in a certain period of time, but also looking all drug stories in the same period where Austrians are involved, and how these stories were presented compared to the example examined by Reisigl and Wodak. The inclusion of an outgroup cognitively implies an ingroup. The significance of the story as 'prejudiced' can thus be explicated by looking at the unsaid premises for including the ethnic background of the perpetrators in the story, and what this inclusion means in terms of how the story is presented. The explication of the unsaid assumption that functions as a common-place (for example the categories of race, ethnicity or culture as an explanatory framework for behaviour) may provide the connection between the statement and the inferred meaning.

What I am trying to say is that any connection between a referential feature of the language and an abstract prejudice – which, of course, would be resolutely denied by anybody involved – would be a function not of the referential features of the text but the result of a particular

discursive (hegemonic) articulation of taken-for-granted categories such as 'foreigners', 'Africans', 'Austrians', 'crime', 'culture' and so on. I will elaborate on both the argumentative significance of unsaid premises and the concept of hegemony (hegemonic articulation) in the coming sections.

The way they analyze the example in terms of prejudice indicates that they share the problematic notion of racism both as a pervasive ideology (the functions of which are not analyzed out of the text but presumed as pre-existing), and as a non-discursive social practice. In other words, they see racism both as a social practice and as a syncretic ideology that manifests itself discursively. "Racism is based on the hierarchical construction of groups of persons who are characterized as communities of descent and to whom are attributed specific collective, naturalized or biologically labeled traits that are considered to be almost invariable. These traits are primarily related to biological features, appearance, cultural practices, customs, traditions, language, or socially stigmatized ancestors. These are – explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly – evaluated negatively, and this judgment is closely in accord with hegemonic views" (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 10). However, they are also aware of the mixed character of racism: "… racism combines different, and sometimes even contradictory, doctrines, religious beliefs and stereotypes…" (p. 10). I take this confusion to be a result of their insistence on defining racism in terms of ideology and their distinction between discursive and non-discursive aspects of social practice.

I would like to make a note about the definition of racism as an ideology as this is where their conceptualization becomes confusing. It is, for example, difficult to make an analytical distinction between 'discourse' as a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective (Fairclough 1995) and ideology that is also understood as a chain of reasoning that combines different ideas from a particular perspective. Both ideology and discourse are understood as a 'code' that signifies meaning but at the same time racism is defined as a mixture of 'different and sometimes contradictory doctrines, beliefs and stereotypes'. If racism is a mixture of diverse ideological elements, how can it itself function as a philosophical current that signifies events from a particular perspective? This confusion leads, in my view, to other confusions, particularly in regard to the ambivalent nature of discourse. They speak of their methodology as 'sociodiagnostic critique' that "is concerned with the demystifying exposure of the – manifest or latent – persuasive, propagandist, populist, 'manipulative' character of discursive practices. It aims at detecting problematic – 'problematic' from the analyst's normative-ethical perspective… - social and political goals and functions of discursive practices, at uncovering the responsibilities and the speaker's –sometimes – disguised, contradictory, opposing, ambivalent or 'polyphonic' intentions, claims and interests…" (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32-33). They are, however, aware that metaphors such as 'exposure/uncovering/unmasking' imply a 'know-it-better' attitude on the part of the analyst, and a conception of the audience as passive consumers of meanings communicated to them. They suggest that these problems can be minimized by 'the greatest possible accuracy on the part of the critical analysts who relate the textual expressions to the wider frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances (p. 33). I discussed earlier the problematic assumption that the analyst has a direct access to the non-discursive aspects of the social life (as if the distinction itself is not a discursive practice), but it is this assumption that makes their argumentation look circular: they suggest solving the problem of 'know-it-better' attitude by knowing better the relationship between 'textual expressions' and 'social and political relations, processes and circumstances'. It works only because the latter is taken to be given.

The description of some discursive practices as 'propagandist, populist, and manipulative' implies yet another assumption that there is a "non-manipulative, non-fallacious, transparent, rational" discourse that can lead to a participatory democracy where everybody can participate

equally in the formation of public opinion, and where a final agreement is reached by a rational logic stripped of interests in the best Habermasian sense (p. 263). This aspect of their model (the role of argumentative discourse in the formation of public opinion) is in fact at the heart of my project, and I want to discuss the proposed model of rational debate by which, according to Reisigl and Wodak, participatory democracy can be achieved.

Their concrete question is how racist, ethnicist, nationalist and sexist prejudices come into one's head and how they can again be put out of one's mind. A partial answer is by persuasion in the sense that a person can be influenced to adopt, fix or change his or her ways of perception, attitudes, and ideas. According to their model of rational argumentation, persuasion happens when a rational and 'universalisable' consent is reached under conditions of widely equal opportunities and symmetrical power-free communication. Universalisable consent means it is consent reached 'under such conditions and proceduralised such that anyone should agree'. "The speakers' and hearers' or readers' ability on rational and logical judgment and conclusion remain in the final criteria in the intersubjective achievement of an agreement on a controversial point in question" (p. 70). They add that this conceptualization is in line with the Habermasian concept of 'ideal communication'.

As can be inferred from this conceptualization – although Habermas makes a distinction between cold rationality of logic and communicative rationality, which is formed in dialogue (Billig 1996, Ryfe 1998) – the basic assumption is that thinking follows some logical rules, and if we all follow these rules without trying to be manipulative, we will reach more or less the same final conclusions. Reisigl and Wodak set up ten basic rules for rational deliberation[9] (pp. 70-71): 1) freedom to argue, 2) obligation to give reasons, 3) correct reference to previous discourse by the antagonist, 4) obligation to 'matter of facts', 5) correct reference to implicit premises, 6) respect of shared starting points, 7) use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentation, 8) logical validity, 9) acceptance of the discussion's results, 10) clarity of expression and correct interpretation.

According to Reisigl and Wodak, racist, ethnicist, nationalist, sexist and other forms of discriminatory discourses violate many of these rules. They call these violations 'fallacies'. All of these rules and the pragmatic fallacies can be discussed one by one illustrating that they are all based on problematic assumptions on the nature of human communication but this paper does not have sufficient space for such a detailed discussion. Let us therefore discuss one example – the example of 'argumentum ad hominem' which means verbal attack on the antagonist's personality, credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, competence and so on. This is not a feature of racist or sexist discourse, and can barely be defined as a fallacy. One of the way in which people produce their accounts as rational and factual is by reference to the expertise or authority of a source or speaker, whom they use as a support for their argument. Alternatively, they deconstruct the expertise and authority of sources or people who may challenge their version. If fact construction is a feature of discourse, and this is one of the ways in which facts are constructed or challenged, then a distinction between fallacious fact construction and non-fallacious fact construction will not be relevant. Consequently, Reisigl and Wodak's argument that this fallacy is not concerned with the 'facts' of the matter in question does not make much sense: basically at the heart of all argumentative discourse is the issue of what the nature of 'facts' is and how we know those facts. In other words, argumentation about 'facts' is a natural part of all argumentation.

The idea of communicative rationality, if it meant agreeing on particular ethics or politics, would be a powerful one, but that would also imply maintaining differential positions in public debate because politics necessarily entail difference. Thus a fully inclusive 'we' is impossible as the

political is organized along antagonistic relationships. In this perspective, the notion of communicative rationality would mean achieving a new hegemonic articulation (later on this). In contrast to this, Habermas' (and thus Reisigl and Wodak's) vision has a rational consensus, or a final reconciliation as the purpose of argumentative discourse. In this sense, although Habermasian notion of argument is not grounded in cold calculations of 'pure' logic with only one outcome, at the root of his vision is the assumption that argumentation, if based on reasoning – the process of advancing clearly stated propositions, providing evidence for those propositions, and producing counter-arguments that are also based in evidence – will end up with the same rational conclusions under the conditions of free, undistorted communication.

In their understanding of argumentation, Reisigl and Wodak draw upon the conception of argument, which Toulmin (1958) outlined some time ago. Argument in this conception is pursued in context, in ambiguous situations, and thus critically shaped by its persuasive goals rather than pure logic. Toulmin was arguing against logicians who were interested in the truth-value of an argument: if the facts are given, following the logical chains of reasoning according to a universal set of criteria applicable in all fields of argument, it should be possible to reach the truth. Against this Toulmin argued that everyday reasoning (or practical argumentation) is based on assumptions, rules, principles, inference-licenses and so on that enable us to present guarded or qualified assertions and conclusions, and its effectiveness is secured via its persuasiveness rather than logical validity. These assumptions, rules and so on link the 'facts' of the matter in question to our conclusions. Toulmin's model builds upon the classical model of argument as outlined by Aristotle (1909) some thousands years ago. According to the classical model, an argument has three components: a major premise, a minor premise, and conclusion. Premise implies some kind of knowable facts of the matter in question. Instead, Toulmin suggest that practical reasoning is based not on factual or categorical premises but rather hypothetical and permissive ones which he calls warrants (Toulmin 1958: 114). A warrant is not a piece of information but "a guarantee *in accordance with* which we can safely take the step from our datum to our conclusion" (p. 114). In order for an argument to begin, warrants often have to be conceded, otherwise arguments will be about the warrants (generalized understandings) rather than the specific claims. I will discuss Toulmin's model in detail in coming sections but the implication in relation to our discussion here is that rationality is not a based on universal standards of truth but is managed locally and contextually. In other words, arguments are pursued in interaction and shaped by the motivations, goals and intentions of the interactional context.

Toulmin's model is meant to illustrate the contingency of rationality, but it is also often taken as a universal model of reasoning according to which arguments are to be judged. Reisigl and Wodak seem also to have an understanding of reasoning as a universalized standard as they set up rules for a rational debate and identify fallacies in argumentation. They argue, for example, that the 'posthoc, ergo propter hoc' fallacy (following this, therefore caused by this) mixes up a temporally chronological relationship with a casually consequential one. The concrete example of this fallacy is the racist argument that the increase in unemployment rates within a specific nation state is the consequence of the growing numbers of immigrants, because it is without any *empirical proof* and ignores the complex economic relationships and relevant economic, political and social factors responsible for unemployment (p. 73). However, this 'racist' argument is based on a perfectly valid reasoning if we explicate the warrant according to Toulmin's model: if there are only a certain numbers of workplaces, then there will be more people to compete for them, and consequently more unemployed. Of course as with any reasoning, this can be challenged, too, but what Reisigl and Wodak do is to challenge this argument with another argument that can be analyzed in precisely the same way into its components, and the questionable presuppositions in their argumentation will also became clear. But they claim that their argument confirm to the reality while the others' claim is a speculation only referring to its own logic as proof. Their use

of the term 'empirical proof' indicates that they think arguments can be evaluated in terms of their truth-value as if 'empirical proofs' and their use in arguments are given once for all for all participants (except racists). In other words, they are engaged in an argument about an argument, and we could go on arguing this way in infinitum without reaching a 'rational' conclusion.

As opposed to this understanding of the model, I suggest that the model be taken as an analytical tool that after the fact constructs the structure of an actual argument to see how people argumentatively make claims and justify their positions, and what kind of assumptions, rules, principles, inference-licenses they draw upon in their discourse. Quasthoff's analysis (1978) of how stereotypes are utilized in discourse is a good example of how argumentative analysis based on Toulmin's model can provide us with insights about they way ideological discourse is naturalized. Stereotypes according to Quasthoff are analytical propositions that claim to express a truth about a group and as such they take the logical form of judgments that attribute or deny particular qualities to the group. In argumentative discourse they often appear as expressions of common knowledge. Consequently, they are often not expressed as conclusions or claims but appear in warrant or backing positions (see later) and as such they become inconspicuous: "in these positions, stereotypes are less objectionable than they would be as claims or data" (p. 29) because they have a non-argumentative, commonsensical function. In these positions, they are – as long as they are not challenged – treated as facts of the matter rather than subjective assertions about a group of people. The very categorization of the group about which stereotypes are articulated would also have to be treated as consensual. We can already see the contours of the connection between Gramscian notion of common sense and Toulmin's concept of warrants as conceptual rather than factual basis of arguments.

One implication of this analysis is that anti-racist strategy has to be aware of the basic assumptions that underline specific arguments rather than inserting arguments on the basis of those assumptions (for example accepting that immigration is about the numbers and discussing whether or not the numbers are 'tolerable', or discussing what 'immigrants' do or not do to the 'society' as if immigrants and society are given categories). If the basic assumptions for racist arguments are accepted, what happens is that "liberals, anti-racist, indeed raging revolutionaries can contribute 'freely' to this debate, and indeed are often obliged to do so, so as not to let the case go by default: without breaking for a moment the chain of assumptions which holds the racist proposition in place. However, changing the terms of the argument, questioning the assumptions and starting points, breaking the logic - this is a quite different, longer, more difficult task" (Hall 1990: 20).

In short, elaborate models of rationality that demands correct reference to implicit premises, obligation to 'matter of facts' or logical validity cannot secure the conditions for a rational debate that ideally should result in a final agreement. The question is more how to create conditions for a new hegemonic articulation with new identification categories rather than 'racist' ones that shape the direction of argument.

The conditions for such a change is in the contingent and precarious nature of identity because identity categories are continuously constructed and transformed in the process of interaction the transformative motor of which is the built-in reflexivity and the consequent variation in discourse. The analytical tools for analyzing these transformative properties are best provided by the so-called Loughborough school of discourse analysis, or in their own term 'discursive psychology'.

Discursive psychology
I have in fact already displayed the basic notions of discursive psychology in my critique of other types of discourse analytical approaches such as its anti-cognitivist stand where discourse is seen

as social action rather than a reflection of mental structures, and consequently its focus on action, construction and variability in discourse and argumentative organization of talk and text. In this section, I will give a more systematized overview of this approach and discuss its virtues and limitations, particularly in terms of how those limitations can be overcome by combining this approach(es) with Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory.

As my overview of discourse analytical approaches has already made clear, one of the basic problems I see with other types of discourse analysis is that they see – despite their constructionist tendencies –texts as expressions of wider social structures such as ideology, and following this, the questions asked to the text are centered around 'what is this an expression of?' Discourses are seen abstract entities that organize meaning in a given text. In contrast, discursive psychology does not see discourses removed from the actual practices of real speakers or writers. Thus, one cannot take a bit of speech or written text and look for the 'discourse' working within it, "because what the person is doing with her or his speech will always 'get in the way of' its straightforward manifestation in that speech" (Burr 1995: 175). The meaning of an utterance is not a straightforward matter of external reference but depends on the local and broader interpretative systems in which the utterance is embedded. People do all sorts of things with their utterances; they make accusations, ask questions, justify their conduct, blame others and so on (but not necessarily in a very conscious manner), and in doing so, they use a wide variety of ideas and linguistic strategies, and they often give shifting, inconsistent and varied pictures of their social worlds. This does not mean that there is no regularity in discourse. However, the regularity cannot be conceptualized as a feature of an abstract discourse and thus be pinned at the level of individual speaker. There is for example regularity in variations. The way inconsistencies occur within a text or across texts can tell us about particular ways of speaking about an issue fit into the rhetorical demands of that particular moment of utterance. These particular ways are what discursive psychologists – or more correctly Wetherell and Potter – call 'interpretative repertoires', following Gilbert and Mulkay (1984).

Discursive psychology, then, does not begin its analytic enquiry by looking for concrete examples of abstract discourses but with the concrete, contextualized utterances from which abstract notions of 'interpretative repertoires' can be analyzed. 'Interpretative repertoires', elaborated in Potter and Wetherell (1987), Wetherell and Potter (1988, 1992), is the key concept here, although discursive psychology (with the exception of Wetherell and Billig) has lately been moving away from it (later on this). "An interpretative repertoire is a culturally familiar and habitual line of argument comprised of recognizable themes, common places and tropes (doxa)…" (Wetherell 1998: 400). Interpretative repertoires are linguistic resources or tool-kits available to people to draw upon in their constructions of their accounts. They are loosely structured building blocks often used with stylistic and grammatical coherence and often organized around one or more central metaphors (for example, 'immigrants' as an economic resource for the host country). They are "the common sense which organizes accountability and serves as a back-cloth for the realization of locally managed positions in actual interaction … and from which … accusations and justifications can be launched. The whole argument does not need to be spelt out in detail. Rather, one fragment or phrase … evokes for listeners the relevant context of argumentation – premises, claims and counter-claims" (ibid.: 401).

The concept of interpretative repertoire is used as an alternative to 'discourse', understood as a 'system of statements that constructs an object' (e.g. medical or legal discourse). As opposed to Foucaultian notion of discourse, these are "resources available that have an off-the-shelf' character and that can be used in a range of different settings to carry out particular tasks … and … that these resources also have a more 'bespoke' flexibility, which allows them to be selectively drawn upon and reworked, according to the setting" (Potter, forthcoming). To borrow Burr's

(1995) analogy, they can be compared to the repertoire of moves of a ballet dancer: finite in number and available to all ballet dancers for the design of a variety of different dances suitable for a variety of different occasions. The audience who regularly follows ballet performances learn to recognize the repertoire of moves that dancers have available to them. "The idea of a repertoire therefore also involves the idea of flexibility of use; the moves can be put together in different ways to suit the occasion (a future not present in the idea of discourses as coherent, organized sets of statements)" (Burr 1995: 176). Variability is, then, an inherent feature of talk because people use different repertoires to suit their current purposes, but repetition, thus, patterns can also be found because different people use the same repertories.

One of the crucial points with the notion of interpretative repertoires as flexible resources that can be used to suit the occasion is then that the traditionally sociological link between ideas (discourses, ideologies, or interpretative repertoires) and any kind of social group – be it class, race or gender – is loosened so much that there is no sense in classifying participants, for example in interviews, into groups corresponding to the identified interpretative repertoires, because each participant would selectively combine different repertoires. In their study of white New Zealanders' way of talking about Maoris, Wetherell and Potter identified a number of interpretative repertoires three of which they picked out as dominant repertoires: culture fostering, pragmatic realism and togetherness. Culture fostering was used by over 90 percent of respondents in their interview sample, while the two other repertoires were drawn on by half of the respondents. In most cases, then, there was a combination of at least two repertoires while 10 percent combined all three repertoires. This makes it impossible to divide respondents into three classes each with a different pattern of beliefs or attitudes.

Of course, drawing upon different and sometimes conflicting repertoires leads to inconsistencies in people's accounts. The conflicting forms of account are generally separated into different passages of talk so inconsistencies do become a problem for people, but when different repertoires are deployed together, participants clearly orient themselves to the potential inconsistencies in different ways. It should be added, though, that it is only when looking at the organization of explanations in the discourse as a whole that the inconsistent nature of talk becomes apparent. This flexibility in accounts is important to ideological effectiveness as racism – discriminatory practices – can be justified through deployment of different repertoires.

When discourse is not understood as an abstract entity the expressions of which one should be looking for in the text, the questions discursive psychologists ask to the text differ, too. The enquiry is no longer centered around the question, 'what structure is this an expression of?' Rather 'how and why is this done?' or 'what is the function of this?' are the leading questions. The analyst would be asking questions about actions and practices in settings such as 'how does a speaker construct her or his identity through descriptions of other people or groups?' 'How is an identity ascription used to disqualify a counter-part's version as a product of their interest or stake?' 'What procedures do speakers use to present their claims as disinterested?' 'How do people display emotion descriptions to provide indirect justifications or blamings?' 'How are available discursive resources used to justify certain racist practices and institutionalizations?

Again, in contrast to the other approaches discussed here, the analysis is not a matter of following rules and recipes. Although stylistic and grammatical elements are associated with interpretative repertoires, the analytic focus is not a linguistic one but is concerned with language use, and the functions of that use and the nature of the interpretative resources that allow that achievement (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 91). Nevertheless, there are some considerations that are important to have in sight in the analytical process (Potter 1998b; forthcoming). Variation in and between accounts can be used as an analytical lever to explicate the activities going on in discourse.

Details such as hesitations, lexical choice, repair, and so on are another analytical concern. Looking at the rhetorical organization of an utterance will tell the analyst how they make argumentative cases and often also undermine (potentially) alternative cases. The focus on rhetoric is linked to an analytic concern with accountability – that is displaying one's activities as rational, sensible and justifiable.

One of the enduring interests in discourse analytical work as a whole has been in the way racism, sexism, and other related forms of discrimination are justified and legitimized. *Mapping the language of racism* (Wetherell and Potter 1992) has been one of the important reference points for many discourse analytical work on racism. In their studies of white New Zealenders' ways of talking about the indigenous Maori people, Wetherell and Potter were interested in how ordinary white New Zealenders described their relations with Maoris. Out of their analysis of qualitative interviews with white New Zealenders, they identified three dominant repertoires which they labeled culture fostering, pragmatic realism, and togetherness. Furthermore they identified two major aspects of culture fostering repertoire each of which itself functioned as a repertoire: culture as heritage and culture as therapy. In the first instance, culture defined as heritage is traditional and unchanging, locked in some kind of golden time of the constant re-enactment of rituals and values. Culture in this sense is the past, not the present or the future:

> I am quite, I'm certainly in favour of a bit of Maoritanga. It is something uniquely New Zealand, and I guess I'm very conservation minded and in the same way as I don't like seeing a species go out of existence I don't like seeing a culture and a language and everything else fade out. (Shell)

The interesting thing about this transcription is that it does not convey the richness of the spoken word with pauses, hesitations, emphases, overlaps and other kinds of interactional features of talk, when discursive psychologists often emphasize the role of features in the production of the local meaning of the text. But later works by discursive psychologists often makes use of Conversation Analytical conventions for transcription to capture these features (see appendix).

Culture as heritage describes Maoris as museum keepers segregated from the issue of systematic exclusion and discrimination. And it encourages concerns about the dangers of 'culture contact' and 'clash of cultures'.

The other aspect of cultural fostering repertoire is culture as therapy in which the focus is changed from rituals and traditions to identity, values, roots and pride:

> I think sort of Maori Renaissance, the Maoritanga, is important because like I was explaining about being at that party on Saturday night, I suddenly didn't know where I was, I had lost my identity … I think it is necessary for people to get it [Maori identity] back because it's something deep rooted inside you. (Reed)

Culture fostering here is seen as positively compensating for what is viewed as a deficit or a weakness within Maoris, and this form of accounting retains the notion of deficit.
Although these two constructions of culture may seem to refer to the same theme, they were applied in rather different contexts where they produced different objects and subjects and often implied competing kinds of proposals for social policy. The first was often used in connection with general discussions of Maori language while the second in discussions of crime among young Maoris or in talk about educational failure. They were doing different sorts of work in discourse.

The identification of interpretative repertoires is one aspect of the analysis as the local meaning of the actual utterance cannot be read out of the repertoire(s) people use in their accounts. Wetherell and Potter (1988) make also a distinction between the psychological motivations for using different interpretative repertoires and their social psychological (unintended – ideological) consequences (functions) which may not be clear to the speakers. Thus, well-intentioned talk that, say, promotes multiculturalism can have racist (discriminatory) consequences.

In my study of Danish discourse on immigrants (1997), I also found similar patterns in my interview sample: culture was the main culprit for all the problems people related to immigrants. I 'identified' a couple of repertoires that all were drawn on to construct immigrants as a category and explain their conduct. These explanations were used to justify the discriminatory practices against 'immigrants' which, of course, were never described as discriminatory, but simply as a consequence of the egalitarian principles upon which Danish society is built. The repertoires were 'culture as an essentialist category', 'culture as traditions', and 'culture as resource'.

Looking back at my 'findings' then, I realize that those were my constructs that in fact were not so easily distinguishable in the data, considering how flexibly the interpretative resources were used. Moreover, these 'repertoires' were not the only interpretative framework that people draw on: they often draw upon liberal and particularly egalitarian ideas (repertoires?) to explain the way immigrants are treated or to suggest specific social policies. As indicated by the use of parenthesis, I hesitate to call these liberal and egalitarian ideas 'repertoire' although they, too, appear to be loosely connected ideas that organize text along lines of particular argument. However, used in connection with immigration, egalitarian arguments are deployed to legitimize discrimination rather than promote equality. This, of course, is not in contradiction to the notion of repertoire, but repertoires are understood as particular lines of argument that promote certain social policy. But egalitarianism, if taken as a repertoire in this sense, does not, when articulated together with essentialist notions of culture, promote equality simply because egalitarian arguments are used against the backcloth of a basic assumption that equality means 'everybody should be (ethnically) similar to be treated in the same way'. And if ideas that 'make up' repertoires are used flexibly to fit the context and often in combination with other types of ideas that are not necessarily related to the issue at hand, how, then, do we identify a 'repertoire'? That a repertoire is the common sense that 'evokes for listeners the relevant context of argumentation – premises, claims and counter-claims' without the whole argument needing to be spelt out in detail implies that repertoires have an internal logic to them. But if repertoires are used flexibly to achieve contradictory ends, and in this sense a 'repertoire' such as egalitarianism gains different meaning because it works on different premises, then the notion of repertoire may still be a concept too rigid (similar to 'ideologies') imposed by the researcher. The identification of the repertoires does not tell much about the local meaning of a discourse, not even about the ideological consequences of it, which is achieved in terms of rhetorical functions of the utterance. The implication of this discussion is that it may be more useful to talk about interpretative resources (not necessarily interconnected ideas) rather than repertoires (coherent set of ideas) to accommodate the flexibility with which ideas are combined in discourse. The 'fixing' of ideas along particular lines or the ideological effects of discourse is not in this sense a function of repertoires but articulation of ideas into chains of arguments.

There is one more thing that the notion of repertoire falls short of explaining. Almost all discourse analytical studies have demonstrated a pervasive feature of racial discourse: whatever ideas may be drawn on in people's accounts, the endpoint is almost always the maintenance of racial (ethnic) discrimination through justification and legitimization strategies. This is in fact the most repeated finding in all kind of work on racism. The question is then: why is it an enduring

feature of racial discourse that people keep justifying racism even if when they display egalitarian, liberal, anti-racist sentiments?

The immediate response to these questions seems to be to move completely away from any notion of abstract categories that do not originate from the data. This is a response that is being developed within discursive psychology. The version of discursive psychology that Potter and Edwards (1992) formulate refrains from abstracting to 'interpretative repertoires' or any kind of broader 'ideological structures' to which the participants do not orient in the data, in order to avoid reiterating analysts' prior assumptions or political values. Discursive psychology in this version has three reference points (Edwards 1995). The first is rhetoric: people built up their accounts argumentatively to do something: to claim and dispute things, to describe and account for how things are, and to justify change or continuity. The second reference point is social constructionist studies of science that encourage an understanding of science – and consequently discursive psychology itself – as a discursive practice that makes discovery claims and constructs the categories it speaks of. The third is ethnomethodology and its sister discipline, conversation analysis. Methodologically (and thus theoretically) this third root has a major influence on discursive psychology in the sense that analysts are interested in participants' own categories rather than abstract categories that are not explicitly acknowledged by the participants. In this perspective, the interview is not seen as a productive research method: since accounts are produced interactionally, interviews, as controlled interactions tend to produce particular responses. The major data for this kind of analysis is a detailed transcription of 'naturally occurring talk'.

The interview material that was used in Wetherell and Potter (1992) was re-transcribed and re-analyzed by Edwards (forthcoming) with a very different focus and outcome. In this analysis, Edwards has a different starting point from Wetherell and Potter: rather than identifying racist talk or racism in talk, he focuses on various features of the talk that seem "particularly relevant to how racism might arise in with regard to these materials, whether as an analysts' conclusion about them, or as a participants' oriented-to, interactionally managed category." Racism in this sense is interesting insofar as it is a category that is interactionally produced. In line with conversation analytical approach, one of the main points in this re-analysis is that common sense (shared knowledge) should not be treated as a back-cloth for what is actually being said but as something interactionally managed. Appeals to shared knowledge are in this sense interactionally produced to do something rather than being expressions of what a speaker may actually think is known. He picks then up three examples of common sense discourse for analysis: 1) links between mental states, events, and rational inferences, 2) scripts and dispositions, 3) reluctance to come to a view, along with coming to a view unlooked-for, serendipitously or by accident. Let us look at an example of the first kind (see appendix).

```
1      FR:    You know there is a problem in the schools for for
2   →         blacks and whites I would think,
3             (0.9)
4             u:m
5             (1.0)
6             There's a Maori lady down the corner here
7             (1.3)
8             and she's got three boys,
9             (0.5)
10  →         well she was thrilled that her boy was put into a
11            class with a lot of Europeans,
12     I:     (h)y(h)eah(h)
```

```
13  →  FR:    because she was worried
14     I:     Yeah
15  →  FR:    um that he would get into a class with quite a few
16            Maoris and therefore they form a gang
17     I:     Yeah [and] stop working,
18:    FR:         [and]
19            and once they're a gang they they ((inaudible))
20            themselves that they,
21     I:     Yeah
22  →  FR:    you know not interested in, they'll be more
23            >interested in agitating< in the classroom [than
24     I:                                               [than
25            working
26     FR:    Mm.
27     I:     Yeah, right.
28            (1.2)
29            °Yeah°
30  →  FR:    But I I don't it makes you wonder sort of the
31            people that make
32            (2.6)
33            these laws and laws,
34            do they kno↑w what's really go↑ing on in the
35            in the you know the average (.) sch__ool and
36            (0.5)
37     I:     Yeah
38     FR:    and ho↑me and everything
39     I:     Probably not.
```

In this type of analysis, expressions like 'I would think' on line 2 are not taken as tokens of speaker's insecurity about the statements that the speaker is making, or impression management techniques but as a way of conveying a sense of inferential carefulness. One rhetorical function such an expression has is to convey a sense of inferences being drawn, in contrast to expressing strongly held views, making bold assertions or knowing more than one is entitled to know. Similarly 'it makes you wonder' on line 30 has the same kind of function: they express avowal of mental state, and display of careful ('wonder' rather than 'conclude' or 'realize'), rational inference ('it makes you'). So these mental state expressions ('think', 'wonder') can be analyzed as performative, interaction-oriented tokens. Participants sometimes offer a view as a kind of causal noticing, as something that they have not really thought much about. The speaker in the extract displays a similar strategy: she does not offer an opinion or attitude that she has prior to the interaction. She is not sure that there is a racial problem; ergo what she is saying does not originate from her own prejudices. Rather, it is a conclusion reached on the basis of a rational inference referring to an external reality. Her statement is thus supported by the story of 'a Maori lady down the corner here' (line 6) that helps the speaker to put herself outside the dichotomy of 'blacks and whites', where she might be taken as one who speaks form a 'white' point of view. The Maori lady serves as an eyewitness – eyewitness accounts have a rhetorical force of their own – and as a representative for Maoris, which has the function of guarding against any potential criticism that her worries may be identified merely as her own or white worries. So, the speaker's racial concerns that she voices in the beginning of the extract emerge as rationally founded, carefully arrived at, and as shared, particularly by Maoris themselves against whom she otherwise might be taken as positioned. What this analysis shows then is that all these epistemic concerns are prejudice-relevant, not only in terms of racial prejudice but prejudice in general.

I find in fact this reanalysis extremely exciting because by paying attention to the micro-levels of the talk, it has a powerful potential to demonstrate the ways in which a realistic image of descriptions of the world is achieved rhetorically in interaction. However, there is also an imminent danger of going back to scientific discourse that claims to describe the world objectively because of its emphasis on empiricism and technical details – in the same way as the participants do with their accounts. Ideology in this view is only interesting insofar as the speakers are oriented to ideology as a category. But there is a problem in this avoidance here: if we follow Edwards own suggestion that people construct their accounts rhetorically, that is argumentatively, then both the assumptions that they bring into the interaction and the anti-topoi, that is the potential alternative versions against which they construct their own versions can be discovered through analysis. Considering the rhetorical nature of talk, it does not make sense to say that such a discovery merely would display the analyst's own categories of ideology. If the rhetorical end for the talk is, as Edward's analysis also implies, to justify particular policies that may be recognizable both to the speaker and the hearer as 'prejudiced' or 'discriminatory' – which is, we must assume, why the speakers initiate complex strategies to avoid such a connection – then we should be able to say that ideology (not in the sense of an abstract category that makes people think in certain ways) is at work here.

People in conversation, even in interview form, are engaged in some kind of argumentation over a topic, but nevertheless the topic that preoccupies the speakers is not of special interest to the analyst, who seem to be interested only in the mind-world mapping strategies of the participants. Such a focus may be interesting in the ongoing debate between cognitive psychology and social constructionist approaches, but those analysts who are also interested in the topic would have to go beyond the enquiry into the ways in which people produce their conclusions as rationally arrived at. The limited focus on the interactional features implies that the analyst can only say something qualified about how people convey an image of themselves but never about the actual topic of the interaction.

If the analysis is prejudice-relevant, this implies that speakers orient themselves towards prejudice not only as a concept but also in terms of its content. The fact they have an idea about what kind of statements might be considered as prejudiced indicate that there is a shared understanding of how the term prejudice relates to content. What people do in their accounts is not only managing the mind-world relationship in terms of constructing themselves as rational beings, but also their rational inferences lead to conclusions that justify inequality and racism – this is evident in another extract in the paper in which the speaker argues that doing away with apartheid in South Africa is not realistically possible even though it is morally the right thing to do.

Pure empiricism then restrains the analyst from taking a critical stand by ignoring the content. How people manage racism in talk is one really interesting question, but how it is justified and legitimized is also equally an important question. Empiricist analysis is an ideological practice on the part of the analyst.

The empiricist approach claims an objectivity in its descriptions of what is going on in the interaction by focusing on the speaker's own categories. However, also in this approach the analyst brings his own 'assumptions' about language use and what this use conveys into the analysis. The text itself – or the speaker – does not say, 'look, this is a rational inference structure!' This is the analyst's own interpretation based on theoretical assumptions about language use. Furthermore, I have also difficulty in seeing the difference between cognitive psychology that attributes meanings to the speaker's mind, and this type of focus that by

implication attributes intentions on the part of speaker (they blame, justify and so on). (For an interesting discussion of these issues, see Wetherell 1998, Schegloff 1998, Billig 1999, Schegloff 1999.)

Discursive psychology, even in its Potter and Wetherell (1987) version has often been criticized on the grounds that it is so much focused on the internal workings of a text that it rarely looks at the wider contexts or political implications. With the tendency to move completely away from the notion of ideology as a useful analytical category, it is now itself being criticized for having ideological functions by ignoring questions such as inequality.

My initial response to the questions I raised (why do people always end up justifying racism even if they display egalitarian values?) is that instead of moving completely away from talking about abstract categories that cannot be found in the data, we should look for the answer through an analysis of the argumentative texture of utterances. If discourse is inherently rhetorical, then we should be able to understand the working of argumentation and its premises through an analytical model that explicates these features. At the micro-level the analysis aims at the explication of unsaid premises for the logical organization of the argument, and at the identification of whatever ideas are drawn on in the specific argument. Thus, the way liberal, anti-racist or egalitarian ideas get articulated together with the other – unsaid – assumptions (for example about the nature of 'culture' in human conduct) can be empirically analyzed. I suggest that how these specific arguments are articulated into chains of arguments can also be analyzed at a macro-level in terms of the semantic and logical connections created in the articulatory process. Overall arguments are organized through chains of single arguments in ways that the claim for one argument becomes the premise for the next level of the argument (for example as in academic discourse).

### *An analytical model of argumentation: Toulmin's T-schema*
Toulmin's argumentation model is built upon the classical model of arguments set up by Aristotle (1909). In Aristotle's model, an argument has three components: a minor premise (singular premise), a major premise (universal premise) and a conclusion. The classical example is:

> Socrates is a man (singular premise)
> All men are mortal (universal premise)
> So Socrates is mortal (conclusion)

The use of the term premise in both places in an argument indicates that we have information available in both places of the schema (minor and major premises). In this model, the major premise 'all men are mortal' provides a certainty that also proves the truth-value of the argument. Toulmin suggests instead a four-fold model where the term major (universal) premise is replaced by the term 'warrant' (W), and minor premise with 'data' (D), while 'backing' is added as the fourth dimension of the scheme in which we still have the conclusion (C). The difference from Aristotle's model is that 'warrants' are not like premises that provide the facts for the argumentation but are themselves subject to questioning and has to justify their authority. A warrant is an inference-license that legitimizes the step from D to C. 'Backing' is used to support and explain the warrant and may be carried out by referring to taxonomic classifications, to statutes or laws, or to statistical statements. This is the basic model the elaborations of which I will discuss later with examples. Now with this model in mind let us look at a similar statement:

> Whales give birth (data)
> Mammals are birth-giving animals (warrant)
> So whales are mammals (conclusion)

The argument can be set up in the following T-schema:

D ——————————→ So C
(Whales give birth)   (Whales are mammals)

Since
W
(Mammals are birth-giving animals)

On account of
B
(the following taxonomic system)

Backing is not explicated here, but in case it is used, it would be a reference to an encyclopedic entry or a taxonomic classification from a biology book. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this reasoning as long as the warrant is unquestioned. And often warrants are "conceded without challenge and their backing is left understood. Indeed, if we demanded the credentials of all warrants at sight and never let none pass unchallenged, argument could scarcely begin" (Toulmin 1958: 106), and communication can scarcely be established, I would add. However, not only the warrant – as to whether or not whales can be ascribed to the category of mammals – but also the very category of mammals can be challenged as a valid taxonomy to classify living organisms. The argument then would not make sense and we would have a new argument about the classification system. The contingent nature of categories – although they appear as naturalized and have a taken for granted status – has long been demonstrated by scholars who study standardization systems (Bowker and Star 1999). In the example above, the warrant has a scientific authority about it and would almost never be disputed. On the other hand, even a dictionary definition of mammals can make this otherwise robust argument unstable. According to the dictionary in my Lotus program, a mammal is "any of various warm-blooded vertebrate animals, including human beings, marked by a covering of hair on the skin and in the female, milk-producing glands." So, one can argue that whales do not exactly fit into this taxonomic classification system. In this case, in order to keep the argument valid, we would have to argue and reach an agreement about the category of mammals first. Even the argument in the first example with Socrates can be destabilized if it is uttered in a context of people who have a different understanding of the relationship between life and death.

These examples are used only to demonstrate that the rationality of an argument cannot be assessed by its truth-value which simply can be tested according to a universal logic of reasoning. Rather, rationality is field-variant and depends on the possibility of establishing inference-warrants in the relevant field: it depends on "to what extent there are already established warrants in science, in ethics or morality, in law, art-criticism, character-judging, or whatever it may be; and how far the procedures for deciding what principles are sound, and what warrants are acceptable, are generally understood and agreed" (Toulmin 1958: 176). Language does not consist of timeless propositions but of utterances dependent on the context and occasion on which they are uttered. Utterances are actions performed in given situations and assessment of the merits of this action in the context of its performance. Only in pure mathematics can the merits of a claim be made context-free and on its own terms (ibid.: 180-181).

In practical argumentation, the merits of a proposition are assessed by its effectivity. Indeed most of the time in our everyday life even when we are not aware of it, we are engaged in some kind of argumentative discourse. A vernacular sentence such 'you have your shoes on' may not look much like an argument, but in a context where a couple discover that they forgot to check the mailbox, it will be an implicit argument that the one with shoes on should go out and do it. It is an implicit argument because the conclusion of the argument is not explicit. If we set up the argument according to the T-schema, we can analyze the argumentative structure of the utterance:

D ———————→ C
You have your shoes on   So you should go and check it (implicit)

W
Since it is easier for the one
who does not have to put shoes on
(fairness principle)
(implicit)

Here, the two components of the argument are not explicated. In fact, the majority of arguments can be expected to have implicit components – mostly implicit warrants – because they typically refer to a general principle that is assumed to be known and accepted by the counterpart, and they can be inferred from the combination of data and conclusion. However, the explicitness or implicitness of the components depends on the rhetorical situation. In this case, the implicitness of the conclusion is probably due to the fact that the implicit parts of the argument are less likely to be challenged, and that the data (D) refers more directly to the general moral principle (W) that makes the connection between D and C possible. However, the argument can very easily be challenged on several grounds. For example, that the warrant is a general moral principle of fairness does not mean that it cannot be challenged. First of all, the other person may accept the principle of fairness but bring new information into the situation: I am too tired; I have been driving the whole day. It would be a new argument using the same warrant: fairness. Furthermore, there can be arguments about the warrant itself: the couple may discuss whether or not fairness is the appropriate principle to apply in the given context, or how fairness should be understood and applied in that particular case.

What this example also implies is that rationality – even though the argument appeals to shared norms and values, common knowledge, or taken-for-granted assumptions – is local and contextualized way of reasoning and thus cannot as such be generalized as a universal standard of thinking which should constitute the standards for a rational (public) discussion. Argumentation is a kind of interaction, and actions (as in the example) have motivations, goals, and results and thus cannot be reduced to the logical relationship between data and claim.

I need to make a quick qualification here: when one digs into the exigencies of everyday argumentation, it is much more complicated than the model 'in the book' proposes. First, actual argumentation is much more complex than suggested model: more than one proposal may fill the slots in the schema and it is not always easy to recognize what the claim, data or warrant are. Second, which component(s) of the argument are explicated depends on the interactional situation. Third, a complicated semantic linkage exists between interwoven arguments, one argument as a whole may make up the warrant or data for the next argument or for the next level, that is, functions of propositions change place fluidly.

However, the extract that I analyzed in the introductory section fits perfectly into the schema and proves to be very useful for an extended discussion of the model for analysis.

> JESPER: Nooo, I can't say I did, I mean, no I didn't. It it, uh, it was, no! Then I would have remembered it, right? It.. it is.. but there is much, some of them are a little dominant in the streets, right? Yeah, I mean, I did I didn't, it wasn't myself, right? And it… I wouldn't want to judge anybody in that case, but I was in a discotheque where there was, uh, a friend of mine, he knew, uh, yeah he knows a rocker, right? And uh, this rocker and some of his friends, they had probably provoked some Turks, right? And then, uh, one of the Turks, he hit the rocker on the head with a bottle, right? And it it was you know, it was I am not saying that there is something he can't, I mean, I am not on the rocker's side here, okay, not at all, but I am just saying, it is such a typical reaction from an immigrant, or I just feel so, right? When they are out, you know, then they are very aggressive, like, and they by definition they are not afraid of anybody. They they have, like, their honor … I would never dare hitting a rocker on the head with a bottle, so, uh, or, there are some people who just scare me, right? But it is as if, it doesn't apply to them. They just don't they just don't care, so, they were only two, the Turks together, right?

If we put the argumentation in the T-schema, it would look something like this:

D ————————→ C
They hit a rocker with a bottle.   Immigrants are aggressive by nature.

W
If you can hit a rocker without fear,
you must be aggressive by nature since everybody else is afraid of them.

B
This is a typical reaction from an immigrant,
because they have their honor

What is remarkable in this example is that all components of the argument are explicit, even the backing, which is interestingly what Quasthoff would describe a stereotype. The stereotype in her definition has "the logical form of a judgment which ascribes or denies certain properties (traits or forms of behaviour) to a set of persons in a (logically) unwarrantably simplifying and generalizing way, with an emotionally evaluative tendency" (Quasthoff 1978: 6). They are characterized by a high degree of collective sharedness. This is why the stereotype appears in the backing position rather than as a conclusion – a position that would be extremely open for objections. As an expression of common knowledge, stereotypes gain a self-evident, intersubjective validity which has to do with how and where in the argumentative scheme they used; they are an oversimplified version of Toulmin's 'referring to the statistics' type of information (presented as factually robust information since we all know how immigrants react because this reaction is presumed to be repetitive and therefore well-known).

The perfection with which this argument corresponds to the T-schema is hardly ever found in natural conversation. The explicitness of all components in the argumentative scheme indicates a very interesting situation – that what we are dealing with here resembles much more a theoretical discourse rather than a practical discourse (e.g. the shoe example). We can therefore interpret the explicitness of all the components of the argument as a result of the specific interactional

character of the interview situation where the participant is questioned by a social researcher against whom he probably feels a need to justify not only his specific claims but also the rationality of these claims (the way in which he inferentially reaches these conclusions). In other words, not only the aggressive nature of the immigrants but also his objectivity and rationality have to be established, and one way of establishing rationality is to explicate all the steps of inferences one is making. As Edwards demonstrates in his analysis of a similar discourse, the speaker displays a sense of inferential carefulness through expressions of epistemological concerns (they 'just' don't care, 'as if', 'it wasn't myself') and by appeals to common knowledge ('yeah', 'you know', 'right?' and so on) which do not seem to be expressions of what the participant actually thinks is common knowledge. They perform an interactional function as inference-triggering devices from the semantic level of sentences to the intersubjective level of stereotypes.

The T-schema I have presented is still a basic model. I want to elaborate the model with more components and as a complex layered structure to make clearer both the interactional nature of argumentation and the ideological limits of it. First, Toulmin's complex model includes two more features that are distinguishable from D, C, W and B positions: modal qualifiers (Q) that indicate the strength conferred by the warrant on this step, and conditions of rebuttal (R) that indicate circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant may be set aside. Often, the model is used to analyze the actual micro-arguments and their internal organization but I suggest that it can also be used to analyze macro structures of the arguments, that is the complex argumentative structures (usually found in theoretical discourses such as this paper; political speeches or courtroom discourse) where arguments are hierarchically organized, and to explicate the implicit premises that structure overall argumentation.. Macro structure in this sense refers to the global structure of argumentation that organizes hierarchically the argumentative structure of the entire text. Let us look at the expanded model:

D ⟶ Q, ⸻ C
They hit a rocker with a bottle.   So, I just feel,   immigrants are aggressive by nature.

W   R: I am not saying it is something he can't
If you can hit a rocker without fear,   I wouldn't judge anybody in that case
you must be aggressive by nature
since everybody else is afraid of them.

B
This is a typical reaction from an immigrant

D ⟶ C
They have their honor
By definition, they are not afraid of anything

W
Culture is what makes us

The new places (Q, R) in the argumentative schema reveal what Edwards (forthcoming) calls "reluctance to come to a view, along with coming to a view unlooked-for, serendipitously, or by

accident." The conclusion is, in case anybody should describe it as prejudiced, presented not as the reflection of the speaker's mindset but as a rational (unavoidable) conclusion he, though reluctantly through a rational inference, arrived at. Clearly, we do not need the T-schema in order to analyze this feature of discourse, but the model also enables us to analyze systematically the complex argumentative organization of the utterance and explicate the hidden premises that warrant the conclusions. The warrant (culture is what makes us) is not explicitly uttered in the interaction and thus can be said to be the analyst' own construction. Edwards for example is not interested in imposing the researcher's own categories upon the participants, but what the model shows – if we accept it as universally applicable model of analysis – is that the implicit ideological categories have a built-in quality about them and can be inferred from the logical organization of the local argument. As long as it is possible to reconstruct a proposition from its linguistic context, that proposition would be considered as having been communicated (Quasthoff 1978: 25): there is usually no semantic need to make these basic propositions explicit except for interactive purposes as I demonstrated with the analysis above. The quality of sharedness is what renders implicit the common knowledge expressions. They are basic considerations about the world that function at the level of common sense and constitute the implicit and unproblematic premises for everyday argumentation.

'Culture is what makes us' is such an ideological proposition that legitimizes the steps taken to the specific conclusion(s) of the overall argumentation. It is an interpretative resource that can be used flexibly in constructing accounts of the world. If an interpretative repertoire is a culturally familiar and habitual line of argument comprised of recognizable themes, common places and tropes, then an interpretative resource is more like an organizing principle behind a particular argument and can be identified rhetorically and refers to a common-place. These interpretative resources can be combined flexibly in chains of arguments as opposed to 'interpretative repertoires' that imply larger, semantically coherent units. They are what allow ideological effectivity of propositions because they do not appear as ideological statements but simply as common sense readily available for inference. They are the sediments of ideologies that Gramsci was talking about. They are 'guarantees' for what Hall (1990) calls the 'racist logic' that fractures arguments along particular lines. If these interpretative resources are key aspects of ideology, then the analysis of common-place (common knowledge) propositions should occupy a major place in the analysis of ideological discourse (Billig 1988: 192).

However, if rationality is localized and contextualized and shaped by the goals of particular argument, we cannot speak of one single logic that always leads to the same conclusions out of the same set of data and warrants. In our analytical example, the speaker actually may have started with the essentialist cultural paradigm (culture is what makes us) and end up concluding how wonderful and respectful kind of people immigrants are because of their culture (of which there are some examples in my interview sample). And he may have advanced both arguments at once. And on the other hand, 'culture is what makes us' would not be a valid common-place if the same claim was made about Danes. There is a deeper level of 'warrant' that is the very category of 'immigrants' that makes possible the inference from the culture-paradigm to conclusions about the specific nature of immigrants, while the same basic understanding of what culture is does not lead to the same conclusions about Danes. In this sense, this kind of common sense propositions are not universal models of explaining world: they are resources that are flexible and contingent.

Richard Jenkins (1999) demonstrates for example that the idea of 'preserving Danish identity' was used as justification for both 'yes' and 'no' votes to the Maastricht treaty in the referendum of 1992. Even more specific concerns such as 'the fear for unchecked immigration' or 'populist resentments against cultural and political elites' could easily be used for both conclusions.

This shows, to repeat one of my points from earlier theoretical discussions, that the discursive resources available are not specific to any social, ethnic, or ideological groups. They are available for the participants in all kinds of discourses. In Sweden, a Kurdish youth who murdered his sister defended himself by resorting to the cliché that 'she broke our rules'. He was reminded by the prosecutor that he himself was convicted several times for drug abuse and theft. He replied back: 'those are your rules, not ours', which created fury in Sweden. He may or may not have believed what he said, but its interactive purpose was clear. What was striking about the following public cry was that his interpretation of what rules apply where and to whom was not challenged but taken as a token of immigrant culture and their disrespect for Swedish culture. The very categories of 'immigrants' and 'immigrant culture' were the resources that 'deep' – in the sense that the existence of which is almost unquestionable categories – in the argumentative texture of Swedish discourse 'structured' the argumentation along the lines of ethnic difference.

If the meaning of utterances can only be interpreted in their rhetorical contexts, then the question is: how is it possible to talk about hegemonic articulations? I already indicated an answer to this question through my discussions, but an immediate response here would be that a hegemonic articulation can be secured by gaining a rhetorical consensus on the basic definitions of the matter of controversy. Before I elaborate on how hegemonic articulations are made possible, I would like to round up my theoretical-analytical overview with a discussion of Laclau and Mouffe's theory of hegemony that will provide the theoretical concepts and an overall framework for my elaboration.

Laclau and Mouffe: hegemony as articulation
Whereas the new tendency within discursive psychology moves away from any notion of abstract category that does not originate from the participants in a conversation, Laclau and Mouffe focus on the structuring effect of 'discursive articulations' and 'nodal points' the function of which resembles common-places in the argumentative model. The difference is that 'nodal points' can be categories such as 'culture' or 'immigrant' the meaning of which can be less precise than the function they have in an argumentative structure (at the micro- level), and that they are conceived as of master-signifiers that structure the whole articulatory system. On the other hand, if we conceive hegemonic articulations as macro-structures of argumentation, they would have the functions of common-place in those structures.

Discursive articulations are what temporarily fix the meanings of elements of discourse which is what hegemony is all about. In this view, elements are not predetermined to enter into one type of arrangement rather than another; nevertheless they coalesce as a result of an external articulating practice. In other words, hegemony is the theory of decision taken in an undecidable terrain where the relationships between discursive elements are contingent. This is exactly where Laclau and Mouffe's theory provides the theoretical framework for combining the insights gained through discourse analysis and argumentative analysis with larger 'structures' such as political projects.

Laclau and Mouffe draw heavily upon Foucault's notion of discourse but reject Foucault's distinction between discursive and non-discursive as a form of mentalism. To say the social is nothing but social does not mean that there is no world external to thought: 'an earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field" (Laclau and mouffe 2001: 108). At the root of this prejudice is the [Cartesian] assumption that there is a dichotomy between an objective field of reality that constitutes itself outside any linguistic articulation and discourse as the pure expression of thought – a dichotomy

which several philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Heidegger tried to break with. For Laclau and Mouffe discourse is human meaning-making process in general. Their definition of discourse includes both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. They give an example from Wittgenstein's notion of language games, which "include within a indissoluble totality both language and the actions interconnected with it." The entire activity of building a brick wall is made up of speech acts and the physical acts. "The linguistic and non-linguistic elements are not merely juxtaposed but constitute a differential and structured system of positions – that is, a discourse" (ibid.: 108) In other words, the whole social space is discursive: it is a vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality. Drawing on Derrida's deconstructionism, Laclau and Mouffe see the social – signification – as an infinite play of differences, in which meaning can never be finally fixed. The being of objects and people can never be encapsulated, once and for all, in a closed system of differences. However, this radical relationalism is different from Lyotard's particularisms in which no political articulation is possible due to the incommensurability of language games. The social fabric is constituted by social actors who occupy differential positions. In this sense they are all particularities, but these particularities – that have no necessary relationships with one another – are pulled together in relatively stable forms, which may last for quite long historical periods. This 'pulling together' around some 'nodal points' is a discursive articulation by the intervention of a discursive exterior. Power is the capacity to form an articulation and 'nodal points' and to make those articulations pervasive, and thus achieve hegemony.

The totality that is achieved by the articulatory practice can never be complete because the social is 'overdetermined'. Overdetermination means that the social constitutes itself as a symbolic order, which implies that the social relations lack an ultimate literality that could reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law. We cannot speak of two planes, one of essences and one of appearances, because it is impossible to fix an ultimate literal sense for which the symbolic would be a second and derived plane of signification. Society and social agents do not have essences; their regularities are a result of the relative and precarious forms of fixation. Take the category of 'woman' for example. There is no prior essence of 'woman', only diverse discursive formations in which social divisions are constituted in the dimension of gender. Relations of equivalence are set up across discursive formations; gender relations and the category of woman in politics are worked by gender relations and the category of woman in the family and in the workplace. As a result, 'woman' emerges as a general category. The concept of overdetermination means these diverse categories are present within the category of woman with potentially contradictory effects within it, making impossible a total closure of the identity of women as a category.

There is a tension here: diverse discursive formations imply a dispersion of subject positions. On the other hand, "overdetermination among diverse sexual differences produces a systematic effect of sexual difference. Every construction of sexual differences, whatever their multiplicity and heterogeneity, invariably constructs the feminine as a pole subordinated to the masculine" (ibid.: 117). So the category of 'woman' is set up as a chain of equivalences in an antagonistic relationship with the category of 'man'. Consequently, woman does not have a referent, which it signifies: rather it signifies the antagonistic relationship – the system itself. Woman in this sense is a 'nodal point' or a 'master signifier' signifying the differential system. It is an 'empty signifier'. The notion of master signifier involves the particular element – the sexual difference – assuming a 'universal' structuring function within a certain discursive field. Similarly, the category of 'black' is such an empty signifier. 'Black' as a particular colour does not only represent the colour black, or even not colour difference per se but a category that is attributed specific characteristics in a subordinated relationship with the White. This is why other ethnic groups in the USA could be characterized as 'blacks' (e.g. the Jewish, the Irish – Rogin 1996,

Noel Ignatiev 1995). The 'immigrant' in Danish discourse is also such a category. Once particularities such as female sex, black colour, and the Muslim have come to connote respectively feminine gender, race, and a cultural category, these imaginary significations produce concrete effects in the diverse social practices.

This position has important implications for conceptualization of democratic struggle and its agents as well as of how to achieve a deliberative democracy. First, the traditional link between consciousness and gender, race or class background is cut off – this is where Laclau and Mouffe parts company with Gramsci whose concept of hegemony constitutes the basis for their theory. Ideology is neither a false consciousness – a notion that was also alive in Gramsci – nor a coherent system of thinking from a particular (subject) position. Since identities are transformed in articulatory processes, the hegemonic transitions are fully dependent on political articulations not on entities outside the political field – such as 'class interests'. After all, politico-hegemonic articulations retroactively create the interests they claim to represent.

The concept of discursive intervention is important in conceptualization of change. How do we identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action against inequalities and in my specific case against ethnic discrimination? For subordination in itself does not signify any antagonistic relationship but merely a set of differential positions between social agents with the following implication that these differential positions (identities) would have a positivity – a fully constituted identities among which relations of equivalence would be impossible to establish – and thus antagonistic relationship would not be possible. "'Serf, 'slave', and so on do not designate in themselves antagonistic positions; it is only in the terms of a different discursive formation, such as 'the rights inherent to every human being', that the differential positivity of these categories can be subverted and the subordination constructed as oppression," and thus also conditions for struggle against oppression. "If, as was the case with women until the seventeenth century, the ensemble of discourses which constructed them as subjects fixed them purely and simply in a subordinated position, feminism as a movement of struggle against women's subordination could not emerge … But in order to be mobilized in this way, the democratic principles of liberty and equality first had to impose itself as the new matrix of social imaginary; or, in our terminology, to constitute a fundamental nodal point in the construction of the political" (ibid.: 154).

The principles of liberty and equality represent a universality but their function of hegemonic universality is not permanent but reversible – hegemony is never a complete state; it needs continuously to be struggled for. This is also one of the basic differences between Laclau and Mouffe's concept of universality and that of Habermas for whom universality has it own content independent of hegemonic articulations. Liberty and equality as organizing principles for democratic discourse are thus vulnerable and can always be transformed through equivalential articulation with other values – which is exactly what we observe in European discourse on immigration and ethnicity: equality is articulated together with other values of similarity, ethnic homogeneity and popular will and so on to create a discriminatory effect.

Also struggles of different groups can be articulated to very different discourses since they are not dependent on the place from where they come. Popular support for Reagan and Thatcher's projects of dismantling the welfare system is the result of such hegemonic articulations. The new right in the USA in 1980s achieved success by capitalizing upon the anger of the lower middle class white Americans whose identities were articulated negatively by the social movements of 1960s and the crises of 1970s. Their anger at social movements and anti-big government sentiments were articulated in an anti-welfare campaign that had an implicit anti-black rhetoric (e.g. law and order). Anti-big government sentiments were articulated against welfare state by

blaming the unemployment among blacks and minorities for parasitism on the 'productive' – White – workers (Omi and Winant 1994. Similarly, Hall et al (1978) argued that in Britain, the radical right in 1970s was able to reintegrate the hegemonic crisis born by the collapse social democratic consensus into a new law and order rhetoric by creating a moral panic against crime that was equated with Blacks. "Thatcherite ideology tapped discontents arising from popular experience in a range of fields extending far beyond what the Left, in general, normally thinks of as 'political', and linked them both to Thatcher's central policy themes and to 'deep', traditional feelings and identities" (Leys p. 125). In both cases, an antagonism was constituted between two poles, the 'people' (articulated around traditional values and freedom of enterprise), and the state/the political elites and all the subversives (blacks, feminists, 'permissives' of every type).

In the British case, the cornerstones of this hegemonic project were already laid down in 1968 by Enoch Powell by his infamous speech 'Rivers of Blood' in which he accused the political elite of being ignorant to the silent majority of British people. While the political target of his speech was the political establishment, it was 'immigration' that was described as the biggest threat against the English culture. His project was to articulate a new definition of Englishness to hold England together. Immigrants signified the antagonistic relations in which Englishness could be constituted as that which it is not (rational because not irrational) (Mercer 1990, Schwarz 1996, Yilmaz 1997b). Although he himself never acquired any direct power, his ideas were adopted by the political establishment, and he also set the agenda for the media (Hall 1990).

The narrative on Enoch Powell's intervention in discourse has remarkable similarities with the xenophobic right wing's seizure of popular discourse in Denmark since mid-eighties. As I wrote in the introduction to this paper, it came as no surprise for those of us who closely followed Danish discourse that 'right wing extremism is accepted into the sphere of respectability through the quiet adoption of their stance by mainstream political parties'.

Also in Denmark, the extreme right intervened in discourse by creating an antagonism between Danishness and immigration in terms of incommensurable cultures. This articulation is signified by the category, 'the immigrant'. In this articulation, Danishness, or Danish culture is connoted with rationality, freedom, individualism, progress and effectivity, capacity to negotiate and reach consensus, nation state, democracy and Christianity, secularism, whereas immigrant culture is the opposite; irrational and prejudiced, emotional, intolerant, criminal, alien, one-sided, ineffective, and backward, culturally and traditionally bound and despotic. Furthermore, this articulation draws on the new hegemonic order of the world: Danishness is equated with the West, while the immigrant stands for Middle East, or more precisely the new 'enemy', that is Islam. However, Islam, which signifies Danishness as a secular and democratic identity, does not itself stand for a particular religion but religion per se: it is a category that signifies the antagonism between religious totality and enlightened individualism. This antagonism is also attached to the rhetoric of 'the people' vs. 'the elite'. The political target for this discourse is the political establishment which, with its rootless internationalism and cosmopolitism, refuses to be a part of the community and thus are accused of being traitors (Dyrberg 2000; Dyrberg unpublished; Yilmaz 2000). The difference between Reagan's and Thatcher's projects and the Danish case is that this antagonism is not articulated around a project of dismantling of the welfare state: on the contrary, the Danish ethnicity is presented as the key to the welfare system on the maintenance of which there is a hegemonic consensus. Rather, the immigrants are blamed for the dismantling of the welfare system with their misuse, and the elite for letting this happen, because they themselves do not feel the effects of immigration and are not interested in Danish culture and values, so the argument goes. The rhetorical target for the hegemonic project has thus been the anxieties of the workers, the unemployed and the elderly Danes who feel that they are left behind in the globalization

process by the network society of elites (Castells 1996), and see immigration as the major threat to the only remaining access they have to welfare – their ethnicity.

Hegemony does not mean that everybody loves or agrees with its propositions. It is merely enough that there is no serious rival way of conceptualizing the social (Leys 1990: 127). A friend of mine who has a daughter in school age asked me about the dilemma she was having: the neighborhood that she lives in is full of immigrants, and the percentage of 'immigrant children' in some of the schools there reaches 80-90 percent. Her dilemma was whether or not she should send her child to a private or a community school, the latter of which would be heavily dominated by 'immigrant children'. The situation is that even the explicitly anti-racist parents take their children out of public schools with the argument that the 'Danish' children do not acquire sufficient skills and knowledge of 'the Danish culture'. It was not that Danish culture mattered much to my friend; but she knew that this imagined Danish culture would be the child's primary key to her future. Ethnicity was an asset in which she felt she had to invest into her daughter's future. This is how hegemony works: it imprisons you intellectually. You may not agree with its propositions, or you may even feel ashamed of thinking this way, but you concede them; or you do not feel you have the power or legitimacy to resist them.

However, hegemony can never be complete. If hegemonic articulations produce antagonistic relations between internal frontiers, the very nature of these relations renders impossible a total closure. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) explain this impossibility through a philosophical discourse of differential and equivalential logics. First the distinction between discourse and discursive field: 'free floating' elements in the general field of discursivity are transformed into 'moments' in an articulatory practice that is, discourse. A moment is the momentary fixity of the meaning of a single element that is articulated in a chain of equivalence. However, the meaning of the element is only fixed momentarily; this fixity is threatened by the overflow of meanings in the field of discursivity where other discursive formations 'fix' the meaning of that element in different ways. It is only by its place in a chain of equivalence that is articulated in an antagonistic relation to another chain of equivalences that the element is transformed into a discursive moment.

Second, if the identity of one of the poles in the antagonistic relationship is produced through equivalence of its differential moments, the identity of that object cannot have any positivity (i.e., the category of woman does not stand for sexual difference). Through equivalence, a positive identity of the object is expressed as that which the object is not. The Danish and the immigrants are not constructed in a system of positive differential positions; their identities are expressed as the negation of the other: the Danish is what the immigrant is not and vice versa. A negative identity cannot be expressed in a direct manner, so it is represented indirectly through an equivalence of its differential elements. However the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence subvert each other. Two terms must be different in order to be equivalent; otherwise there would be a simple identity that consists of only one element. On the other hand, equivalence can only be reached by subverting the differential character of those terms. This is the point where the contingent subverts the necessary by preventing it from fully constituting itself. In their words, "certain discursive forms, through equivalence, annul all positivity of the object and give a real existence to negativity as such" (p. 128). Antagonistic relationship is thus impossible; it cannot be an objective relation of frontiers but as reciprocal subversion of each other.

In a more concrete form, the elements of Danish identity are articulated in a chain of equivalence in an antagonistic relation to the elements of the immigrant identity. I am rational insofar the immigrant is irrational. However, rationality and irrationality cannot exist as independent positivities; only as poles of the same ontological order. Hence, a society cannot be rational without also being irrational; rationality is only achieved through representation of its negativity.

The elements of Danish and immigrant identities cannot be totally external to each other. Therefore, any of these identities can never be full; 'the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself'. Hence the ultimate character of the unfixity of equivalences.

In order for a discursive articulation to become hegemonic, there must be a plurality of meanings. It is only in the field of 'floating discursive elements' that a hegemonic articulation is possible. Hegemony thus presupposes plurality and contingency of meanings, otherwise there would be repetition in every practice, and there would be nothing to hegemonize. This is where Laclau and Mouffe parts with Gramsci: Gramsci recognized the fragmented and disjointed character of popular thought (common sense) which is the terrain the hegemonic struggles contend to master, but saw the contradiction as a flaw and weakness: the working class consciousness had to be brought in line with their 'real' class interests. For Laclau and Mouffe, the openness and incompleteness of the social as a field open to articulatory practices is the precondition for any hegemonic articulation. Second, an articulation also presupposes a hegemonic subject that is partially exterior to what it articulates, but this exteriority cannot be conceived as that existing between two different ontological levels, but only as that corresponding to different discursive formations on the same plan: the general field of discursivity.

In a given social formation, there can be a variety of hegemonic nodal points (139); the constitution of Danish society is not preconditioned upon one single master signifier – the immigrant. But, this is my point, through the hegemonic articulation, one antagonistic relation comes to determine the meaning of the social at a political level.

So, what we have here is a contingent relationship among the moments of an articulation (the contingency of language), the unfixity of identities (the openness of the social), and a hegemonic subject. However, these are merely 'moments' of an abstract theoretical model: Laclau and Mouffe, like most poststructuralist theorists with a more global view, are not really interested in getting their hands 'dirty' by dealing with how language actually works – despite the fact that they theorize heavily about the nature of language, meaning production and the social life. When they are called on to explain, say, the impossibility of closure of meaning, they resort to an abstract reasoning on the nature of signification systems (for example, by using mathematical/rhetorical theory on how zero is both the condition and the impossibility of the mathematical system – Laclau 1998). All of these are analyzable features of the language. Take the notion of dispersion of subject positions for example. A detailed examination of an actual conversation easily reveals how many positions the speaker may take during a short time interval. As in an earlier example (Gotsbachner 2001), the speakers during a very short time not only shift their subject positions but also their descriptions of the object of the discourse (immigrants) correspondingly, when the interactional context changes. Instead of going to abstract notions such as the nature of signification, the notion of subject positions could be grounded in an analysis of actual language use. "One useful way into such analysis … is to look for variability in accounts and formulations – tracking the emergence of different and often contradictory or inconsistent versions of people, their characters, motives, states of mind and events in the world – and asking why this (different) formulation at this point in the strip of talk?" (Wetherell 1998: 395). Such an analytical perspective would not only give a more grounded view on the contingent nature of identity and the openness of the social but also a better insight into how these features arise: not so much due to the nature of signification but the because of the reflexivity built into interaction and the transformative properties of that interaction. "Contingency, precariousness and openness arise in part because utterances are designed to do interactional tasks and do not thereby entail descriptive closures and cognitive consistency" (ibid.: 401) and thus draw on the entire field of discursivity rather than only particular discourses to construct their versions (this is what such an abstract sentence as 'the elements of discourse is overflowed by surplus meaning' means) – a

feature which opens up a possibility for change and an alternative hegemonic intervention. The impossibility of closure is the possibility of change.

If what we see in utterances is fragmentation, variation and inconsistency, how can we then go back to a theorization – grounded in analysis – about hegemonic articulations? Or to ask the question in another way, how can we analytically recognize hegemonic articulations when all what we see is fragmentation and contingency in utterances? I suggest that Toulmin's model of argumentation would be a great analytical tool in this connection. As we have seen, the model is basically about the contingency of the argumentation: that the relationship between different elements of an argument – both at micro- and macro levels – is contingent in nature but linked together through common-places (warrants, premises) that consist of values, principles, and assumptions about how world is put together. And again, the direction of the argument is not necessarily determined by the nature of common-place on which the argument is based – the same premise can be used to justify opposite propositions. However, in a particular discourse (say Danish discourse) at a particular time we can expect a pervasive pattern of argumentation: the different elements of an argument are linked together in certain directions by an articulatory practice. We can expect a tendency to link a common-place such as 'culture is what makes us' in connection with a particular category of immigrants in a pervasive manner. We can also expect a tendency to articulate particular notions together to construct the object of the discourse (or what Laclau and Mouffe call 'nodal point'). These are analyzable indicators of hegemonic articulations. This is a different analytical approach to ideological discourse than one which attempts to identify ideological structures (or rather the linguistic expressions of them) as abstract categories in discourse. The proposed analytical approach is one that focuses on the ideological effects of the ways in which accounts are put together: it is more useful to talk about ideological propositions than ideologies. The argument that immigrants are aggressive by nature is such a proposition. In contrast, as I also pointed out earlier, if 'culture' or 'Danish identity' are recognized and constructed as ideological structures, they would not have the internal coherence that an ideology is expected to have: they would often lead to different and opposite propositions (as in Jenkins' example (1999)). An entity such as Danish Identity cannot be an ideology in terms of a coherent, structuring logic from a particular perspective.

One important implication of this perspective is that hegemony should no longer be understood as an ideological project that binds people's heads together or as an aggregate of opinions and attitudes. Rather, it is a political project that is accomplished through rhetorical strategies and with the help of opinion-making techniques.

The contradictory and fragmented nature of public opinion has long been acknowledged even outside the constructionist approaches and discourse theory. Political scientist Zaller (1992) argues for example that people have different and often contradictory considerations on issues, but in opinion polls they make up their mind in a haphazard manner drawing on the most available information on top of their head. Based on this, Ryfe (1998) contends that 'if individuals tend to hold contradictory beliefs, but aggregates of public hold stable beliefs, this implies that individuals have little understanding of the values and beliefs that motivate aggregate public opinion." It is not that individuals do not have 'understanding of the values and beliefs that motivate public opinion' but rather that public opinion is not something that exists beyond polls and surveys. In other words, public opinion is produced by polls and surveys by the use of certain rhetorical strategies (definition of questions) and by techniques used to eliminate ambiguity in responses. Opinion polls operate within the hegemonic discourses or by responding to the attempts for hegemonic transformations. First of all, opinion sampler will be asking about matters of controversy. Nobody would bother "asking questions about issues on which no member of the public bothers to take a stance ... Our opinion-sampler is not likely to ask modern pedestrians to

locate their belief on a carefully graded scale about the issue of whether rainfall is the sived urine of Zeus" (Billig 1996: 207) as was the issue in ancient times. This is where rhetorics come in: the power to define what the matter of controversy is all about is the power to hegemonize. Power in this sense is not only the capacity to articulate but to lay the foundations that makes difficult other types of articulations. If a poll on Danes' attitudes towards immigrants is framed on the basis of the assumption that culture is the explanatory paradigm for the relationship between Danes and immigrants, then the views that can be expressed about immigrants will have be limited by the parameters of culture paradigm. Thus, although public discourse will continue to be fragmented and contradictory, the aggregate result will confirm to the basic definition of the question. And, once public opinion on an issue is constructed – whether or not it corresponds to any kind of aggregate opinion – it has immediate effects in social practices in terms of policy-making and institutionalization. It becomes a reference point for public discourse and has an important role in discursive transformations.

This is precisely how Enoch Powell suceeded in hegemonizing the British discourse: it was not his specific anti-immigration propositions that gathered support and became pervasive. Rather, it was his rhetoric that the political establishment did not listen to the concerns of the silent majority, which paradoxically – he was himself a part of that political establishment – was voiced through him. Once again: all politico-hegemonic articulations retroactively create the interest they claim to represent. The basic concern of the 'people', he said, was the threat immigration posed for the English people, particularly working class (he came himself form an aristoctaric family). The whole political establishment responded negatively. He was immediately isolated and was eventually sacked from the Conservative Party by the then conservative prime minister Edward Heath.

Of course, Powell did not himself create immigration as a concern: it had probably been a concern alongside many other concerns, or to use Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, an element in the field of discursivity. What Powell did was to push immigration into the center as the new dividing line for society with the then hegemonic center on one side and the 'ordinary' the people who felt excluded from the channels of communication on the other. This articulation of the social and political division around the immigration issue found immediate response among the white English working class, who marched to the parliament in support for 'the only white man in there'.

Thus, the rhetorical force of his claim on representing the concerns of the silent majority was huge. What happens in such a situation was typical: the media responded by painting negative portrayals of him in a sensationalized manner, but they also responded by asking 'the people' – of course white English – about their attitudes towards immigrtion. Once the basic definition of what the major concern for public controversy is, is conceded, the positions that can be taken on the issue have to address themselves to the questions the basic concern arises. Polls and opinion surveys are useful tools to 'measure' the public puls on the matters of controversy, and are frequently used as one of the basic source of media coverage. The massive hostility that the political establishment and the media displayed toward Powell – which he probably had counted on – could only contribute to the claim that the political elite was deaf to the concerns of the silent majority. This was the power of Powell's rhetoric. It did not come as surprise that many of Powell's original propositions were soon adapted by the Conservative prime minister who had immediately sacked him.

This seems to be a classical receipe for hegemonic interventions during the seventies and eighties. Benson reports many of Front Nationale's ideas were also adapted by the political establishment during 80s in France. One of the interesting observations Benson makes is the increasing use of

polls in the media's coverage of immigration; the article that I referred in the introduction to this paper also indicates a similar process for Denmark. Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) analysis of FPÖ's Austria First Petition (1993) and responses to it are also indicative of the same receipe.

It is my hypothesis that the hegemonic intervention in Danish case can be traced to a particular moment in discourse: a priest's campaign against the political elite's immigration policy in 1986. The rhetoric and the way the whole establishment including the media responded to the campaign was very similar to what had happened in England in 1968 and onwards. Also in Danish case, polls were an important element in measuring public responses to Krarup's characteristic intervention in discourse. Opinion surveys are now one of the major sources in the media's coverage of immigration and immigrants. The surveys do not only measure what people actually think about immigration but actively produce the responses they claim to measure by framing the questions in line with the hegemonic articulations. The very opposition – asking Danes about immigrants – in itself reinforces the political division along the lines of immigration. Other questions such as what to do about Muslim graveyards, to what extend to tolerate immigrants' culture and so on do all limit the range of responses that might be produced in surveys within the hegemonic articulations.

The way opinion-samplers and the political establishment respond to hegemonic interventions are also prescriptive for the media's responses. However, there is a need for studying how the organizational structures of the media, journalists' daily routines and professional myths of journalism shape the media's coverage of immigration as a matter of public controversy. It is important to understand racist interventions in discourse, and how the media with their particular routines and professional 'ideologies' become susceptible to this kind of communication. For example, once criminality and immigration become a 'natural' connection or an explanatory framework, journalists feel – even if they actually may resent reproducing prejudices – obliged to deploy this framework in their stories either unreflectedly or because this connection is reprocuded elsewhere that constitute journalists' source of information. So, a rational debate on immigration as a public concern becomes only possible as a dialogue among the limited range of positions that can be taken within the framework of the hegemonic articulation. If the basic principles for the debate are not accepted, communication and thus any debate will be impossible. The role of the media in defining the parameters for a public debate is thus crucial.

The importance of a hegemonic intervention in discourse cannot be overstated. The effectivness of the intervention in public argumentation should not only be judged in terms of winning an argument but more by its sucess in changing the way argumentation is done. This is a much more difficult, time and energy consuming task that may not be accomplished in a short time spand. As Shotter (1993a) reminds us, "the move that begun in the seventeenth century during the Enlightenment – to talk less about our lives in religious and more in secular terms, less in terms of 'souls' and the 'human spirit' and more in terms of 'brains' and 'minds', less in terms of God's will and more in terms of natural mechanisms – was, and still is, just as important for the new ways of talking and the new forms of social relationship (and new forms of contest) it introduced, as for any of the particular conclusions so far reached" (p.18)

This is where hegemonic approach is different from that of Habermassian notion of rational debate because the central role that the notion of antagonism plays in this approach forecloses any possibility of a final reconciliation, or of any kind of rational consensus. At the root of Habermas' vision is a celebration of agreement rather than argument and fraction. Hegemonic approach proposes a new articulation along new frontiers; it suggests a radically democratic articulation of signifiers such as liberty, equality, egalitarianism, anti-racism and so on. It is more about changing the premises for the way argumentation is done than winning an actual argument. And

this approach is inherently democratic in the sense that the precondition for any hegemonic articulation is the plurality of meanings. The hegemonic projects – such as racist ones that construct a homogeneous people as one opposed to an external enemy or the 'power elite' – result in terror and dictatorship, because they aim at dissolving difference in equivalence. Pluralism is the basic concept for Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of hegemony. In this sense, their approach cannot be discarded as yet another postmodernist theory: they retain a belief in Enlightenment ideas' potential for emancipation, indeed, their radical democratic politics is an expansion of modern democratic principles rather than a radical break with them.

Appendix

The transcription symbols used in Edwards' paper are derived from Gail Jefferson's full system.

(.)   Just noticeable pause

(0.3) (2 secs)   Examples of exactly timed pauses

.hh, hh   Speaker's in-breath and out-breath respectively.

wo(h)rd   'Laughter' within words

cu-   A sharp cut-off of a prior word or sound.

lo:ng   Stretching of the preceding sound.

(word)   Transcriber's guess at an unclear part of the tape.

run=   Material that runs on
=on

under   Emphasis in volume

° soft °   Speech noticeably quieter than the surrounding talk.

> fast <   Talk noticeably quicker or slower than the surrounding talk
<slow>

over [lap]   Overlapping talk
     [over]

-word   The onset of a noticeable pitch rise
‾word   The onset of a noticeable pitch descent

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Notes

[1] "Traditional dress" here does not imply the type of folkloric dress that one might see on the tourism posters by the Turkish Ministry of Culture. The dress is traditional in the sense that it is not put together in a "modern, Western" way, in which most Turks in cities would dress.

[2] I must admit that it is difficult to demarcate poststructuralism from postmodernism that are often used synonymously (Burman and Parker 1993: 6), but many proponents of poststructuralist approaches would like to make a distinction. Although both terms designate some degree of constructivism, anti-essentialism, a critique of meta-narratives and underlying codes that determine meaning, poststructuralists would maintain the notion that meaning is – even if temporarily – fixed in discourses, institutional practices and historical formations through regularities. One indication of poststructuralist thinking that distinguish it from postmodernism is the concept of ideology. Poststructuralists sustain a notion of ideology that in some degree influence the way people see and talk about the reality, that is, the struggle over determining meaning is an ideological one.

[3] Morley later criticized his own work and the subsequent developments in Cultural Studies for overestimating the audience's ability to resist the dominant messages (Morley 1992). John Fiske, for example, argued that cultural products are inherently polysemic, and "meanings occur only in the encounter between texts and subjects" (Fiske 1986: 404).

[4] Bakhtin is believed to have published under the names of his friends V.N. Voloshinov (*Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, and *Freudianism*) and P.N. Medvedev (*The Formal Method in Literary Studies*) (Holquist in Bakhtin 1981), and Bakhtin here refers also to these works.

[5] Fairclough and Wodak (1997) include in CDA – beside Fairclough's own approach – French structuralist discourse analysts (Pêcheux 1982: *Language Semantics and Ideology.* London: Macmillan), critical linguists (Fowler et. al. 1979: *Language and Control.* London: Routledge), social semiotics (Hodge and Kress 1988: *Social Semiotics.* Cambridge: Polity Press), Kress and van Leeuwen 1990: *Rading Images.* Geelong: Deakin University Press), socio-cognitive analysis (van Dijk 1984: *Prejudice Discourse.* Amsterdam: Benjamins; van Dijk 1991: *Racism and the Press.* London: Routledge), discourse-historical approach (Wodak et al. 1996: *Disorders of Discourse.* London: Longman), and Duisburg school (Jäger and Jäger 1993: *Aus der mItte der Gesellschaft.* Duisbourg: Diss). However, only three of these approaches (beside Fairclough) define themselves as Critical Discourse analysts: the socio-cognitive, the social semiotic, and the discourse-historical approaches.

[6] The influence of Frankfurt School on Cultural Studies and other critical scholars should be mentioned here, too.

[7] This is a general comment on this type of analysis. Van Dijk combines in fact discourse analysis with content analysis in *Racism and the Press* (1991) thus is able to tell what type of stories dominate in the general picture of media coverage.

[8] As I indicated from the start, I find all practices as discursive practices. So, when I use 'discursive' practice it does not imply a distinction between discursive or non-discursive practices but reiterates my understanding of social practice as a discursive practice.

[9] They borrow the rules from van Eeemeren and Grootendorst (1992): *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective*, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, and (1994): 'Rationale for a pragma-dialectical perspective' in F.H. van Eeemeren and R. Grootendorst (eds) *Studies in Pragma-Dialectics*, Amsterdam: International Center for the Study of Argumentation, pp.11-28.